Page "On War" Paragraph 30

The " dualism " of Clausewitz's view of war ( i. e., that wars can vary a great deal between the two " poles " he proposed, based on the political objectives of the opposing sides and the context ) seems simple enough, but few commentators have proven willing to accept this crucial variability — they insist that Clausewitz " really " argued for one end of the scale or the other.

On War has been seen by some prominent critics as an argument for " total war ".

It has been blamed for the level of destruction involved in the First and Second World Wars, but it seems rather that Clausewitz ( who did not actually use the term " total war ") had merely foreseen the inevitable development that started with the huge, patriotically motivated armies of the Napoleonic wars.

These wars resulted ( though war's evolution has not yet ended ) in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with all the forces and capabilities of the state devoted to destroying forces and capabilities of the enemy state ( thus " total war ").

Conversely, Clausewitz has also been seen as " The preeminent military and political strategist of limited war in modern times.

" ( Robert Osgood, 1979 )