Page "Erich Raeder" Paragraph 45

Instead of the " Mediterranean strategy ", the German war machine was diverted to Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, which he vigorously opposed.

Raeder thought Hitler was so fixated on wiping out the Soviet regime that he did not realise that a larger, global strategy could easily have tipped the balance in Germany's favour.

Hitler, in ordering Barbarossa, was not rejecting Raeder's " Mediterranean strategy ", and was instead just postponing it.

Hitler expected, and was told by all of his generals, that the Red Army was hopelessly inferior to the Wehrmacht, and that it would take the German Army at most six months, and more probably two to three months to destroy the Soviet Union.

Once Barbarossa was completed with the destruction of the Soviet Union later in 1941, Raeder's " Mediterranean plan " would be executed in 1942 while German industry would focus on building the fleet envisioned in the Z Plan, that would, when complete, carry out Raeder's programme of trans-oceanic expansionism.

Hitler was so confident of the success of Barbarossa that on 20 June 1941, two days before Barbarossa was to begin, he ordered that from 1 January 1942 the army was to go from first to third in regards to spending and allocation of raw materials to build up the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe.

The American historian Keith Bird summed up the strategic differences between Hitler and Raeder: " Raeder's continual pressure for an intensified war with Britain and his willingness to risk war with the United States, however, conflicted with Hitler's short-term continental goals.

Raeder persistently tried to influence Hitler's every decision in favour of preparing the foundations for the next step of the Navy's ambitions.

Above all, he wanted to ensure that the Navy would have a pre-eminent role in Hitler's Weltreich and armament priorities far beyond what it could hope to achieve in this war " Hitler saw the conquest of the Soviet Union, which was intended to give Germany lebensraum and with it control of enough of Eurasia, to provide sufficient Autarky to challenge the sea powers and carry out Raeder's plans for trans-oceanic expansionism.

Raeder by contrast preferred to focus on defeating Britain before turning east.

Though Raeder often disagreed with Hitler on strategy, he was the beneficiary of huge bribes.

In April 1941, Raeder accepted a 250, 000-Reichsmark bribe from Hitler as a reward for loyalty to the Nazi regime.

In general, officers who were in some way critical of Hitler's military, if not necessarily political leadership, such as Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt and Admiral Raeder, received ( and accepted ) larger bribes than officers who were well known to be convinced National Socialists, such as General Walter Model, Admiral Karl Dönitz and Field Marshal Ferdinand Schörner.

The success of Hitler's bribery system backfired in that some officers, who had proven themselves especially greedy, such as Guderian and Raeder, came to be regarded by Hitler as a serious annoyance because of their endless demands for more money and more free land for their estates.

Raeder's demand in 1942 that on top of his lifetime exemption from paying income taxes Hitler also cancel out taxes on the interest he earned from his 4, 000-Reichsmarks-a-month payment from Konto 5 was viewed as outrageous greed.