Page "Joachim von Ribbentrop" Paragraph 62

The German occupation of the Czech area of Czecho-Slovakia on the Ides of March, in total contravention of the Munich Agreement that had been signed less than six months before, infuriated British and French public opinion and lost Germany all sympathy.

Such was the state of public fury that it appeared possible for several days afterwards that the Chamberlain government might fall due to a backbencher rebellion.

Even Ribbentrop ’ s standard line that Germany was only reacting to an unjust Versailles treaty, and really only wanted peace with everyone, which had worked so well in the past, failed to carry weight.

Reflecting the changed mood, the Conservative M. P Alfred Duff Cooper wrote in a letter to The Times :“ Some of us are getting rather tired of the sanctimonious attitude which seeks to take upon our shoulders the blame for every crime committed in Europe.

If Germany had been left stronger in 1919 she would sooner have been in a position to do what she is doing today ”.

Moreover, the British government had genuinely believed in the German claim that it was only the Sudetenland that concerned them, and that Germany was not seeking to dominate Europe.

By occupying the Czech part of Czecho-Slovakia, Germany lost all credibility with its claim to be only righting the alleged wrongs of Versailles.

Shortly afterwards, false reports spread in mid-March 1939 by the Romanian minister in London, Virgil Tilea, that his country was on the verge of an immediate German attack, led to a dramatic U-turn in British policy of resisting commitments in Eastern Europe.

Ribbentrop denied correctly that Germany was going to invade Romania, but since his denials were issued in almost identical language to the denials that he had issued in early March, when he denied that anything was being planned against the Czechs, this increased rather than diminished the “ Romanian war scare ” of March 1939.

From the British point of view, it was regarded as highly desirable to keep Romania and its oil out of German hands ; since Germany had hardly any natural supplies of oil, the ability of the Royal Navy to successfully impose a blockade represented a British trump card both to deter war, and if necessary, win a war.

If Germany were to occupy oil-rich Romania, this would undercut all of the British strategic assumptions based on Germany's need to import oil from the Americas.

Since Poland was regarded as the East European state with the most powerful army, it became imperative to tie Poland to Britain as the best way of ensuring Polish support for Romania, since it was the obvious quid pro quo that Britain would have to do something for Polish security if the Poles were to be induced to do something for Romanian security.

On 31 March 1939, the British Prime Minister Chamberlain announced before the House of Commons the British “ guarantee ” of Poland, which committed Britain to go to war to defend Polish independence, though pointedly the “ guarantee ” excluded Polish frontiers.

As a result of the " guarantee " of Poland, Hitler began to speak with increasing frequency of a British " encirclement " policy, and used the “ encirclement ” policy as the excuse for denouncing in a speech before the Reichstag on 28 April 1939 the A. G. N. A and the Non-Aggression Pact with Poland.