In Fichte's technical terminology, the original unity of self-consciousness is to be understood as both an action and as the product of the same I, as a fact and / or act ( Tathandlung ), a unity that is presupposed by and contained within every fact and every act of empirical consciousness, though it never appears as such therein.

In 1891, Steiner earned a doctorate in philosophy at the University of Rostock in Germany with a thesis based upon Fichte's concept of the ego, later published in expanded form as Truth and Knowledge.

While the DB still insists upon Fichte's idea of a German nation based on language, thought and culture, the NeueDB favors defining Germany as the political Germany established by the German Basic Law ( constitution ) in 1949 and altered by the 1990 unification.

The first edition of the book was published, without Kant or Fichte's knowledge, without Fichte's name and signed preface ; it was thus mistakenly thought to be a new work by Kant himself.

Fichte's account proceeds from the general principle that the I must set itself up as an individual in order to set itself up at all, and that in order to set itself up as an individual it must recognize itself as it were to a calling or summons ( Aufforderung ) by other free individual ( s ) — called, moreover, to limit its own freedom out of respect for the freedom of the other.

The I does this, according to Fichte's analysis, by setting its own limitation, first, as only a feeling, then as a sensation, then as an intuition of a thing, and finally as a summons of another person.

The new standard edition of Fichte's works in German, which supersedes all previous editions, is the Gesamtausgabe ( Collected Works or Complete Edition, commonly abbreviated as ' GA '), prepared by the Bavarian Academy of Sciences: Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 42 volumes.

* Jacobi an Fichte, German Text ( 1799 / 1816 ), with Introduction and Critical Apparatus by Marco Ivaldo and Ariberto Acerbi ( Introduction, German Text, Italian Translation, 3 Appendices with Jacobi's and Fichte's complementary Texts, Philological Notes, Commentary, Bibliography, Index ): Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici-Press, Naples 2011, ISBN 978-88-905957-5-2.

The nation state received a philosophical underpinning in the era of Romanticism, at first as the ' natural ' expression of the individual peoples ( romantic nationalism: see Johann Gottlieb Fichte's conception of the Volk, which would be later opposed by Ernest Renan ).

J. G. Fichte and Arthur Schopenhauer, for example, are sharply differing writers who focused on questions raised by Kant ; but Schopenhauer's doctrine of the will or Fichte's dialectical spin on transcendental idealism could hardly be seen as examples of inquiries that close off fundamental questions in order to consider technical problems of application.

Though Anstoss plays a similar role as the thing in itself does in Kantian philosophy, unlike Kant, Fichte's Anstoss is not something foreign to the I.

The spirit of the institution was semi-monastic and, while the education given was excellent in its way, it is doubtful whether there was enough social life and contact with the world for a pupil of Fichte's temperament and antecedents.

Schelling ( 1775 – 1854 ) claimed that the Fichte's " I " needs the Not-I, because there is no subject without object, and vice versa.

Bret W. Davis writes, for example, " The first philosophical development of the idea of nihilism is generally ascribed to Friedrich Jacobi, who in a famous letter criticized Fichte's idealism as falling into nihilism.

With regard to the experience of objects, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling ( 1775 – 1854 ) claimed that the Fichte's " I " needs the Not-I, because there is no subject without object, and vice versa.

According to Steiner, he also introduced Steiner to a person that Steiner only identified as a “ Master ”, and who had a great influence on Steiner's subsequent development, in particular directing him to study Fichte's philosophy.

In particular, Gnosology has also been used to render Fichte's term for his central theoretical philosophy, Wissenschaftslehre, meaning " Doctrine of Knowledge ".

Everyone, including the first reviews of the book, assumed Kant was the author ; when Kant cleared the confusion and openly praised the work and author, Fichte's reputation skyrocketed, as many intellectuals of the day were of the opinion that it was "... the most shocking and astonishing news ... nobody but Kant could have written this book.

