Page "George Meade" Paragraph 22

Additional differences caused further friction between Grant and Meade.

Waging a war of attrition in his Overland Campaign against Robert E. Lee, Grant was willing to suffer previously unacceptable losses with the knowledge that the Union Army had replacement soldiers available, whereas the Confederates did not.

Meade, despite his aggressive performance in lesser commands in 1862, had become a more cautious general and more concerned about the futility of attacking entrenched positions.

Most of the bloody repulses his army suffered in the Overland Campaign were ordered by Grant, although the aggressive maneuvering that eventually cornered Lee in the trenches around Petersburg were Grant's initiative as well.

Meade was additionally frustrated by the manner in which Grant sometimes gave preferable treatment to subordinates that he brought with him from the Western Theater.

A primary example of this was Grant's interference with Meade's direction of Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan's Cavalry Corps.

Meade had insisted that Sheridan's troopers perform traditional cavalry functions of reconnaissance, screening, and guarding the Army's trains, but Sheridan objected and told Meade that he could " whip Stuart " if Meade let him.

Meade reported the conversation to Grant, who replied, " Well, he generally knows what he is talking about.

Let him start right out and do it.

" Meade deferred to Grant's judgment and issued orders to Sheridan to " proceed against the enemy's cavalry " and from May 9 through May 24, sent him on a raid toward Richmond, directly challenging the Confederate cavalry.