(' There is nothing about the matter in my file of correspondence with Guderian himself except ... that I thanked him ... for what he said in that additional paragraph '.

Guderian insisted in 1933 to the high command that every tank in the German armoured force must be equipped with radio.

Guderian claimed there was opposition from many officers who gave primacy to the infantry or simply doubted the usefulness of the tank.

Another theorist, Ernst Volckheim, was also used by Guderian, and wrote a huge amount on tank and combined arms tactics, and is not acknowledged by Guderian.

Guderian argued that the tank was the decisive weapon of war.

Although some proponents of mobile warfare — such as J. F. C. Fuller — advocated building " tank fleets ", others — such as Heinz Guderian in Germany, Adna R. Chaffee Jr. in the United States, and Mikhail Tukhachevsky in the Soviet Union — recognized that tank units required close support from infantry and other arms, and that these supporting arms needed to maintain the same pace as the tanks.

In late 1944 General Heinz Guderian ordered that production of the Type 38 ( t ) Hetzer tank be modified to incorporate a Tatra Type 928 V-8 air-cooled diesel engine, though this order was delayed so production could continue uninterrupted.

Guderian insisted in 1933, within the high command, that every tank in the German armoured force must be equipped with radio and visual equipment in order to enable the tank commander to communicate and perform a decisive role in blitzkrieg.

According to Guderian, Hitler was easily persuaded to field too many new tank designs, and this resulted in supply, logistical, and repair problems for German forces in Russia.

* Guderian describes what he would do if he were in charge of German tank forces.

* Guderian describes what he did when he was in charge of German tank forces.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s German tank theory was pioneered by two figures: General Oswald Lutz and his chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Heinz Guderian.

The infantry tank, according to Guderian, was to be heavily armored to defend against enemy anti-tank guns and artillery.

Simplifying his earlier proposal, Guderian suggested the design of a main combat vehicle which would be developed into the Panzer III, and a breakthrough tank, the Panzer IV.

On January 11, 1934, following specifications laid down by Heinz Guderian, the Army Weapons Department drew up plans for a medium tank with a maximum weight of and a top speed of.

The production Panther was a direct response to the Soviet T-34, after encountering difficulties fighting the Soviet T-34, Field marshal Heinz Guderian suggested simply copying the T-34 ; although the report of the enquiry recommended that the main attributes of the T-34-armament, sloped armor and suspension-be incorporated into a new German Medium weight tank.

As one of the casemate-style turretless Jagdpanzer ( tank destroyer, literally " hunting tank ") designs, it was developed against the wishes of Heinz Guderian, the inspector general of the Panzertruppen, as a replacement for the Sturmgeschütz III ( StuG III ).

Guderian objected against the needless, in his eyes, diversion of resources from Panzer IV tank production, as the Stug III and Sturmgeschütz IV were still more than adequate for their role.

The integration of the main battle tank, with close air support, rapid movement of troops, and concentrated forces, were described as blitzkrieg, " Lightning War ' by Heinz Guderian, who then deployed these tactics during Second World War.

In Germany, the ideas of Guderian established the need for unified tank formations, but with a mixture of armaments for differing roles.

Guderian had planned for two main tanks, the Panzer III was in production but the second support tank with a 75 mm gun was not.

Heinz Guderian was probably the first to fully develop and advocate the principles associated with blitzkrieg.

The armoured and motorized units under Guderian and Rommel initially advanced far beyond the following divisions, and indeed far in excess of that with which German high command was initially comfortable.

Among them, Guderian claimed, was Chief of the General Staff Ludwig Beck ( 1935 – 38 ), who he alleged was skeptical that armored forces could be decisive.

Guderian expressed a hearty contempt for General Ludwig Beck, chief of the General Staff from 1935 to 1938, whom he characterized as hostile to ideas of modern mechanised warfare: quoting Guderian " He was a paralyzing element wherever he appeared .... ignificantly of his way of thought was his much-boosted method of fighting which he called delaying defense ".

After an intense argument with General Heinz Guderian, who insisted on a change of command of the Army Group Vistula, Hitler assigned General Walther Wenck to Himmler's headquarters to take over command of a limited counter-offensive ; Hitler then observed that it was not possible for him to move the troops needed for Guderian's planned double pincer attack from neighbouring regions.

" Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, chief of staff of the German Army, stated that Patton " was the American Guderian.

