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Several figures of the intelligentsia took Najibullah's offer seriously, even if they sympathised or were against the regime.
There hopes were dampened when the Najibullah government introduced the state of emergency on 18 February 1989, four days after the Soviet withdrawal.
1, 700 intellectuals were arrested in February alone, and until November 1991 the government still supervised and restricted freedom of speech.
Another problem was that party members took his policy seriously too, Najibullah recanted that most party members felt " panic and pessimism.
" At the Second Conference of the party, the majority of members, maybe up to 60 percent, were radical socialists.
According to Soviet advisors ( in 1987 ), a bitter debate within the party had broken out between those who advocated the islamisation of the party and those who wanted to defend the gains of the Saur Revolution.
Opposition to his policy of National Reconciliation was met party-wide, but especially from Karmalists.
Many people did not support the handing out of the already small state resources the Afghan state had at its disposal.
On the other side, several members were proclaiming anti-Soviet slogans as they accused the National Reconciliation programme to be supported and developed by the Soviet Union.
Najibullah reassured the inter-party opposition that he would not give up the gains of the Saur Revolution, but to the contrary, preserve them, not give up the PDPA's monopoly on power, or to collaborate with reactionary Mullahs.

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