Page "Civil war" Paragraph 65

In sharp contrast, decolonization was an entirely different process of state formation.

Most imperial powers had not foreseen a need to prepare their colonies for independence ; for example, Britain had given limited self-rule to India and Sri Lanka, while treating British Somaliland as little more than a trading post, while all major decisions for French colonies were made in Paris and Belgium prohibited any self-government up until it suddenly granted independence to its colonies in 1960.

Like Western states of previous centuries, the new ex-colonies lacked autonomous bureaucracies, which would make decisions based on the benefit to society as a whole, rather than respond to corruption and nepotism to favor a particular interest group.

In such a situation, factions manipulate the state to benefit themselves or, alternatively, state leaders use the bureaucracy to further their own self-interest.

The lack of credible governance was compounded by the fact that most colonies were economic loss-makers at independence, lacking both a productive economic base and a taxation system to effectively extract resources from economic activity.

Among the rare states profitable at decolonization was India, to which scholars credibly argue that Uganda, Malaysia and Angola may be included.

Neither did imperial powers make territorial integration a priority, and may have discouraged nascent nationalism as a danger to their rule.

Many newly independent states thus found themselves impoverished, with minimal administrative capacity in a fragmented society, while faced with the expectation of immediately meeting the demands of a modern state.

Such states are considered " weak " or " fragile ".

The " strong "-" weak " categorization is not the same as " Western "-" non-Western ", as some Latin American states like Argentina and Brazil and Middle Eastern states like Egypt and Israel are considered to have " strong " administrative structures and economic infrastructure.