Page "Battle of Borodino" Paragraph 40

Only the misplacement of Russian forces by Kutuzov over both Bagration's and Barclay's protest prevented the ruin of the French army that day, both the Prussian Staff Officer Karl von Clausewitz, the historian and future author of On War, and Alexander I of Russia noting that the poor positioning of troops in particular had hobbled the defense.

Barclay communicated with Kutuzov in order to receive further instructions.

According to Ludwig von Wolzogen ( in an account dripping with sarcasm ), the commander was found a half-hour away on the road to Moscow, encamped with an entourage of young nobles and grandly pronouncing he would drive Napoleon off the next day.

Despite his bluster, Kutuzov knew from dispatches that his army had been too badly hurt to fight a continuing action the following day.

He knew exactly what he was doing: by fighting the pitched battle, he could now retreat with the Russian army still intact, lead its recovery, and force the weakened French forces to move even further from their bases of supply.

The dénouement became a textbook example of what a hold logistics placed upon an army far from its center of supply.

On September 8, the Russian army moved away from the battlefield in twin columns to Semolino, allowing Napoleon to occupy Moscow and await for 5 weeks a Russian surrender that would never come.