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Raeder's strategy was much as political as naval.
Having spent the last six years championing to Hitler sea power as the only way in which Germany could become a world power, Raeder was anxious that the Kriegsmarine be seen as doing more than its share of the fighting to ensure that Hitler would reward the Navy by not cutting its budget after the war.
Raeder was obsessed with the fear that " the war would end before the heavy units had been engaged " and that the sailors would " fail " in their duty to the fatherland " due to inactivity ", the last a veiled reference to the mutiny of 1918.
In a message sent to all officers in early 1940, Raeder exclaimed: " The great aim of the Führer has set forth for the German nation requires the utmost exertion in all places ... A navy which undertakes daring actions against the enemy and suffers losses through this will be reborn on an even larger scale.
If it has not fought this action, then its existence will be threatened after the war ".
Reflecting this assessment, Raeder was furious with the outcome of the Battle of the River Plate.
The captain of the Admiral Graf von Spee, Hans Langsdorff, believing that his damaged ship was faced with a superior British force, chose to scuttle his ship to spare the lives of his men.
Both Hitler and Raeder believed that Langsdorff should have fought the British and gone down fighting, even if it meant the deaths of most or all of the crew of Admiral Graf von Spee.
Raeder, knowing that Hitler was very displeased with the Navy as a result of the River Plate, issued orders that henceforth naval commanders were not to concern themselves with the lives of their crews, and were to go down fighting.
Raeder's order that intended to avoid a repeat of the scuttling of the Admiral Graf von Spee read: " The German warship and her crew are to fight with their strength to the last shell, until they win or they go down with their flag flying.
Once engaged, the battle is to be fought to the finish.

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