Page "Hossbach Memorandum" Paragraph 18

After the conference, three of the attendees, Blomberg, Fritsch and Neurath, all argued that the foreign policy Hitler had outlined was too risky — Germany needed more time to re-arm.

Additionally, they stated that the " contingencies " Hitler described as the prerequisite for war were too unlikely to occur: such as the apparent certainty expressed in the document, of the Spanish Civil War leading to a Franco-Italian war in the Mediterranean or that France was on the verge of civil war.

Moreover, it was argued any German aggression in Eastern Europe was bound to trigger a war with France because of the French alliance system in Eastern Europe, the so-called Cordon sanitaire, and if a Franco-German war broke out, then Britain was almost certain to intervene rather than risk the prospect of France ’ s defeat.

Thus, any German attack on the states of Eastern Europe, like Czechoslovakia, was likely to embroil Germany in war not only with the Czechoslovaks, but also with the British and the French before Germany was fully re-armed and ready for war with the other " Great Powers ".

As such, Fritsch, Blomberg and Neurath advised Hitler to wait until Germany had more time to re-arm before pursuing a high-risk strategy of pursuing localized wars that was likely to trigger a general war before Germany was ready for such a war ( none of those present at the conference had any moral objections to Hitler ’ s strategy, with which they were in basic agreement ; only the question of timing divided them ) By February 1938, Neurath, Fritsch and Blomberg had been removed from their positions.

Some historians, such as Sir John Wheeler-Bennett and William L. Shirer, believed that Blomberg, Fritsch and Neurath were removed because of their opposition to the plans expressed in the Hossbach memorandum.