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Khrushchev and was
Meanwhile, in Moscow, Khrushchev was adding his bit to the march of world law by promising to build a bomb with a wallop equal to 100 million tons of TNT, to knock sense into the heads of those backward oafs who can't see the justice of surrendering West Berlin to communism.
The reason was to speed up domestic production in the USSR, which Khrushchev promised upon grabbing power, and try to end the permanent recession in Russian living standards.
These never ceased to suggest that if, in the eyes of Marx and Lenin `` full communism '' was still a very distant ideal, the establishment of a Communist society had now, under Khrushchev, become an `` immediate and tangible reality ''.
It seems that Khrushchev himself took a very special pride in having made a world-shaking contribution to Marxist doctrine with his Draft Program ( a large part of his twelve-hour speech at the recent Congress was, in fact, very largely a rehash of that interminable document ).
Over all these fairly awkward problems Khrushchev was to skate rather lightly ; ;
Mr. Khrushchev was jesting in the expansive mood of the successful banker.
One of the initial questions put to President Kennedy at his first news conference last January was about his attitude toward a meeting with Premier Khrushchev.
The President knew that a confrontation with Mr. Khrushchev sooner or later probably was inevitable and even desirable.
Thus when Premier Khrushchev intimated even before inauguration that he hoped for an early meeting with the new President, Mr. Kennedy was confronted with a delicate problem.
The letter, dated Feb. 22, was delivered to Premier Khrushchev in Novosibirsk, Siberia, on March 9.
There was reason to believe that Premier Khrushchev was also concerned about a possible spread of nuclear weapons, particularly to Communist China.
It was in the midst of such White House deliberations that Premier Khrushchev on May 4 made new inquiries through the U. S. Embassy in Moscow about a meeting with the President in the near future.
There was also the fact that by the time he meets Mr. Khrushchev, the President will have completed conversations with all the other principal Allied leaders.
After Cuba and Laos, it was argued, Mr. Khrushchev will interpret the President's consent to the meeting as further evidence of Western weakness -- perhaps even panic -- and is certain to try to exploit the advantage he now believes he holds.
The question was raised, for example, as to what attitude the President would take if Mr. Khrushchev proposes a broad neutral belt extending from Southeast Asia to the Middle East.
Though President John F. Kennedy was primarily concerned with the crucial problems of Berlin and disarmament adviser McCloy's unexpected report from Khrushchev, his new enthusiasm and reliance on personal diplomacy involved him in other key problems of U.S. foreign policy last week.
This leader must be a man who lives above illusions that heretofore have shaped the foreign policy of the United States, namely that Russia will agree to a reunited Germany, that the East German government does not exist, that events in Japan in June 1960 were Communist-inspired, that the true government of China is in Formosa, that Mao was the evil influence behind Khrushchev at the Summit Conference in Paris in May 1960, and that either China or Russia wants or expects war.
Chaplin continued being a subject to political controversy throughout the 1950s, especially as he was awarded the International Peace Prize by the Communist World Peace Council and lunched with Chou En-Lai in 1954, and when he briefly met Nikita Khrushchev in 1956.
But six months after the crisis, a Gallup Poll found that public worry about nuclear weapons had fallen back to its lowest point since 1957, and there was a view, disputed by CND supporters, that U. S. President John F. Kennedy's success in facing down Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev turned the British public away from CND.
" The half-hearted invasion left Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev and his advisers with the impression that Kennedy was indecisive and, as one Soviet adviser wrote, " too young, intellectual, not prepared well for decision making in crisis situations ... too intelligent and too weak.
In addition, Khrushchev ’ s impression of Kennedy ’ s weakness was confirmed by the President ’ s soft response during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, particularly the building of the Berlin Wall.
Khrushchev increased the perception of a missile gap when he loudly boasted to the world that the USSR was building missiles " like sausages " whose numbers and capabilities actually were nowhere close to his assertion.
In May 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was persuaded by the idea of countering the United States ' growing lead in developing and deploying strategic missiles by placing Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba.
A second reason Soviet missiles were deployed to Cuba was because Khrushchev wanted to bring West Berlin — the American / British / French-controlled democratic zone within Communist East Germany — into the Soviet orbit.

