Unlike the other factions, Ribbentrop's foreign policy programme was the only one that Hitler allowed to be executed during the years 1939 – 41, though it was more due to the temporary bankruptcy of Hitler's own foreign policy programme that he had laid down in Mein Kampf and Zweites Buch following the failure to achieve an alliance with Britain, than to a genuine change of mind.

Earlier, speaking of Ribbentrop's activities and of the views of his British friends, Leopold von Hoesch, the German Ambassador in London from 1932 – 36, warned that Berlin should "... not pay any attention to the Londonderrys and Lothians, who in no way represented any important section of British opinion ".

Because of Ribbentrop's firmly held views that Britain was Germany's most dangerous enemy and that an Anglo-German war was thus inevitable, it scarcely mattered to him when his much desired war with Britain came.

In 1935, Sir Eric Phipps, the British Ambassador to Germany, complained to London about Ribbentrop's British associates in the Anglo-German Fellowship, that they created " false German hopes as in regards to British friendship and caused a reaction against it in England, where public opinion is very naturally hostile to the Nazi regime and its methods ".

In September 1937, the British Consul in Munich, writing about the group Ribbentrop had brought to the Nuremberg Party Rally, reported that there were some " serious persons of standing among them " and that an equal number of Ribbentrop's British contingent were " eccentrics and few, if any, could be called representatives of serious English thought, either political or social, while they most certainly lacked any political or social influence in England ".

Ribbentrop first seems to have considered the idea of a pact with the Soviet Union after an unsuccessful visit to Warsaw in January 1939, when the Poles again refused Ribbentrop's demands about Danzig, the " extra-territorial " roads across the Polish Corridor and the Anti-Comintern Pact.

In July 1939, Ribbentrop's claims about Bonnet's alleged statement of December 1938 were to lead to a lengthy war of words via a series of letters to the French newspapers between Bonnet and Ribbentrop over just what precisely Bonnet had said to Ribbentrop.

On the night of 30 – 31 August 1939, Ribbentrop had an extremely heated exchange with the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, who objected to Ribbentrop's demand, given at about midnight, that if a Polish plenipotentiary did not arrive in Berlin that night to discuss the German " final offer ", then the responsibility for the outbreak of war would not rest on the Reich.

Ribbentrop's efforts to persuade Molotov to abandon his demands about Europe as the price of Soviet entry into the war as a German ally were entirely unsuccessful.

* In science-fiction stories Samolot von Ribbentrop ( Von Ribbentrop's plane ) and Atomowa Ruletka ( Nuclear Roulette ) by Polish writer Andrzej Pilipiuk, " red mercury reactors " are used as highly efficient power sources, although no further information about either the substance or said reactors is given.

Of course, Czechoslovakia did not know about this change in Ribbentrop's attitude, and the Slovak leaders ' confidence in a favorable German decision was instrumental in bringing them to accept arbitration.

Because the Foreign Office's diplomats were not so sunny in their appraisal of the prospects for an alliance, Ribbentrop's influence with Hitler increased.

Ribbentrop's civil-war statements were greeted with incredulity by those British people who heard them.

The crisis was resolved when Neurath pointed out to Hitler that under Ribbentrop's rules, if the Soviet Ambassador were to give the communist clenched-fist salute, then Hitler would be obliged to return it.

The appointment of a general as Ambassador to Japan reflected Ribbentrop's belief that German – Japanese relations were in the future to be of a mainly military nature.

Though the Germans were not planning an attack on Poland in March 1939, Ribbentrop's bullying behaviour towards the Poles destroyed whatever faint chance there was of Poland allowing Danzig to return to Germany.

Ribbentrop's efforts were crowned with success with the signing of the Pact of Steel in May 1939, though this was accomplished only by falsely assuring Mussolini that there would be no war for the next three years.

Henderson stated that the terms of the German " final offer " were very reasonable, but argued that Ribbentrop's time limit for Polish acceptance of the " final offer " was most unreasonable, and furthermore, demanded to know why Ribbentrop insisted upon seeing a special Polish plenipotentiary and could not present the " final offer " to Józef Lipski or provide a written copy of the " final offer ".

But Ribbentrop's motives in seeking to have Japan enter the war were more anti-British then anti-Soviet.

It should be noted that the professional diplomats, and not just Ribbentrop's cronies from the Dienststelle, were highly involved in the “ Final Solution ”.

