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Quwwatli ’ s strategy in Palestine was designed from the outset to prevent Abdullah's possible advance north to Damascus.
In the best case, Quwwatli hoped to acquire some of northern Palestine for Syria.
A second reason for Quwwatli's hesitation to commit Syrian military troops was that he had failed in his early efforts to reform the army and questioned the loyalty and effectiveness of its leadership.
Although the head of the military, General Abdullah Atfeh, swore to the Minister of Defense in May 1947, that the Syrian army was " the best of all the Arab armies, the best army in the Middle East ," the brigade commanders scoffed at this ridiculous assessment and cabled the President to warn, that " the army is not worth a red cent.
" Quwwatli was fully aware of the problems in his military.
" The real problem is to reform the Syrian army and to solve the problem of its leadership ," he confided to Taha al-Hashimi in September 1947.

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