Page "Cuban missile crisis" Paragraph 20

The Soviet leadership believed, based on their perception of Kennedy's lack of confidence during the Bay of Pigs Invasion, that he would avoid confrontation and accept the missiles as a fait accompli.

On September 11, the Soviet Union publicly warned that a US attack on Cuba or on Soviet ships carrying supplies to the island would mean war.

The Soviets continued their Maskirovka program to conceal their actions in Cuba.

They repeatedly denied that the weapons being brought into Cuba were offensive in nature.

On September 7, Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin assured United States Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson that the USSR was supplying only defensive weapons to Cuba.

On September 11, the Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza ( Soviet News Agency TASS ) announced that the Soviet Union had no need or intention to introduce offensive nuclear missiles into Cuba.

On October 13, Dobrynin was questioned by former Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles about whether the Soviets plan to put offensive weapons in Cuba.

He denied any such plans.

And again on October 17, Soviet embassy official Georgy Bolshakov brought President Kennedy a " personal message " from Khrushchev reassuring him that " under no circumstances would surface-to-surface missiles be sent to Cuba.