Page "Philosophical progress" Paragraph 23

Nor do these alternatives exhaust the possibilities: one might agree with the optimists that philosophical inquiry has value, but agree with the pessimists that philosophical inquiry must justify itself in terms of scientific-technical progress to have any value.

This may seem to conflict with the shared premise between progress-pessimists that there is no progress in philosophy, but the trick here is to argue that philosophical progress is not the only sort of progress to which philosophical inquiry might contribute.

Philosophy is seen as being justified by progress — but not by progress in philosophy, but rather in providing useful tools for making progress in other fields.

Since this view values philosophy as a means to an end rather than as an end in itself, we might call it " instrumental optimism " about philosophy, as opposed to the " intrinsic optimism " already discussed.

On this view, philosophy is seen neither as a sort of pseudoscience, nor as something radically distinct from the sciences, but rather as a sort of incubator for new sciences — protosciences.

While the intrinsic optimists draw on Plato and Aristotle's writings on the value of philosophical inquiry, the instrumental optimists can draw on another aspect of the Ancients ' work: specifically, Aristotle was concerned both about " physics " ( and biology ) and " metaphysics ".

He didn't really make any distinction between these two fields.

Actually, the name " meta-physics " was given by later scholars who meant by this word: what is " beyond " or " after " the study of " nature " ( phusis-physics ).

Thus, " philosophy " (" love of wisdom " in Greek ) at that time included both " physics " and " metaphysics ".

Instrumental optimists thus argue this non-distinction between physics and metaphysics, and point out the historical role that the Ancients ' philosophical works played in the development of the natural sciences, and then later the social sciences.

From this history, instrumental optimists might urge that speculative philosophy can have value as a place for proposing new sciences and new research programmes within the sciences, as well as a critical location for exposing and clearing away confusions that obstruct progress in the natural sciences.

Philosophy, then, is seen as a sort of midwife: she does not give birth to any progress of her own, but proves her worth by making it possible for others to bring their progress into the world.

Thus, whereas the value of mechanics or biology or psychology is taken to be internal to the practice ( i. e., judged in terms of the progress of mechanical, biological, or psychological achievements ), the value of philosophy is taken to be external ( i. e., judged in terms of its effects on achievements in other fields, such as mechanics, biology, and psychology ).

This view is congenial to the conception of philosophy, most famously propounded by John Locke, as a sort of intellectual " underlabourer " to the sciences.

It is also a view endorsed in various articles by Hilary Putnam, and may be the most popular view amongst contemporary Analytic philosophers -- especially those with a naturalistic bent.