Fichte's wife devoted herself to nursing and caught a virulent fever.

Translation of: Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte's first major exposition of the Wissenschaftlehre.

* The Science of Knowing: J. G. Fichte's 1804 Lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre.

" Fichte's ' Aenesidemus ' Review and the Transformation of German Idealism " The Review of Metaphysics 34 ( 1980 / 1 ) 545 – 68.

" Fichte's Original Insight " Contemporary German Philosophy 1 ( 1982 ) 15 – 52.

Fichte's ' Grundlage ' of 1794.

Idealism and Objectivity: Understanding Fichte's Jena Project.

Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity.

" A Case Study in Ad Hominem Arguments: Fichte's Science of Knowledge ," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 23, 1 ( 1990 ) 12 – 42.

Fichte's Transcendental Philosophy: The Original Duplicity of Intelligence and Will.

' Mathesis of the Mind ': A Study of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre and Geometry.

Maybe an entire scene comes into consciousness, with action and motion, or a static view: `` a house under a pine tree, with a little stone path going up to the door ''.

Most writers on the philosophy of consciousness have been concerned to defend a particular point of view, and have organized their material accordingly.

His own view is that consciousness has subjective, first-person causal powers by being essentially intentional due simply to the way human brains function biologically ; conscious persons can perform computations, but consciousness is not inherently computational the way computer programs are.

They show how our conscious experience can discriminate between infinitely different possible scenes and details ( differentiation ) because it integrates those details from our sensory systems, while the integrative nature of consciousness in this view easily explains how our experience can seem unified as one whole despite all of these individual parts.

This position is sometimes referred to as eliminative materialism: the view that consciousness is a property that can be reduced to a strictly mechanical description, and that our experience of consciousness is, as Daniel Dennett describes it, a " user illusion ".

Now, the opposite view is that everything starts with consciousness.

In this view, consciousness imposes " downward causation.

* Non-violence ( to be in soul consciousness rather than body consciousness ) is the foundation of right view, the condition of right knowledge and the kernel of right conduct.

Contrasting with this point of view is dualism which asserts that there are two ultimately irreconcilable substances or realities ( with consciousness and / or mind on the one hand and matter on the other ) or pluralism which asserts any number of fundamental substances or realities more than two.

The view that the heart was the source of consciousness was not challenged until the time of the Greek physician Hippocrates.

Russell observes that " the same view of ' consciousness ' is set forth in succeeding essay, " a World of Pure Experience " ( ib., pp. 39-91 )".

On Hegel ’ s view, the external world is inseparable from the mind, consciousness or perceptions.

Marx and Engels held the view that the consciousness of those who earn a wage or salary ( the " working class " in the broadest Marxist sense ) would be moulded by their " conditions " of " wage-slavery ", leading to a tendency to seek their freedom or " emancipation " by overthrowing ownership of the means of production by capitalists, and consequently, overthrowing the state that upheld this economic order.

* For Edmund Husserl, phenomenology is " the reflective study of the essence of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view.

His method of writing from the point of view of a character within a tale allows him to explore issues related to consciousness and perception, and his style in later works has been compared to impressionist painting.

He has however consistently tried to modify this view of his concerns: " I prefer to speak of the imaginary, or of consciousness.

Such a view, such global consciousness, may be termed internationalism, the idea that nations and peoples should cooperate instead of preoccupying themselves with their respective national interests or pursuing uncoordinated approaches to promote them.

In literary criticism, stream of consciousness is a narrative mode that seeks to portray an individual's point of view by giving the written equivalent of the character's thought processes, either in a loose interior monologue ( see below ), or in connection to his or her actions.

Tom has since stated, " When the Smothers Brothers came on the air we had no political point of view or social consciousness, it just evolved as the show was on the air.

Faulkner employs stream of consciousness by narrating the story from the first person view of multiple characters.

Dennett's view of consciousness is that it is the apparently serial account for the brain's underlying parallelism.