Ribbentrop for his part, who valued Japanese friendship far more than Chinese friendship, argued that Germany and Japan should sign the pact even without Chinese participation.

As for the contradiction between German rearmament and his message of peace, Ribbentrop argued to whoever would listen that the German people had been “ humiliated ” by the Versailles treaty, that Germany wanted peace above all, and German violations of Versailles were part of an effort to restore Germany's " self-respect " By the 1930s, much of British opinion had been convinced that the treaty was monstrously unfair and unjust to Germany, so as a result, many in Britain like Thomas Jones were very open to Ribbentrop ’ s message that if only Versailles could be done away with, then European peace would be secured.

Following the lead of Andreas Hillgruber, who argued that Hitler had a Stufenplan ( stage by stage plan ) for world conquest, Hildebrand argued that Ribbentrop may not have fully understood what Hitler's Stufenplan was, or alternatively in pressing so hard for colonial restoration was trying to score a personal success that might improve his standing with Hitler.

Besides converting the Anti-Comintern Pact into an anti-British military alliance, Ribbentrop argued that German foreign policy should work to " furthermore, winning over all states whose interests conform directly or indirectly to ours ".

Ribbentrop argued that with Soviet economic support ( especially in the form of oil ), Germany was now immune to the effects of a British naval blockade, and as such, the British would never take on Germany.

Even if the British were serious in their warnings of war, Ribbentrop took the view that since a war with Britain was inevitable, the risk of a war with Britain was an acceptable one and accordingly he argued that Germany should not shy away from such challenges.

Henderson stated that the terms of the German " final offer " were very reasonable, but argued that Ribbentrop's time limit for Polish acceptance of the " final offer " was most unreasonable, and furthermore, demanded to know why Ribbentrop insisted upon seeing a special Polish plenipotentiary and could not present the " final offer " to Józef Lipski or provide a written copy of the " final offer ".

Ribbentrop argued that the Soviets and Germans shared a common enemy in the form of the British Empire, and as such, it was in the best interests of the Kremlin to enter the war on the Axis side.

In August 1941, when the question of whether to deport foreign Jews living in Germany arose, Ribbentrop argued against deportation as a way of maximizing the Foreign Office's influence.

Ribbentrop argued to Hitler that a war between the United States and Germany was inevitable given the extent of American aid to Britain and the increasingly frequent " incidents " in the North Atlantic between U-boats and American warships guarding convoys to Britain, and that having such a war begin with a Japanese attack on the United States was the best way to begin it.

The two arbiters, Ribbentrop and Ciano, continued their conversations with the delegates at lunch and then retired to a separate room, where they argued over a map.

On August 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Molotov – Ribbentrop non-aggression pact, which secretly provided for the dismemberment of Poland into Nazi and Soviet-controlled zones.

After a failed attempt to sign an anti-German military alliance with France and Britain and talks with Germany regarding a potential political deal, on 23 August 1939, the Soviet Union entered into a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany, negotiated by Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov and German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop.

After the Tripartite Pact was signed by Axis Powers Germany, Japan and Italy, in October 1940, Stalin traded letters with Ribbentrop, with Stalin writing about entering an agreement regarding a " permanent basis " for their " mutual interests.

" After a conference in Berlin between Hitler, Molotov and Ribbentrop, Germany presented Molotov with a proposed written agreement for Axis entry.

Ulrich Friedrich Wilhelm Joachim von Ribbentrop ( 30 April 1893 – 16 October 1946 ) was Foreign Minister of Germany from 1938 until 1945.

Ribbentrop was educated irregularly at private schools in Germany and Switzerland.

When World War I began, Ribbentrop left Canada ( which, as part of the British Empire, was at war with Germany ) for the neutral United States.

Ribbentrop became Hitler's favourite foreign-policy adviser, partly by dint of his familiarity with the world outside Germany, but also by shameless flattery and sycophancy.

Ribbentrop was tasked with ensuring that the world remained convinced that Germany sincerely wanted an arms-limitation treaty while also ensuring that no such treaty ever materialized.

But because no sanctions were sought against Germany, Ribbentrop could claim success.

