Page "Illocutionary act" Paragraph 1

The notion of an illocutionary act is closely connected with Austin's doctrine of the so-called ' performative ' and ' constative utterances ': an utterance is " performative " just in case it is issued in the course of the " doing of an action " ( 1975, 5 ), by which, again, Austin means the performance of an illocutionary act ( Austin 1975, 6 n2, 133 ).

According to Austin's original exposition in How to Do Things With Words, an illocutionary act is an act ( 1 ) for the performance of which I must make it clear to some other person that the act is performed ( Austin speaks of the ' securing of uptake '), and ( 2 ) the performance of which involves the production of what Austin calls ' conventional consequences ' as, e. g., rights, commitments, or obligations ( Austin 1975, 116f., 121, 139 ).

Thus, for example, in order to make a promise I must make clear to my audience that the act I am performing is the making of a promise, and in the performance of the act I will be undertaking an obligation to do the promised thing: so promising is an illocutionary act in the present sense.

Since Austin's death, the term has been defined differently by various authors.