Peirce argues that good abductive reasoning from P to Q involves not simply a determination that, e. g., Q is sufficient for P, but also that Q is among the most economical explanations for P. Simplification and economy are what call for the ' leap ' of abduction.

Abductive validation is common practice in hypothesis formation in science ; moreover, Peirce argues it is a ubiquitous aspect of thought:

Most important, each year from 1907 until James's death in 1910, James wrote to his friends in the Boston intelligentsia to request financial aid for Peirce ; the fund continued even after James died.

It is even possible to define all four in terms of a sole sufficient operator such as the Peirce arrow ( NOR ) or Sheffer stroke ( NAND ).

Whether one chooses to call it " pragmatism " or " pragmaticism "— and Peirce himself was not always consistent about it even after the notorious renaming — his conception of pragmatic philosophy is based on one or another version of the so-called " pragmatic maxim ".

But Peirce did not seize on this fact to enhance his reputation, and even coined the word " pragmaticism " to distinguish his philosophical position.

" So it would seem that Peirce intended the coinage " pragmaticism " for two distinguishable purposes: ( 1 ) protection from literary journals and word-kidnappers, and ( 2 ) reference strictly to his own form of pragmatism, as opposed even to other pragmatisms that had not moved him to the new name.

" I believe Peirce was right in holding that all clocks are clouds to some considerable degree — even the most precise of clocks.

About 20 years later, Newcomb allegedly influenced the Carnegie Institution Trustees, to prevent C. S. Peirce's last chance to publish his life's work, through a denial of a Carnegie grant to Peirce, even though Andrew Carnegie himself, Theodore Roosevelt, William James and others, wrote to support it.

Beta does not nest in gamma, quantified modal logic being more than even Peirce could envisage.

This caused some to argue that Morris misinterpreted Peirce by converting the interpretant into a logically existent thing.

In an 1893 manuscript " Immortality in the Light of Synechism ," Peirce applied his doctrine of synechism to the question of the soul's immortality in order to argue in the affirmative.

Although James certainly agreed with Peirce and against Berkeley that general ideas exist as a psychological fact, he was a nominalist in his ontology:

EPI can also be seen as a game against nature, first proposed by Charles Sanders Peirce.

The definitions of necessarian, necessarianism, and necessitarian ( and possibly all the related words ) were written by the philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, who argued against necessitarianism with Paul Carus.

Sir Ludovic Kennedy, a campaigner against miscarriages of justice, dedicated a book to Peirce, calling her " the doyenne of British defence lawyers " and that she " refuses to be defeated in any case no matter how unfavourable it looks ".

Benjamin Peirce, Charles ' father, then took the stand and asserted that, given the independence of each downstroke, the probability that all 30 downstrokes should coincide in two genuine signatures was.

His claim ( which he attributes to Charles Sanders Peirce and John Buridan ) is that every statement includes an implicit assertion of its own truth.

The three most influential forms of the pragmatic theory of truth were introduced around the turn of the 20th century by Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey.

Peirce defines truth as follows: " Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential ingredient of truth.

Although Peirce uses words like concordance and correspondence to describe one aspect of the pragmatic sign relation, he is also quite explicit in saying that definitions of truth based on mere correspondence are no more than nominal definitions, which he accords a lower status than real definitions.

Peirce emphasized fallibilism, considered the assertion of absolute certainty a barrier to inquiry, and in 1901 defined truth as follows: " Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential ingredient of truth .".

Peirce emphasized that a supposition of reality and truth seems to be the only way to explain scientific progress and to justify the scientific practice of seeking explanations of regularities in better theories.

( Peirce held that one cannot have absolute theoretical assurance of having actually reached the truth, and later said that the confession of inaccuracy and one-sidedness is an essential ingredient of a true abstract statement.

For more on Peirce's theory of truth, see the Peirce section in Pragmatic theory of truth.

In " The Fixation of Belief ", Peirce characterized inquiry in general not as the pursuit of truth per se but as the struggle to settle disturbances or conflicts of belief, irritating, inhibitory doubts, belief being that on which one is willing to act.

Starting from the idea that people seek not truth per se but instead to subdue irritating, inhibitory doubt, Peirce shows how, through the struggle, some can come to submit to truth, seek as truth the guidance of potential practice correctly to its given goal, and wed themselves to the scientific method.

The conception of truth in question varies along lines that reflect the influence of several thinkers, initially and notably, Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, but a number of common features can be identified.

In his contribution to the article " Truth and Falsity and Error " for Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology ( 1901 ), Peirce defines truth in the following way:

Although Peirce occasionally uses words like concordance and correspondence to describe one aspect of the pragmatic sign relation, he is also quite explicit in saying that definitions of truth based on mere correspondence are no more than nominal definitions, which he follows long tradition in relegating to a lower status than real definitions.