Ribbentrop made frequent trips to Britain, and upon his return he always reported to Hitler that most British people longed for an alliance with Germany.

On the basis of Lord Lothian's praise for the natural friendship between Germany and Britain, Ribbentrop informed Hitler that all elements of British society wished for closer ties with Germany.

But there was a certain difference of opinion between Ribbentrop and Hitler: Ribbentrop sincerely wished to recover the former German colonies, whereas for Hitler, colonial demands were just a negotiating tactic: Germany would renounce its demands in exchange for a British alliance.

The origins of the Anti-Comintern Pact went back to the summer and fall of 1935, when in an effort to square the circle between seeking a rapprochement with Japan and Germany's traditional alliance with China, Ribbentrop and Ōshima devised the idea of an anti-Communist alliance as a way to bind China, Japan, and Germany together.

In 1935, Ribbentrop arranged for a series of much-publicized visits of World War I veterans to Britain, France, and Germany.

Ribbentrop persuaded the British Legion ( the leading veterans ' group in Britain ) and many French veterans ' groups to send delegations to Germany to meet German veterans as the best way to promote peace.

Ribbentrop was able to persuade an impressive array of British high society to visit Hitler in Germany.

" In his diaries, he expressed the belief that German diplomacy should find a way to exploit the emerging tensions between Stalin and the West, but he proclaimed foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, whom Hitler would not abandon, incapable of such a feat.

Ribbentrop immediately suggested that he should succeed Bülow as State Secretary.

In June 1937, when Lord Mount Temple, the Chairman of the Anglo-German Fellowship, asked to see the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain after meeting Hitler in a visit arranged by Ribbentrop, Robert Vansittart, the British Foreign Office's Undersecretary wrote a memo stating that :" The P. M. Minister should certainly not see Lord Mount Temple – nor should the S of S. We really must put a stop to this eternal butting in of amateurs – and Lord Mount Temple is a particularly silly one.

By the last statement, Ribbentrop clearly implied that the Soviet Union should be included in the anti-British alliance system he had proposed.

Ribbentrop expressed his firmly-held belief that neither Britain nor France would go to war for Poland, but if that should occur, he fully expected the Italians to honour the terms of the Pact of Steel ( which was both an offensive and defensive treaty ), and declare war not only on Poland, but on the Western powers if necessary.

It would be a dangerous illusion to think that, if war once starts, it will come to an early end even if a success on any one of the several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been secured " Ribbentrop for his part told Hitler that Chamberlain's letter was just a bluff, and urged his master to call it.

Ciano was amazed at the way that Laval fell in with the German demands, and thought it all typical Ribbentrop that he should remind Laval in a very tactless way how this forest had once served as Napoleon's headquarters.

But even in prison, Ribbentrop remained loyal to Hitler: " Even with all I know, if in this cell Hitler should come to me and say ' Do this!

On October 19, however, the Slovak representatives Tiso and Ďurčanský met with Ribbentrop in Munich and managed to persuade him to assign Košice ( with 75 % Hungarian majority in 1910 ) to Czechoslovakia and to accept the principle that there should remain as many Slovaks and Rusyns in Hungary as Magyars in Czechoslovakia.

After long hesitation, Ribbentrop was also persuaded that the award should go beyond the ethnic principle, and should above all give Hungary the important towns of Košice ( Kassa ), Uzhhorod ( Ungvár ) and Mukachevo ( Munkács ).

He ( Ribbentrop ) also said that if Japan were to go to war with America, Germany would, of course, join in immediately, and Hitler's intention was that there should be absolutely no question of Germany making a separate peace with England.

On August 19, 1938, Weizsäcker wrote a memo to the Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop stating: " I again opposed the whole theory of ( an attack on Czechoslovakia ) and observed that we should have to wait political developments until the English lose interest in the Czech matter and would tolerate our action, before we could tackle the affair without risk ".

At a meeting Ōshima had with Hitler and Ribbentrop on 27 May 1944, Hitler advised that the Japanese government should publicly hang every captured US pilot who was involved in air raids, with the hope this would deter further such attacks.