The innovative German Major ( later General ) Heinz Guderian developed the motorised part of this strategy as the head of one of the Truppenamt groups and may have incorporated Fuller's and Liddell Hart's ideas to amplify the groundbreaking Blitzkrieg effect that was seen used by Germany against Poland in 1939 and later against France in 1940.

This was however prevented by personal intervention of Gen. Guderian, who in his memoirs stated that he encountered his staff " wearing helmets, preparing an anti-tank gun for a possible Polish cavalry attack ," and that " the panic of the first day of war was overcome quickly ".

General Ewald von Kleist was now to command Panzer ( Armoured ) Group Kleist, consisting of three armoured corps, led by Heinz Guderian, Georg-Hans Reinhardt and Hermann Hoth.

" Guderian objected vehemently to being ordered to halt, and Rundstedt was forced to mediate between Hitler and his impetuous armoured commanders, who were backed by Halder.

During the Invasion of Poland in 1939 the city was defended by a small garrison of four infantry battalions under General Konstanty Plisowski against the XIX Panzer Corps of General Heinz Guderian.

Heinz Wilhelm Guderian (; 17 June 1888 – 14 May 1954 ) was a German general during World War II.

Guderian was born in Kulm, West Prussia ( now Chełmno, Poland ).

Early in 1919, Guderian was assigned to serve on the staff of the central command of the Eastern Frontier Guard Service.

It is summarized by Guderian as “ Klotzen, nicht kleckern !” ( literally " boulders, not blots " and means " act powerfully, not superficially ").

Liddell Hart, in letters to Guderian, " imposed his own fabricated version of blitzkrieg on the latter and compelled him to proclaim it as original formula ".

" Addressing the faster rate at which defenders could reinforce an area than attackers could penetrate it during the First World War, Guderian wrote that " since reserve forces will now be motorized, the building up of new defensive fronts is easier than it used to be ; the chances of an offensive based on the timetable of artillery and infantry co-operation are, as a result, even slighter today than they were in the last war.

Hitler sent Guderian on a forced medical leave of absence, and he resigned his post as chief of staff to Hans Krebs on 29 March.

His ideas on mechanised warfare continued to be influential in the lead-up to World War II, ironically more with the Germans, notably Heinz Guderian, than with his countrymen.

Polish units were engaged in battle from 0500 against elements of German 76th Infantry Regiment ( Colonel Hans Gollnick ) of 20th Motorised Division under Lt. Gen. Mauritz von Wiktorin, which operated on the left ( northern ) flank of XIX Panzer Corps under Gen. Heinz Guderian.

During the division's advance on Riga, it committed numerous atrocities as part of its ideological mission to " cleanse and clean "; these events are omitted by Guderian in his memoirs.

The German panzer forces were created largely on the lines laid down by Guderian in Achtung-Panzer!

Guderian ( centre ) and Semyon Krivoshein ( right ) at the German – Soviet military parade in Brest-Litovsk | joint German – Soviet parade in Brest, Belarus | Brest-Litovsk on September 22, 1939.

In 1941 he commanded Panzergruppe 2, also known as Panzergruppe Guderian, in Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, receiving the 24th award of the Oak Leaves to his Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross on 17 July of that year.

He was relieved of his command on 25 December 1941 after Feldmarschall Günther von Kluge, not noted for his ability to face up to Hitler, claimed that Guderian had ordered a withdrawal in contradiction of Hitler's " stand fast " order.

Guderian was transferred to the Oberkommando des Heeres ( OKH ) reserve pool, his chances of being promoted to Feldmarschall, which depended on Hitler's personal decision, possibly ruined forever.

' When it came to the climatic Operation Citadel ( The Battle of Kursk ) Guderian conversed with Hitler on May 14, 1943:

Though Hitler was committed to the attack based on political reasons to maintain the aura of German initiative on the Eastern Front he shared many reservations on military grounds with Guderian.

Hitler finally dismissed Guderian on 28 March 1945 after a shouting-match over the failed counterattack of General Theodor Busse's 9th Army to break through to units encircled at Küstrin ; he stated to Guderian that " your physical health requires that you immediately take six weeks convalescent leave ," (" Health problems " were commonly used as a facade in the Third Reich to remove executives who for some reason could not simply be sacked, but from episodes Guderian describes in his memoirs it is evident that he actually did suffer from congestive heart failure.

Together with his Panzer staff, Guderian surrendered to American troops on 10 May 1945 and remained in U. S. custody as a prisoner of war until his release on 17 June 1948.