When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941 Rokossovsky was serving as the commander of the 9th Mechanised Corps, where his command participated in the Battle of Dubno — an early Soviet counter-attack that ended in the destruction of most of the participating Soviet forces against Von Rundstedt's Army Group South in the Ukraine.

The Götz von Berlichingen was placed under the LXXX Army Corps, a part of Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt's Heeresgruppe D.

Two massive German armies flanked them: General Fedor von Bock's Army Group B was to the east, and General Gerd von Rundstedt's Army Group A to the west.

Since Reichenau's order was widely understood as endorsing the mass killings of Ukrainian Jews which were going on behind the German lines, with which 6th Army at any rate was actively co-operating, Rundstedt's open endorsement of its strongly anti-Semitic language clearly contradicts his later assertions that he did not know what the Einsatzgruppen were doing.

Although he was commander of the German Army in the west, charged with defending the coasts of France and Begium against attack by the western Allies, the military governors in Paris and Brussels ( Rundstedt's former subordinate Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel and Alexander von Falkenhausen respectively ) were not under his direct command, and he had no control over the Navy or Air Force.

Since he was a witness, not a defendant, the questioning was not intended to prove Rundstedt's guilt: it was designed to bolster the prosecution's case that the high command had functioned as an organisation and that it was collectively responsible for the German invasions of various countries between 1939 and 1941 and also for the war crimes committed during those invasions.

Bock's Army Group B on the right was to advance on Paris, while Rundstedt's Army Group A, now consisting only of List's 12th Army, Weichs's 2nd Army and Busch's 16th Army, was to attack towards Soissons and Rheims.

Rundstedt's biographer writes: " This was something for which some Germans, while they were prepared to forgive him everything else, could and cannot excuse him.

It is Rundstedt's steadfast refusal to lend his support to any of the plans to overthrow Hitler's government, however, which is most held against him, particularly in a modern Germany which has turned its back on militarism and has elevated the 20 July plotters to the status of national heroes.

Rundstedt's main field commanders ( from north to south ) were Blaskowitz ( 9th Army ), List ( 12th Army ) and General Ernst Busch ( 16th Army ).

General Günther von Kluge's 4th Army and General Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Weichs's 2nd Army were transferred from Army Group B to Rundstedt's command.

This was a sign that Rundstedt still had Hitler's respect, as were Hitler's two visits to Rundstedt's armies during this period.

Had this happened, Rundstedt's forces would have been in no state to give chase: they were exhausted after two months of ceaseless combat.

Rundstedt's armies were also weakened by the transfer of units back to Army Group Centre to take part in the attack on Moscow ( Operation Typhoon ).

Rundstedt's command of French and his good relationship with the head of the collaborationist Vichy regime, Marshal Philippe Pétain, were considerable assets.

Rundstedt's defence, both at the time and after the war, was that as a soldier he had a duty to obey the orders of the legitimate government, whoever that was, and whatever the orders were.

" This was not an indication of any fondness for the Weimar Republic on Rundstedt's part-he remained a monarchist.

Even after this, two of Rundstedt's friends, Generals Erwin von Witzleben and Erich Hoepner, remained involved in anti-Hitler plots and continued to try to recruit him.

In May Hitler approved Rundstedt's appointment as commander of Army Group South, to invade Poland from Silesia and Slovakia.

Some writers have sought to connect Rundstedt's acceptance this money with his continuing refusal to support the resistance movement against Hitler's regime within the Germany Army.

At the same time, in the Soviet Union, Rundstedt's old command, Army Group South, was facing disaster at Stalingrad, the decisive battle of World War II in Europe.

During the attack on the Low Countries and France, the 4th Army, as part of Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt's Army Group A, went into Belgium from the Rhineland.

In May 1941, Panzer Group Kleist became Panzer Group 1 ( Panzergruppe 1 ), which was attached to Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt's Army Group South at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa.

On 24 May, Hitler had visited General von Rundstedt's headquarters at Charleville.

Rundstedt's education followed the path ordained for Prussian military families: the junior cadet college at Diez, near Koblenz, then the military academy at Lichterfelde in Berlin.

On 29 May, Hitler came to Rundstedt's headquarters at Charleville-Mézières to discuss the new offensive.

On 10 July Brauchitsch arrived at Rundstedt's headquarters at Brody, with instructions from Hitler that Kleist was turn south towards Vinnitsa and link up with Schobert's army there, rather than continue south-east to Kirovograd.

On 3 November Brauchitsch visited Rundstedt's headquarters at Poltava, where Rundstedt told him that the armies must halt and dig in for the winter.

" The historian Stephen E. Ambrose wrote: " The only high-command officer who responded correctly to the crisis at hand was Field Marshal Rundstedt, the old man who was there for window-dressing and who was so scorned by Hitler and OKW ... Rundstedt's reasoning was sound, his actions decisive, his orders clear.

Hitler sent the chief of staff of the Armed Forces Supreme Command ( Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW ), General Wilhelm Keitel, to Rundstedt's headquarters, to urge caution.

Hitler's personal intervention also greatly hindered the effective working of the General Staff, notably by confirming Gerd von Rundstedt's order to halt short of Dunkirk in 1940.

Rundstedt's mother, Adelheid Fischer, was of Huguenot ( French Protestant ) descent.

Rundstedt's retirement did not last long.

Rundstedt's armies advanced rapidly into southern Poland, capturing Krakow on 6 September, but Reichenau's over-ambitious attempt to take Warsaw by storm on 9 September was repelled.

Rundstedt's biographer says: " There is certainly no evidence that Rundstedt ever condoned, let alone encouraged, these acts.

Although Manstein is often credited for the change of plans, he himself acknowledged Rundstedt's decisive role.

Rundstedt's attack began on 9 June, and within a few days had broken the French resistance.

Nevertheless, during October Rundstedt's forces won another great victory when Manstein and Kleist's tanks reached the Sea of Azov, trapping two Soviet Armies around Mariupol and taking over 100, 000 prisoners.

He arrived in Poltava on 3 December, where he found both Reichenau and Dietrich firm in defending the correctness of Rundstedt's actions.

In Rundstedt's area of command, Einsatzgruppe C, commanded by Otto Rasch, operated in northern Ukraine, and Einsatzgruppe D, commanded by Otto Ohlendorf, operated in southern Ukraine.

The Corps disintegrated at the Berezina crossings as its columns attempted to cross the river under heavy air attack ; nearly all its units were destroyed by the 2nd Belorussian Front in the subsequent encirclement east of Minsk.