Page "Consciousness" Paragraph 55

Regarding the primary function of conscious processing, a recurring idea in recent theories is that phenomenal states somehow integrate neural activities and information-processing that would otherwise be independent.

This has been called the integration consensus.

Another example has been proposed by Gerald Edelman called dynamic core hypothesis which puts emphasis on reentrant connections that reciprocally link areas of the brain in a massively parallel manner.

These theories of integrative function present solutions to two classic problems associated with consciousness: differentiation and unity.

They show how our conscious experience can discriminate between infinitely different possible scenes and details ( differentiation ) because it integrates those details from our sensory systems, while the integrative nature of consciousness in this view easily explains how our experience can seem unified as one whole despite all of these individual parts.

However, it remains unspecified which kinds of information are integrated in a conscious manner and which kinds can be integrated without consciousness.

Nor is it explained what specific causal role conscious integration plays, nor why the same functionality cannot be achieved without consciousness.

Obviously not all kinds of information are capable of being disseminated consciously ( e. g., neural activity related to vegetative functions, reflexes, unconscious motor programs, low-level perceptual analyses, etc.

) and many kinds of information can be disseminated and combined with other kinds without consciousness, as in intersensory interactions such as the ventriloquism effect.

Hence it remains unclear why any of it is conscious.

For a review of the differences between conscious and unconscious integrations, see