Soviet Premier Khrushchev sent New Year's hopes for peace to President-elect Kennedy, and got a cool acknowledgment in reply.

And again on October 17, Soviet embassy official Georgy Bolshakov brought President Kennedy a " personal message " from Khrushchev reassuring him that " under no circumstances would surface-to-surface missiles be sent to Cuba.

Then in 1956, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev made a sweeping denunciation of Stalin, which sent shock waves throughout the communist world.

In July 1961 during the Berlin Crisis of 1961 KGB chief Alexander Shelepin sent a memorandum to Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev containing an array of proposals to create a situation in various areas of the world which would favor dispersion of attention and forces by the US and their satellites, and would tie them down during the settlement of the question of a German peace treaty and West Berlin.

This event also illustrated the new nature of Soviet politics — the most decisive attack on the Stalinists was delivered by defense minister Georgy Zhukov, and the implied threat to the plotters was clear ; however, none of the " anti − party group " were killed or even arrested, and Khrushchev disposed of them quite cleverly: Georgy Malenkov was sent to manage a power station in Kazakhstan, and Vyacheslav Molotov, one of the most die-hard Stalinists, was made ambassador to Mongolia and later the Soviet representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

When Salmanov struck the second oil reserve in Ust-Balyk, he sent a telegram to the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev: " I found oil.

Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov and Bulganin attempted to oust Khrushchev in the summer of 1957 and won a vote in the Presidium to oust Khrushchev but Georgy Zhukov the defence minister and war hero, supported Khrushchev's demands that the matter be sent to the Central Committee which overturned the Presidium vote.

He survived the Soviet leadership's transition from Khrushchev to Brezhnev in 1964, and in 1968 again demonstrated his loyalty to the Soviet Union by taking a formal part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia ; that is, he sent a limited number of troops for attendance but not for actually taking part in the bringing down of the Prague Spring.

But if anything can bring home to Mr. Khrushchev the idea that he will not really get much enjoyment from watching this Braddock-against-the-Indians contest, it will probably be the fact that SEATO forces are ready to attempt it -- plus the fact that Moscow has something to lose from closing off disarmament and other bigger negotiations with Washington.

Meanwhile, in Moscow, Khrushchev was adding his bit to the march of world law by promising to build a bomb with a wallop equal to 100 million tons of TNT, to knock sense into the heads of those backward oafs who can't see the justice of surrendering West Berlin to communism.

According to the original program, Premier Khrushchev expected the millions looking toward the Kremlin this morning to be filled with admiration or rage -- depending upon individual or national politics -- because of the `` bold program for building communism in our time '' which the Congress will adopt.

Khrushchev threatens us with a 100-megaton bomb??

It seems that Khrushchev himself took a very special pride in having made a world-shaking contribution to Marxist doctrine with his Draft Program ( a large part of his twelve-hour speech at the recent Congress was, in fact, very largely a rehash of that interminable document ).

in fact, with having been against all the more popular features of the Khrushchev `` welfare state ''.

The effect of Chou En-lai's clash with Khrushchev, together with the everlasting attacks on Molotov & Co., has shifted the whole attention of the world, including that of the Soviet people, from the `` epoch-making '' twenty-year program to the present Soviet-Chinese conflict.

And the Chinese, as the Albanian incident shows, have strong suspicions that Khrushchev is anxious to secure a `` shameful '' peace with the West.

Indications are that Khrushchev ( and, with him, the bulk of the Soviet people ) favor peaceful coexistence and ( with the exception of Berlin ) the maintenance of the status quo in the world.

At least in Indonesia, Khrushchev found an American proud to be at total war with Communism ''!!

Diplomats stayed up nights thinking of ways to attain peaceful coexistence, not with Nikita Khrushchev, but with John Rooney.

One of the initial questions put to President Kennedy at his first news conference last January was about his attitude toward a meeting with Premier Khrushchev.

The President knew that a confrontation with Mr. Khrushchev sooner or later probably was inevitable and even desirable.

President Kennedy will meet with Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev in Vienna June 3 and 4.

