Page "Meta-ethics" Paragraph 30

** Moral relativism maintains that all moral judgments have their origins either in societal or in individual standards, and that no single objective standard exists by which one can assess the truth of a moral proposition.

Meta-ethical relativists, in general, believe that the descriptive properties of terms such as " good ", " bad ", " right ", and " wrong " do not stand subject to universal truth conditions, but only to societal convention and personal preference.

Given the same set of verifiable facts, some societies or individuals will have a fundamental disagreement about what one ought to do based on societal or individual norms, and one cannot adjudicate these using some independent standard of evaluation.

The latter standard will always be societal or personal and not universal, unlike, for example, the scientific standards for assessing temperature or for determining mathematical truths.

Some philosophers maintain that moral relativism entails non-cognitivism.

Most relativist theories are forms of moral subjectivism, though not all subjectivist theories are relativistic.