" Stepping out of Joachim von Ribbentrop's plane in 1939, Fish opined that Germany's claims were ' just.

Ryti and Mannerheim did not know the internal balance between OKW and Wilhelmstraße and the stakes were too high to risk Ribbentrop's pressuring the Wehrmacht to withdraw its support from Finland.

Bizarrely enough, during this period Luther continued to work as an interior decorator for Ribbentrop's spouse, helping her with the design of her various houses, as well as her clothes.

On 25 August 1939, Ribbentrop's influence with Hitler wavered for a moment when the news reached Berlin of the ratification of the Anglo-Polish military alliance and a personal message from Mussolini telling Hitler that Italy would dishonour the Pact of Steel if Germany attacked Poland.

An area where Ribbentrop enjoyed more success arose in September 1940, when he had the Far Eastern agent of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, Dr. Heinrich Georg Stahmer, start negotiations with the Japanese foreign minister, Yōsuke Matsuoka, for an anti-American alliance ( the German Ambassador to Japan, General Eugen Ott, was excluded from the talks on Ribbentrop's orders ).

Another low point in Ribbentrop's relations with the SS occurred in February 1943, when the SD backed a Luther-led internal putsch to oust Ribbentrop as Foreign Minister.

Hitler turned down this idea of Ribbentrop's, but nonetheless during his meeting with Lord Halifax, Ribbentrop spent much of the meeting demanding that Britain sign an alliance with Germany and return the former German colonies.

The biggest wartime deception was over Operation Overlord, where the use of a British naval officer, apparently embittered into becoming a turncoat, ( but the son of von Ribbentrop's doctor and so personally known to him during his pre-war stint as ambassador in London ), helped to persuade Hitler that the actual attack would come in the Pas de Calais.

The British diplomat Brian Urquhart, a student at the same school during Ribbentrop's time there, in his autobiography " A Life in Peace and War ( 1987 )" describes the latter as being " doltish, surly and arrogant ".

It was Ribbentrop's fear that if German-Polish talks did take place, there was the danger that the Poles might back down and agree to the German demands as the Czechoslovaks had done in 1938 under Anglo-French pressure, and thereby deprive the Germans of their excuse for aggression.

Ribbentrop's assistance in arranging the meeting and lending his home for the purpose endeared him to Hitler.

During the same meeting in East Prussia with Count Ciano, Pierre Laval arrived and promptly agreed to Hitler's and Ribbentrop's demands that he place French police under the command of more radical anti-Semitics and conscript and send hundreds of thousands of French workers to work in Germany's war industry.

Once, Neurath instructed a Ribbentrop aide not to correct any of Ribbentrop's spelling mistakes.

In addition, the fact that Ribbentrop chose to spend as little time as possible in London in order to stay close to Hitler irritated the British Foreign Office immensely, as Ribbentrop's frequent absences prevented the handling of many routine diplomatic matters.

In February 1937, Ribbentrop committed a notable social gaffe by unexpectedly greeting King George VI with a stiff-armed Nazi salute: the gesture nearly knocked over the King, who was walking forward to shake Ribbentrop's hand.

In a protest note at Ribbentrop's behaviour, Colonel Beck reminded the German Foreign Minister that Poland was an independent country and was not some sort of German protectorate which Ribbentrop could bully at will.

At the same time, Ribbentrop's efforts to convert the Anti-Comintern Pact into an anti-British alliance met with considerable hostility from the Japanese over the course of the winter of 1938 – 39, but with the Italians Ribbentrop enjoyed some apparent success.

During the summer of 1939, Ribbentrop sabotaged all efforts at a peaceful solution to the Danzig dispute, leading the American historian Gerhard Weinberg to comment that " perhaps Chamberlain's haggard appearance did him more credit than Ribbentrop's beaming smile " as the countdown to a war that would kill millions inexorably gathered pace.

During his trip to Moscow, Ribbentrop's talks with Stalin and Molotov proceed very cordially and efficiently with the exception of the question of Latvia, which Hitler had instructed Ribbentrop to try to claim for Germany.

Much to Ribbentrop's fury, someone leaked the plans for the German invasion to the Dutch Embassy in Berlin, which led Ribbentrop to devote the next several months to conducting an unsuccessful investigation into who leaked the news.

Most of Ribbentrop's time was spent either demanding that Britain sign the Anti-Comintern Pact or that London return the former German colonies in Africa.