Khrushchev and able
Khrushchev was able to consolidate his powers within the party machine after Malenkov's resignation, but Malenkov remained the de facto leading figure of the Party.
However, Khrushchev and Malenkov were able to gather enough support for Beria's ouster, but only when a rumour of a potential coup led by Beria began to take hold within the party leadership.
With new acquired powers, Khrushchev was able to appoint associates to the leadership in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Armenia and Moldavia ( modern Moldova ), while Malenkov, in contrast, was able to appoint an associate to leadership only in Moscow.
Brezhnev was able to succeed Khrushchev because a majority in the Central Committee voted in favour of removing Khrushchev from office as both First Secretary and Chairman of the Council of Ministers
Brezhnev was able to consolidate power to become the leading figure, but he was never able to gather as much powers as Stalin and Khrushchev had done previously.

Khrushchev and hold
Talks with Nikita Khrushchev eased tensions in East-West relations over West Berlin and led to an agreement in principle to stop nuclear tests and to hold a further summit meeting of Allied and Soviet heads of government.

Khrushchev and on
The widespread purge that has taken place the past twelve months or so among Communist leaders in the provinces gives assurance that the party officials who will dominate the Congress, and the Central Committee it will elect, will all have passed the tightest possible Khrushchev screening, both for loyalty to him and for competence and performance on the job.
Khrushchev himself is reported to be concerned by the surge of animosity he has aroused, yet our own nuclear statesmen seem intent on following compulsively in his footsteps.
But one cannot escape the suspicion that all this non-stop harping on the misdeeds of the long liquidated `` anti-party '' group would be totally unnecessary if there were not, inside the party, some secret but genuine opposition to Khrushchev on vital doctrinal grounds, on the actual methods to be employed in the `` transition to communism '' and, last but not least, on foreign policy.
The effect of Chou En-lai's clash with Khrushchev, together with the everlasting attacks on Molotov & Co., has shifted the whole attention of the world, including that of the Soviet people, from the `` epoch-making '' twenty-year program to the present Soviet-Chinese conflict.
Not only, as we know, did Chou En-lai publicly treat Khrushchev's attack on Albania as `` something that we cannot consider as a serious Marxist-Leninist approach '' to the problem ( i.e., as something thoroughly dictatorial and `` undemocratic '' ), but the Albanian leaders went out of their way to be openly abusive to Khrushchev, calling him a liar, a bully, and so on.
U. S. willingness to accept a neutral Laos may have led Premier Khrushchev to believe that other areas could be `` neutralized '' on Soviet terms.
`` The President and Chairman Khrushchev understand that this meeting is not for the purpose of negotiating or reaching agreement on the major international problems that involve the interest of many other countries.
Mr. Khrushchev is known to rely heavily on his instincts about his adversaries and to be a shrewd judge of men.
The confrontation ended on October 28, 1962, when President John F. Kennedy and United Nations Secretary-General U Thant reached a public and secret agreement with Khrushchev.
The Soviets maintained their tight secrecy, writing their plans longhand, which were approved by Rodion Malinovsky on July 4 and Khrushchev on July 7.
And again on October 17, Soviet embassy official Georgy Bolshakov brought President Kennedy a " personal message " from Khrushchev reassuring him that " under no circumstances would surface-to-surface missiles be sent to Cuba.
Consequently, the United States could find itself bombing operational missiles were the blockade to fail to force Khrushchev to remove the missiles already on the island.
In Moscow, Ambassador Kohler briefed Chairman Khrushchev on the pending blockade and Kennedy's speech to the nation.
A power struggle between Malenkov and Khrushchev began, and on 14 March Malenkov was forced to resign from the Secretariat.
Khrushchev and Malenkov, who had begun receiving information which stated that the MVD bad begun spying on party officials, started to act in the spring of 1953.
In contrast, Khrushchev tried to strengthen the central party apparatus by focusing on the Central Committee.
Khrushchev tried to revitalise the Central Committee by hosting several discussions on agriculture at the Central Committee plenums.

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