Meanwhile, in Moscow, Khrushchev was adding his bit to the march of world law by promising to build a bomb with a wallop equal to 100 million tons of TNT, to knock sense into the heads of those backward oafs who can't see the justice of surrendering West Berlin to communism.

The reason was to speed up domestic production in the USSR, which Khrushchev promised upon grabbing power, and try to end the permanent recession in Russian living standards.

These never ceased to suggest that if, in the eyes of Marx and Lenin `` full communism '' was still a very distant ideal, the establishment of a Communist society had now, under Khrushchev, become an `` immediate and tangible reality ''.

It seems that Khrushchev himself took a very special pride in having made a world-shaking contribution to Marxist doctrine with his Draft Program ( a large part of his twelve-hour speech at the recent Congress was, in fact, very largely a rehash of that interminable document ).

Over all these fairly awkward problems Khrushchev was to skate rather lightly ; ;

One of the initial questions put to President Kennedy at his first news conference last January was about his attitude toward a meeting with Premier Khrushchev.

The President knew that a confrontation with Mr. Khrushchev sooner or later probably was inevitable and even desirable.

Thus when Premier Khrushchev intimated even before inauguration that he hoped for an early meeting with the new President, Mr. Kennedy was confronted with a delicate problem.

The letter, dated Feb. 22, was delivered to Premier Khrushchev in Novosibirsk, Siberia, on March 9.

There was reason to believe that Premier Khrushchev was also concerned about a possible spread of nuclear weapons, particularly to Communist China.

It was in the midst of such White House deliberations that Premier Khrushchev on May 4 made new inquiries through the U. S. Embassy in Moscow about a meeting with the President in the near future.

There was also the fact that by the time he meets Mr. Khrushchev, the President will have completed conversations with all the other principal Allied leaders.

After Cuba and Laos, it was argued, Mr. Khrushchev will interpret the President's consent to the meeting as further evidence of Western weakness -- perhaps even panic -- and is certain to try to exploit the advantage he now believes he holds.

The question was raised, for example, as to what attitude the President would take if Mr. Khrushchev proposes a broad neutral belt extending from Southeast Asia to the Middle East.

Though President John F. Kennedy was primarily concerned with the crucial problems of Berlin and disarmament adviser McCloy's unexpected report from Khrushchev, his new enthusiasm and reliance on personal diplomacy involved him in other key problems of U.S. foreign policy last week.

This leader must be a man who lives above illusions that heretofore have shaped the foreign policy of the United States, namely that Russia will agree to a reunited Germany, that the East German government does not exist, that events in Japan in June 1960 were Communist-inspired, that the true government of China is in Formosa, that Mao was the evil influence behind Khrushchev at the Summit Conference in Paris in May 1960, and that either China or Russia wants or expects war.

Chaplin continued being a subject to political controversy throughout the 1950s, especially as he was awarded the International Peace Prize by the Communist World Peace Council and lunched with Chou En-Lai in 1954, and when he briefly met Nikita Khrushchev in 1956.

But six months after the crisis, a Gallup Poll found that public worry about nuclear weapons had fallen back to its lowest point since 1957, and there was a view, disputed by CND supporters, that U. S. President John F. Kennedy's success in facing down Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev turned the British public away from CND.

" The half-hearted invasion left Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev and his advisers with the impression that Kennedy was indecisive and, as one Soviet adviser wrote, " too young, intellectual, not prepared well for decision making in crisis situations ... too intelligent and too weak.

In addition, Khrushchev ’ s impression of Kennedy ’ s weakness was confirmed by the President ’ s soft response during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, particularly the building of the Berlin Wall.

Khrushchev increased the perception of a missile gap when he loudly boasted to the world that the USSR was building missiles " like sausages " whose numbers and capabilities actually were nowhere close to his assertion.

In May 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was persuaded by the idea of countering the United States ' growing lead in developing and deploying strategic missiles by placing Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba.

A second reason Soviet missiles were deployed to Cuba was because Khrushchev wanted to bring West Berlin — the American / British / French-controlled democratic zone within Communist East Germany — into the Soviet orbit.

