Page "Battle of Long Tan" Paragraph 92

While the plan as outlined by Hong had many of the components of an annihilation ambush, and the tactic of drawing the enemy out his base areas was a standard communist stratagem, a number of weaknesses were evident including the lack of a means of neutralising the Australian artillery, as well as the absence of indirect fire support weapons for the ambush, and the comparatively small size of the ambushing force.

Equally the plan to establish a second ambush position outside artillery range would have been ineffective as the Australians would have been unlikely to proceed that far unless their guns had followed.

Ultimately Hong believed the ambush failed for a number of reasons, stating that the soldiers at the front of the ambush — those facing 11 Platoon — had fired before the entire Australian force had entered the ambush, while it should have been opened from the rear against 12 Platoon.

Meanwhile, D445 Battalion had more than three hours from the initial contact to close the gap at the rear of the ambush and failed to do so.

Yet a number of issues cast doubt on this version of events.

Firstly, if the Viet Cong force had been in the plantation on 17 and 18 August preparing for the ambush they would likely have been identified by patrols from A or B Company, 6 RAR.

Secondly, the alleged size of the Viet Cong force is questionable.

Indeed a force of just 700 men would have been insufficient to mount such an operation with any certainty of success, while according to communist doctrine it would have required more than a regiment to achieve overwhelming force.

Ultimately the reaction of the Viet Cong indicted that they had not detected D Company's presence in the rubber plantation until the first clash with 11 Platoon.