In addition, the fact that Ribbentrop chose to spend as little time as possible in London in order to stay close to Hitler irritated the British Foreign Office immensely, as Ribbentrop's frequent absences prevented the handling of many routine diplomatic matters.

Most of Ribbentrop's time was spent either demanding that Britain sign the Anti-Comintern Pact or that London return the former German colonies in Africa.

Ribbentrop's appointment was generally taken at the time and since as indicating that German foreign policy was moving in a more radical direction.

Ribbentrop's time as Foreign Minister can be divided into three periods.

At the same time, Ribbentrop's efforts to convert the Anti-Comintern Pact into an anti-British alliance met with considerable hostility from the Japanese over the course of the winter of 1938 – 39, but with the Italians Ribbentrop enjoyed some apparent success.

Henderson stated that the terms of the German " final offer " were very reasonable, but argued that Ribbentrop's time limit for Polish acceptance of the " final offer " was most unreasonable, and furthermore, demanded to know why Ribbentrop insisted upon seeing a special Polish plenipotentiary and could not present the " final offer " to Józef Lipski or provide a written copy of the " final offer ".

The British diplomat Brian Urquhart, a student at the same school during Ribbentrop's time there, in his autobiography " A Life in Peace and War ( 1987 )" describes the latter as being " doltish, surly and arrogant ".

Earlier, speaking of Ribbentrop's activities and of the views of his British friends, Leopold von Hoesch, the German Ambassador in London from 1932 – 36, warned that Berlin should "... not pay any attention to the Londonderrys and Lothians, who in no way represented any important section of British opinion ".

In 1935, Sir Eric Phipps, the British Ambassador to Germany, complained to London about Ribbentrop's British associates in the Anglo-German Fellowship, that they created " false German hopes as in regards to British friendship and caused a reaction against it in England, where public opinion is very naturally hostile to the Nazi regime and its methods ".

According to files declassified by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mrs. Simpson was believed to be a regular guest at Ribbentrop's social gatherings at the German Embassy in London where it was thought the two struck up a romantic relationship.

The biggest wartime deception was over Operation Overlord, where the use of a British naval officer, apparently embittered into becoming a turncoat, ( but the son of von Ribbentrop's doctor and so personally known to him during his pre-war stint as ambassador in London ), helped to persuade Hitler that the actual attack would come in the Pas de Calais.

Another factor that aided Ribbentrop's rise was Hitler's distrust of, and disdain for, Germany's professional diplomats.

The appointment arose in large part because of doubts created in foreign capitals over just what precisely Ribbentrop's diplomatic status was.

He could not take seriously anyone whose written German, to say nothing of his English and French, was as full of spelling errors and grammatical mistakes as Ribbentrop's.

In February 1937, Ribbentrop committed a notable social gaffe by unexpectedly greeting King George VI with a stiff-armed Nazi salute: the gesture nearly knocked over the King, who was walking forward to shake Ribbentrop's hand.

The crisis was resolved when Neurath pointed out to Hitler that under Ribbentrop's rules, if the Soviet Ambassador were to give the communist clenched-fist salute, then Hitler would be obliged to return it.

Ribbentrop's first move as Foreign Minister was to sack Mackensen ( who, as Neurath's son-in-law, was totally unacceptable to him ) as State Secretary and replace him with Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker, a former naval officer turned career diplomat who joined the Foreign Office in 1920.

One of Ribbentrop's first acts as Foreign Minister was to achieve a total volte-face in Germany's Far Eastern policies.

In a protest note at Ribbentrop's behaviour, Colonel Beck reminded the German Foreign Minister that Poland was an independent country and was not some sort of German protectorate which Ribbentrop could bully at will.

When the news of Ribbentrop's remarks was leaked to the Polish press despite Colonel Beck's order to the censors on 27 March, it caused anti-German riots in Poland with the local N. S. D. A. P headquarters in the ethnically mixed town of Lininco destroyed by a mob.

