Page "Dormant Commerce Clause" Paragraph 45

In Exxon, the Court stressed that the Commerce Clause protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or burdensome regulations.

A nondiscriminatory regulation serving substantial state purpose is not invalid simply because it causes some business to shift from a predominantly out-of-state industry to a predominantly in-state industry.

Only if the burden on interstate commerce clearly outweighs the State ’ s legitimate purpose does such a regulation violate the commerce clause.

When a state statute regarding safety matters applies equally to interstate and intrastate commerce, the courts are generally reluctant to invalidate it even if it may have some impact on interstate commerce.

In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines 359 U. S. 520, 524 ( 1959 ), the United States Supreme Court stated: ' These safety measures carry a strong presumption of validity when challenged in court.

If there are alternative ways of solving a problem, we do not sit to determine which of them is best suited to achieve a valid state objective.

Policy decisions are for the state legislature, absent federal entry into the field.

Unless we can conclude on the whole record that " the total effect of the law as a safety measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or problematical as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it " we must uphold the statute.