Page "Internalism and externalism" Paragraph 6

Consider the following situation.

Suppose that it's against the moral law to steal from the poor, and Sasha knows this.

However, Sasha doesn't desire to follow the moral law, and there is currently a poor person next to him.

Is it intelligible to say that Sasha has a reason to follow the moral law right now ( to not steal from the poor person next to him ), even though he doesn't care to do so?

The reasons externalist answers in the affirmative (" Yes, Sasha has a reason not to steal from that poor person.

"), since he believes that one can have reasons for action even if one does not have the relevant desire.

Conversely, the reasons internalist answers the question in the negative (" No, Sasha does not have a reason not to steal from that poor person, though others might .").

The reasons internalist claims that external reasons are unintelligible ; one has a reason for action only if one has the relevant desire ( that is, only internal reasons can be reasons for action ).

The reasons internalist claims the following: the moral facts are a reason for Sasha's action not to steal from the poor person next to him only if he currently wants to follow the moral law ( or if not stealing from the poor person is a way to satisfy his other current goals — that is, part of what Williams calls his " subjective motivational set ").

In short, the reasoning behind reasons internalism, according to Williams, is that reasons for action must be able to explain one's action ; and only internal reasons can do this.