Page "James F. Byrnes" Paragraph 21

Although Byrnes's tough position against the Soviets paralleled the feelings of the President, personal relations between the two men grew strained, particularly when Truman felt that Byrnes was attempting to set foreign policy by himself, and only informing the President afterward.

An early instance of this friction was the Moscow Conference in December 1945.

Truman considered the “ successes ” of the conference to be “ unreal ” and was highly critical of Byrnes ’ s failure to protect Iran, which was not mentioned in the final communiqué.

“ I had been left in the dark about the Moscow conference ,” Truman told Byrnes bluntly.

In a subsequent letter to Byrnes, Truman took a harder line in reference to Iran, saying in part, " Without these supplies furnished by the United States, Russia would have been ignominiously defeated.

Yet now Russia stirs up rebellion and keeps troops on the soil of her friend and ally — Iran … Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making.

Only one language do they understand —“ how many divisions do you have ?” I do not think we should play compromise any longer … I am tired of babying the Soviets ".

This led to the Iran crisis of 1946, and Byrnes took an increasingly hardline position in opposition to Stalin, culminating in the speech held in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946.

" Restatement of Policy on Germany ", also known as the " Speech of hope " it set the tone of future U. S. policy as it repudiated the Morgenthau Plan economic policies and gave the Germans hope for the future.

Byrnes was named TIME Man of the Year.

Truman and others believed that Byrnes had grown resentful that he had not been Roosevelt's running mate and successor, and in his resentment he was disrespecting Truman.

Whether this was true or not, Byrnes felt compelled to resign from the Cabinet in 1947 with some feelings of bitterness.