When Khrushchev was dismissed, Alexei Kosygin took over Khrushchev's position as Soviet Premier, but Kosygin's reforms was not successful and conservative communists led by Brezhnev blocked any motions for reforms after Kosygin's failed attempt.

That fact is very clearly illustrated in the case of the many present-day intellectuals who were Communists or near-Communists in their youth and are now so extremely conservative ( or reactionary, as many would say ) that they can define no important political conviction that does not seem so far from even a centrist position as to make the distinction between Mr. Nixon and Mr. Khrushchev for them hardly worth noting.

In this case he has put the alternatives clearly to Mr. Khrushchev for the third time.

Since Laos is of no more purely military value to Moscow itself than it is to Washington, this approach might be expected to head off Mr. Khrushchev for the moment.

But if anything can bring home to Mr. Khrushchev the idea that he will not really get much enjoyment from watching this Braddock-against-the-Indians contest, it will probably be the fact that SEATO forces are ready to attempt it -- plus the fact that Moscow has something to lose from closing off disarmament and other bigger negotiations with Washington.

A nuclear pacifier of these dimensions -- roughly some six and a half times bigger than anything the United States has triggered experimentally -- would certainly produce a bigger bang, and, just for kicks, Khrushchev might use it to propel the seminar of the house of delegates from St. Louis to the moon, where there wouldn't even be any beer to drink.

The same can be said about the half-hearted Cuban invasion mounted by the administration last April, which, we trust, is not symptomatic of the methods to be invoked in holding off the felonious Khrushchev.

According to the original program, Premier Khrushchev expected the millions looking toward the Kremlin this morning to be filled with admiration or rage -- depending upon individual or national politics -- because of the `` bold program for building communism in our time '' which the Congress will adopt.

This Congress will see Premier Khrushchev consolidating his power and laying the groundwork for an orderly succession should death or illness remove him from the scene in the next few years.

The widespread purge that has taken place the past twelve months or so among Communist leaders in the provinces gives assurance that the party officials who will dominate the Congress, and the Central Committee it will elect, will all have passed the tightest possible Khrushchev screening, both for loyalty to him and for competence and performance on the job.

`` Chairman Khrushchev received the U.S. President's disarmament adviser, John McCloy.

Chairman Khrushchev ( Kennedy ) rattles his rockets ( sabre ) in order to cure his internal ills and to strengthen his negotiating position.

Chairman Khrushchev and John McCloy had a terrible row at Sochi.

Some time ago, however, Mr. Khrushchev decided that when bigger bombs were made, the Soviet Union would make them.

Khrushchev himself is reported to be concerned by the surge of animosity he has aroused, yet our own nuclear statesmen seem intent on following compulsively in his footsteps.

Nikita Khrushchev, however, has created yet another problem for himself.

So, while we properly inveigh against the new poisoning, history is not likely to justify the pose of righteousness which some in the West were so quick to assume when Mr. Khrushchev made his cynical and irresponsible threat.

Some government scientists say privately that the figure probably is closer to 80 megatons, and that the full 50-megaton bomb that Khrushchev mentioned may still be detonated.

The publication last July of the party's Draft Program -- that blueprint for the `` transition to communism '' -- had led the uninitiated to suppose that this Twenty-second Congress would be a sort of apotheosis of the Khrushchev regime, a solemn consecration of ideas which had, in fact, been current over the last three or four years ( i.e., since the defeat of the `` anti-party group '' ) in all theoretical party journals.

And, as we know, the Virgin Lands are not producing as much as Khrushchev had hoped.

in fact, with having been against all the more popular features of the Khrushchev `` welfare state ''.

But one cannot escape the suspicion that all this non-stop harping on the misdeeds of the long liquidated `` anti-party '' group would be totally unnecessary if there were not, inside the party, some secret but genuine opposition to Khrushchev on vital doctrinal grounds, on the actual methods to be employed in the `` transition to communism '' and, last but not least, on foreign policy.