Page "Catholic Concept of the Divine" Paragraph 19

In the fourth century Aetius and Eunomius maintained that, because the Divine nature is simple, excluding all composition or multiplicity, the various terms and names applied to God are to be considered synonymous.

Otherwise they would erroneously imply composition in God.

This opinion was combated by St. Cyril of Alexandria, St.

Basil, and St. Gregory of Nyssa ( In Eunom., P. G., XLV ).

The principle of attribution received more precise statement at the hands of St. Augustine, in his investigation of the conditions of intellectual knowledge ( De Genesi ad Litteram, IV, 32 ).

In the ninth century, John Scotus Erigena, who was largely influenced by Neo-Platonism, transmitted through the works of the Pseudo-Dionysius, contributed to bring into clearer relief the analogical character of predication ( De Divinâ Naturâ, Lib.

I ).

The Nominalists revived the views of Eunomius, and the opposition of the Realists was carried to the other extreme by Gilbert de la Porrée, who maintained a real, ontological distinction between the Divine Essence and the attributes.

His opinion was condemned by the Council of Reims ( 1148 ).

St. Thomas definitively expressed the doctrine that, after some controversies between Scotists and Thomists upon minor points and subtleties, and with some divergence of opinion upon unimportant details, is now the common teaching of Catholic theologians and philosophers.

It may be summarized as follows: The idea of God is derived from our knowledge of finite beings.

When a term is predicated of the finite and of the Infinite, it is used, not in a univocal, but in analogical sense.

The Divine Perfection, one and invisible, is, in its infinity, the transcendental analogue of all actual and possible finite perfections.

By means of an accumulation of analogous predicates methodically co-ordinated, we endeavour to form an approximate conception of the Deity who, because He is Infinite, cannot be comprehended by finite intelligence.

Modern philosophy presents a remarkable gradation, from Pantheism, which finds God in everything, to Agnosticism, which declares that He is beyond the reach of knowledge.

Spinoza conceives God as " a substance consisting of infinite attributes each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence ".

The two attributes manifested to us are thought and extension.

At the other extreme we find Agnostics of the school of Herbert Spencer ( see agnosticism ) and some followers of Hegel, who hold that the nature of God, or, to use their favourite term, " the Absolute " is utterly unknowable, and its existence not determined to any mode ; therefore, to predicate of it various attributes, expressive of determinations, is idle and misleading.

Between the finite and the Infinite there is no common ground of predication.

Hence, words that signify finite perfections can have no real meaning when predicated of God.

They become mere empty symbols.

All theological attempts to elaborate an idea of God are vain, and result in complete absurdity when they conceive God after man's image and likeness ( see anthropomorphism ), and circumscribe the Infinite in terms borrowed from human psychology.

Criticism of this kind indicates that its authors have never taken the trouble to understand the nature of analogical predication, or to consider fairly the rigorous logical process of refining to which terms are subjected before being predicated of God.

It often happens too, that writers, after indulging liberally in eloquent denunciation of theological anthropomorphism proceed, on the next page, to apply to the Infinite, presumably in a strictly univocal sense, terms such as " energy ", " force ", and " law ", which are no less anthropomorphic, in an ultimate analysis, than " will " and " intelligence ".

The position of the Catholic Church declared in the Fourth Lateran Council ( 1215 ), is again clearly stated in the following pronouncement of the Vatican Council: