Page "Consciousness Explained" Paragraph 7

However, John Searle argues that Dennett, who insists that discussing subjectivity is nonsense because it is unscientific and science presupposes objectivity, is making a category error.

Searle argues that the goal of science is to establish and validate statements which are epistemically objective, ( i. e., whose truth can be discovered and evaluated by any interested party ), but are not necessarily ontologically objective.

Searle calls any value judgment epistemically subjective.

Thus, " McKinley is prettier than Everest " is epistemically subjective, whereas " McKinley is higher than Everest " is epistemically objective.

In other words, the latter statement is evaluable ( in fact, falsifiable ) by an understood (' background ') criterion for mountain height, like ' the summit is so many meters above sea level '.

No such criteria exist for prettiness.

Searle says that in Dennett's view, there is no consciousness in addition to the computational features, because that is all that consciousness amounts to for him: mere effects of a von Neumann ( esque ) virtual machine implemented in a parallel architecture and therefore implies that conscious states are illusory, but Searle points out: " where consciousness is concerned, the existence of the appearance is the reality.