Page "religion" Paragraph 202

Naturally, where one or the other of the effects of an action is uncertain, this has to be taken into account.

Especially is this true when, because the good effect is remote and speculative while the evil is certain and grave, the action is prohibited.

Presumably, if the reverse is the case and the good effect is more certain than the evil result that may be forthcoming, not only must the good and the evil be prudentially weighed and found proportionate, but also calculation of the probabilities and of the degree of certainty or uncertainty in the good or evil effect must be taken into account.

There must not only be greater good than evil objectively in view, but also greater probability of actually doing more good than harm.

If an evil which is certain and extensive and immediate may rarely be compensated for by a problematic, speculative, future good, by the same token not every present, certain, and immediate good ( or lesser evil ) that may have to be done will be outweighed by a problematic, speculative, and future evil.

Nevertheless, according to the traditional theory, a man begins in the midst of action and he analyzes its nature and immediate consequences before or while putting it forth and causing these consequences.

He does not expect to be able to trammel up all the future consequences of his action.

Above all, he does not debate mere contingencies, and therefore, if these are possibly dreadful, find himself forced into inaction.

He does what he can and may and must, without regarding himself as lord of the future or, on the other hand, as covered with guilt by accident or unforeseen consequences or by results he did not `` permit '' in the sense explained.

By contrast, a good deal of nuclear pacifism begins with the contingencies and the probabilities, and not with the moral nature of the action to be done ; ;

and by deriving legitimate decision backward from whatever may conceivably or possibly or probably result, whether by anyone's doing or by accident, it finds itself driven to inaction, to non-political action in politics and non-military action in military affairs, and to the not very surprising discovery that there are now no distinctions on which the defense of justice can possibly be based.