from Brown Corpus
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I come now to a third argument, which again is very simple.
When we come upon the rabbit and make our remark about its suffering being a bad thing, we presumably make it with some feeling ; ;
the positivists are plainly right in saying that such remarks do usually express feeling.
But suppose that a week later we revert to the incident in thought and make our statement again.
And suppose that the circumstances have now so changed that the feeling with which we made the remark in the first place has faded.
The pathetic evidence is no longer before us ; ;
and we are now so fatigued in body and mind that feeling is, as we say, quite dead.
In these circumstances, since what was expressed by the remark when first made is, on the theory before us, simply absent, the remark now expresses nothing.
It is as empty as the word `` Hurrah '' would be when there was no enthusiasm behind it.
And this seems to me untrue.
When we repeat the remark that such suffering was a bad thing, the feeling with which we made it last week may be at or near the vanishing point, but if we were asked whether we meant to say what we did before, we should certainly answer Yes.
We should say that we made our point with feeling the first time and little or no feeling the second time, but that it was the same point we were making.
And if we can see that what we meant to say remains the same, while the feeling varies from intensity to near zero, it is not the feeling that we primarily meant to express.

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