Here Peirce makes a statement that is decisive for understanding the relationship between his pragmatic definition of truth and any theory of truth that leaves it solely and simply a matter of representations corresponding with their objects.

This tells us the sense in which Peirce entertained a correspondence theory of truth, namely, a purely nominal sense.

In preparing for this task, Peirce makes use of an allegorical story, omitted here, the moral of which is that there is no use seeking a conception of truth that we cannot conceive ourselves being able to capture in a humanly conceivable concept.

William James ( 1907 ) begins his chapter on " Pragmatism's Conception of Truth " in much the same letter and spirit as the above selection from Peirce ( 1906 ), noting the nominal definition of truth as a plausible point of departure, but immediately observing that the pragmatist's quest for the meaning of truth can only begin, not end there.

Frege developed a similar view ( though later ) in his great work The Foundations of Arithmetic, as did Charles Sanders Peirce ( but Peirce held that the possible and the real are not limited to the actually, individually existent ).

Jastrow wrote the following summary: " Mr. Peirce ’ s courses in logic gave me my first real experience of intellectual muscle.

Though I promptly took to the laboratory of psychology when that was established by Stanley Hall, it was Peirce who gave me my first training in the handling of a psychological problem, and at the same time stimulated my self-esteem by entrusting me, then fairly innocent of any laboratory habits, with a real bit of research.

Peirce, like Kant before him, recognizes Aristotle's distinction between a nominal definition, a definition in name only, and a real definition, one that states the function of the concept, the reason for conceiving it, and so indicates the essence, the underlying substance of its object.

Truth is defined, for Peirce, as what would be the ultimate outcome ( not any outcome in real time ) of inquiry by a ( usually scientific ) community of investigators.

The best definition of truth from the logical standpoint which is known to me is that by Peirce: " The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real 5. 407.

The objective random-assignment is used to test the significance of the null hypothesis, following the ideas of C. S. Peirce and Ronald A. Fisher.

His 1938 Logic: The Theory of Inquiry is much influenced by Peirce.

Testing a hypothesis using the data that was used to specify the model is a fallacy, according to the natural science of Bacon and the scientific method of Peirce.

It is also possible to represent logical descriptions using semantic networks such as the existential Graphs of Charles Sanders Peirce or the related Conceptual Graphs of John F. Sowa.

In the nineteenth century, Charles Sanders Peirce defined what he termed " semiotic " ( which he sometimes spelled as " semeiotic ") as the " quasi-necessary, or formal doctrine of signs ", which abstracts " what must be the characters of all signs used by ... an intelligence capable of learning by experience ", and which is philosophical logic pursued in terms of signs and sign processes.

John Dewey, less broadly than James but more broadly than Peirce, held that inquiry, whether scientific, technical, sociological, philosophical or cultural, is self-corrective over time if openly submitted for testing by a community of inquirers in order to clarify, justify, refine and / or refute proposed truths.

He also defines the term “ skepticism ” as he uses it and identifies two types of skeptic, the Apollonian, who is “ committed to clarity and rationality ” and the Dionysian, who is “ committed to passion and instinct .” William James, Bertrand Russell, and Friedrich Nietzsche exemplify the Apollonian skeptic, Carroll says, and Charles Sanders Peirce, Tertullian, Søren Kierkegaard, and Blaise Pascal are Dionysian skeptics.

Spade attempts to explain himself to Brigid O ' Shaughnessy with the Flitcraft parable, in which Hammett makes an oblique reference to the philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, but O ' Shaughnessy has no idea what he is getting at.

Peirce said that to abduce a hypothetical explanation from an observed surprising circumstance is to surmise that may be true because then would be a matter of course.

Thus, in the twentieth century this collapse was reinforced by Karl Popper's explication of the hypothetico-deductive model, where the hypothesis is considered to be just " a guess " ( in the spirit of Peirce ).

Before 1900, Peirce treated abduction as the use of a known rule to explain an observation, e. g., it is a known rule that if it rains the grass is wet ; so, to explain the fact that the grass is wet ; one infers that it has rained.

The influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, and of early operationalists and pragmatists such as Charles Sanders Peirce, is particularly clear in the foundational ideas of general semantics.

Randomization is a core principle in statistical theory, whose importance was emphasized by Charles S. Peirce in " Illustrations of the Logic of Science " ( 1877 – 1878 ) and " A Theory of Probable Inference " ( 1883 ).

John Florian Sowa is the computer scientist who invented conceptual graphs, a graphic notation for logic and natural language, based on the structures in semantic networks and on the existential graphs of Charles S. Peirce.