Page "Battle of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket" Paragraph 3

In the fall of 1943, the German forces of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein ’ s Army Group South including General Otto Wöhler's 8th Army had fallen back to the Panther-Wotan Line, a defensive position that in Ukraine followed the Dnieper river.

By December 1st, 1943 the line had been broken and the Soviet Army had crossed the Dnieper in force.

Only two corps, the XI under Gen. Wilhelm Stemmermann, the XLII Army Corps under Lt. Gen.

Theobald Lieb and the attached Corps Detachment B from the 8th Army were holding a salient in the new Soviet line.

The salient to the west of Cherkassy extended some 100 kilometers to the Dnieper river settlement of Kanev, with the town of Korsun roughly in the center of the salient, with the 1st Ukrainian Front to its left and the 2nd Ukrainian Front to its right.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov realized the potential for destroying Wöhler ’ s 8th Army with the Stalingrad model as precedent and using similar tactics as were applied to defeat Paulus ’ encircled 6th Army.

Zhukov recommended to the Soviet Supreme Command ( Stavka ) to deploy 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts to form two armored rings of encirclement: an inner ring around the pocket followed by destruction of the forces it contained, and an external ring to prevent relief formations from reaching the trapped units.

Despite repeated warnings from Manstein and others, Hitler refused to allow the exposed units to be pulled back to safety.