Page "Cumulative voting" Paragraph 19

Cumulative voting satisfies the monotonicity criterion, the participation criterion, the consistency criterion, and reversal symmetry.

Cumulative voting does not satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives, later-no-harm criterion nor the Condorcet criterion.

It does not satisfy the plurality criterion.

The 11th edition of Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised states, " If it is desired to elect by mail, by plurality vote, by preferential voting, or by cumulative voting, this must be expressly stated, and necessary details of the procedure should be prescribed ( see 45 ).

" ( Emphasis added ).

Robert's Rules describes the cumulative voting process.

It provides that, " A minority group, by coordinating its effort in voting for only one candidate who is a member of the group, may be able to secure the election of that candidate as a minority member of the board.

" ( Emphasis added ).

Thus, cumulative voting, when permitted, is a right to accumulate or stack votes but not a guarantee that this stacking will meet or override other election criteria such as a majority vote or majority present.