Though the Germans were not planning an attack on Poland in March 1939, Ribbentrop's bullying behaviour towards the Poles destroyed whatever faint chance there was of Poland allowing Danzig to return to Germany.

One of the consequences of Ribbentrop's heavy-handed behaviour was the signing of the Anglo-Turkish alliance of 12 May 1939.

Ribbentrop's efforts were crowned with success with the signing of the Pact of Steel in May 1939, though this was accomplished only by falsely assuring Mussolini that there would be no war for the next three years.

It was Ribbentrop's fear that if German-Polish talks did take place, there was the danger that the Poles might back down and agree to the German demands as the Czechoslovaks had done in 1938 under Anglo-French pressure, and thereby deprive the Germans of their excuse for aggression.

The extent that Hitler was influenced by Ribbentrop's advice can be seen in Hitler's orders for a limited mobilization against Poland alone.

Hitler believed that British policy was based upon securing Soviet support for Poland, which led him to perform a diplomatic U-turn and support Ribbentrop's policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union as the best way of ensuring a local war.

Ustinov is also supposed to have clandestinely leaked Ribbentrop's presence at his school to The Times.

He was also head of the French fifth columnists through Ribbentrop's special unit within the Foreign Service.

Ribbentrop's civil-war statements were greeted with incredulity by those British people who heard them.

* In science-fiction stories Samolot von Ribbentrop ( Von Ribbentrop's plane ) and Atomowa Ruletka ( Nuclear Roulette ) by Polish writer Andrzej Pilipiuk, " red mercury reactors " are used as highly efficient power sources, although no further information about either the substance or said reactors is given.

Following the occupation of all of Vichy France on 11 November 1942, von Ribbentrop's influence was minimal as all of France was run by German military authorities, in conjunction with military police.

Luther resented having to work for Ribbentrop's wife, stating that she treated him like one of her household servants.

( In fact, Ribbentrop's efforts had nothing to do with the lack of sanctions ).

Because the Foreign Office's diplomats were not so sunny in their appraisal of the prospects for an alliance, Ribbentrop's influence with Hitler increased.

Ribbentrop's personality, with his disdain for diplomatic niceties, meshed with what Hitler felt should be the relentless dynamism of a revolutionary regime.

This diplomatic success did much to increase Ribbentrop's prestige with Hitler, who called the day the A. G. N. A.

Ribbentrop's habit of summoning tailors from the best British firms, making them wait for hours and then sending them away without seeing him with instructions to return the next day, only to repeat the process, did immense damage to his reputation in British high society.

Hitler turned down this idea of Ribbentrop's, but nonetheless during his meeting with Lord Halifax, Ribbentrop spent much of the meeting demanding that Britain sign an alliance with Germany and return the former German colonies.

Ribbentrop's friendship with Papen, which went back to 1918, ended over this issue.

Ribbentrop first seems to have considered the idea of a pact with the Soviet Union after an unsuccessful visit to Warsaw in January 1939, when the Poles again refused Ribbentrop's demands about Danzig, the " extra-territorial " roads across the Polish Corridor and the Anti-Comintern Pact.

During his trip to Moscow, Ribbentrop's talks with Stalin and Molotov proceed very cordially and efficiently with the exception of the question of Latvia, which Hitler had instructed Ribbentrop to try to claim for Germany.

On 25 August 1939, Ribbentrop's influence with Hitler wavered for a moment when the news reached Berlin of the ratification of the Anglo-Polish military alliance and a personal message from Mussolini telling Hitler that Italy would dishonour the Pact of Steel if Germany attacked Poland.

Because of Ribbentrop's firmly held views that Britain was Germany's most dangerous enemy and that an Anglo-German war was thus inevitable, it scarcely mattered to him when his much desired war with Britain came.

The Greek historian Aristotle Kaillis wrote that it was Ribbentrop's influence with Hitler together with his insistence that the Western powers would in the end not go to war for Poland that was the most important reason why Hitler did not cancel Fall Weiß all together instead of postponing " X-day " for six days.