But Mr. Kennedy had become convinced that a personal confrontation with Mr. Khrushchev might be the only way to prevent catastrophe.

Premier Khrushchev wrecked the conference at its initial session with a bitter denunciation of the U. S. for the U-2 incident.

Thus when Premier Khrushchev intimated even before inauguration that he hoped for an early meeting with the new President, Mr. Kennedy was confronted with a delicate problem.

But it also briefly suggested the possibility of a meeting with Mr. Khrushchev before the end of the year if the international climate were favorable and schedules permitted.

It was in the midst of such White House deliberations that Premier Khrushchev on May 4 made new inquiries through the U. S. Embassy in Moscow about a meeting with the President in the near future.

There was also the fact that by the time he meets Mr. Khrushchev, the President will have completed conversations with all the other principal Allied leaders.

Though President John F. Kennedy was primarily concerned with the crucial problems of Berlin and disarmament adviser McCloy's unexpected report from Khrushchev, his new enthusiasm and reliance on personal diplomacy involved him in other key problems of U.S. foreign policy last week.

Plans for a three-day mission only went forward when the approval of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was obtained ; in the end, Vostok 3 would last nearly four days.

From the years 1958 to 1968, Dr. Khrushchev worked as an engineer, then later as a deputy section head in charge of guidance systems for missile and space design.

After the war, he became deputy commander for political affairs in the Kiev military district in the Ukrainian SSR, under the administration of Ukrainian Communist Party leader ( and later Soviet leader ) Nikita Khrushchev.

The widespread purge that has taken place the past twelve months or so among Communist leaders in the provinces gives assurance that the party officials who will dominate the Congress, and the Central Committee it will elect, will all have passed the tightest possible Khrushchev screening, both for loyalty to him and for competence and performance on the job.

Khrushchev himself is reported to be concerned by the surge of animosity he has aroused, yet our own nuclear statesmen seem intent on following compulsively in his footsteps.

But one cannot escape the suspicion that all this non-stop harping on the misdeeds of the long liquidated `` anti-party '' group would be totally unnecessary if there were not, inside the party, some secret but genuine opposition to Khrushchev on vital doctrinal grounds, on the actual methods to be employed in the `` transition to communism '' and, last but not least, on foreign policy.

Not only, as we know, did Chou En-lai publicly treat Khrushchev's attack on Albania as `` something that we cannot consider as a serious Marxist-Leninist approach '' to the problem ( i.e., as something thoroughly dictatorial and `` undemocratic '' ), but the Albanian leaders went out of their way to be openly abusive to Khrushchev, calling him a liar, a bully, and so on.

The letter, dated Feb. 22, was delivered to Premier Khrushchev in Novosibirsk, Siberia, on March 9.

U. S. willingness to accept a neutral Laos may have led Premier Khrushchev to believe that other areas could be `` neutralized '' on Soviet terms.

`` The President and Chairman Khrushchev understand that this meeting is not for the purpose of negotiating or reaching agreement on the major international problems that involve the interest of many other countries.

Mr. Khrushchev is known to rely heavily on his instincts about his adversaries and to be a shrewd judge of men.

The confrontation ended on October 28, 1962, when President John F. Kennedy and United Nations Secretary-General U Thant reached a public and secret agreement with Khrushchev.

The Soviets maintained their tight secrecy, writing their plans longhand, which were approved by Rodion Malinovsky on July 4 and Khrushchev on July 7.

Consequently, the United States could find itself bombing operational missiles were the blockade to fail to force Khrushchev to remove the missiles already on the island.

In Moscow, Ambassador Kohler briefed Chairman Khrushchev on the pending blockade and Kennedy's speech to the nation.

A power struggle between Malenkov and Khrushchev began, and on 14 March Malenkov was forced to resign from the Secretariat.

Khrushchev and Malenkov, who had begun receiving information which stated that the MVD bad begun spying on party officials, started to act in the spring of 1953.

In contrast, Khrushchev tried to strengthen the central party apparatus by focusing on the Central Committee.

Khrushchev tried to revitalise the Central Committee by hosting several discussions on agriculture at the Central Committee plenums.