Critics of Goerdeler such as the American political scientist Daniel Goldhagen have asserted that, because Goerdeler published a list of " non-Aryan " physicians to be excluded from practicing under public insurance, Goerdeler was an anti-Semite ; by contrast, Goerdeler's defenders like the Canadian historian Peter Hoffmann have argued that Goerdeler's insistence on enforcing the laws served to protect those Jewish physicians entitled to practice.

In the same report, Goerdeler argued that the root of German economic problems was rearmament, and advocated as the solution reducing military spending, increasing German exports, and returning to a free market economy.

Goerdeler argued that the tolerance of other Western nations, especially the United States for German state's subsiding the dumping of exports was wearing thin, and would soon result in harsh new tariffs being applied against German goods.

Goerdeler argued that the only way out of the economic crisis which gripped the German economy in 1936 was the devaluation of the Reichmark, and abandoning all of the restrictions governing foreign exchange in Germany.

Goerdeler argued that for devaluation of the Reichmark to be successful would require co-ordination with other nations, especially the United States, the United Kingdom and France, who otherwise might be tempted to engage in competitive devaluations of the dollar, the pound and the franc respectively.

To secure their co-operation, Goerdeler argued for rapprochement with the Western powers.

To this end, Goerdeler argued in exchange for Anglo-French-American economic co-operation and support, Germany should at a minimum cease its unilateral economic policies, and sharply cut military spending.

The British historian Adam Tooze has argued that Goerdeler was following his own agenda in seeking to moderate the regime's domestic policies in his memorandum, and that it is highly unlikely that outside powers would have required the concessions on anti-Semitic and other domestic policies that Goerdeler advocated as the price of Western economic support ( through Tooze does feel that Goerdeler was correct in arguing that the West would have made cutbacks in military spending a precondition of economic support ).

Goerdeler argued his policies of economic liberalization and devaluation would in the short run cause 2 million-2. 5 million unemployed in Germany, but argued that in the long-run, the increase in exports would make the German economy stronger.

Goerdeler's critics are offended by his suggestion that German Jews whose ancestors had not lived within the borders of the German Empire before July 1, 1871 should not be considered German citizens, whereas Goerdeler's defenders such as the Canadian historian Peter Hoffmann have argued that Goerdeler was trying to present the Nazi regime with an alternative to genocide.

On January 22, 1943 at the home of Peter Yorck von Wartenburg Goerdeler met with the Kreisau Circle, during which he argued and debated forcefully about the social and economic policies to be pursued by a post-Nazi government.

Only because all offences against law and decency are carried out under the protection of secrecy and under the pressures of terror " Goerdeler argued that if only a situation were created " in which, if only for twenty-four hours, it possible for the truth to be spoken again ", then the Nazi regime would collapse like a house of cards.

Some historians such as Christof Dipper and Martin Broszat have argued that Goerdeler agreed with the antisemitic policy of the regime until 1938, though afterwards he did resist the Holocaust and other forms of mass murder.

The German historian Christof Dipper in his 1983 essay " Der Deutsche Widerstand und die Juden " ( translated into English as " The German Resistance and the Jews ") argued that the majority of the anti-Nazi national-conservatives such as Goerdeler were anti-Semitic.

Underlying the basis of the “ containment ” of Germany was the so-called “ X documents ” provided by Carl Friedrich Goerdeler over the course of the winter of 1938 – 39 which suggested that the German economy, under the strain of massive military spending was on the verge of collapse, and which led British policy-makers to the conclusion that if Hitler could be deterred from war and if his regime was “ contained ” long enough, then the German economy would collapse, and with it, presumably the Nazi regime.

* May 6 – Carl Friedrich Goerdeler tells the British government that the German and Soviet governments are secretly beginning a rapprochement with the aim of dividing Eastern Europe between them.

They soon established contacts with several prominent civilians, including Carl Goerdeler, the former mayor of Leipzig, and Helmuth James Graf von Moltke, the great-grandnephew of the hero of the Franco-Prussian War.

Goerdeler was apparently also in indirect contact with Himmler via a mutual acquaintance Carl Langbehn.

Canaris arranged for appointment of Gisevius as Vice Consul in Switzerland, where Gisevius met with Allen Dulles in 1943, and agreed to serve as a liaison with the German opposition to Hitler, including General Ludwig Beck, Canaris, and Mayor Carl Goerdeler of Leipzig.

During the economic crisis of 1935-36, Schacht, together with the Price Commissioner Dr. Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, helped lead the " free-market " faction in the German government.

On December 8, 1931, Chancellor Heinrich Brüning, a personal friend of Goerdeler, appointed him as Reich Price Commissioner, and entrusted him with the task of overseeing his deflationary policies.

The sternness with which Goerdeler administered his task as Price Commissioner made him a well-known figure in Germany.

By the mid-1930s, Goerdeler grew increasingly disillusioned with the Nazis as it become more and more apparent that Hitler had no interest in reading any of Goerdeler's memoranda, but instead was carrying out economic and financial polices that Goerdeler regarded as highly irresponsible.

During his second term as Price Commissioner in 1934 – 1935, Goerdeler often came into conflict with the Economics Minister and Reichsbank president Dr. Hjalmar Schacht over his inflationary policies.

In his report, Goerdeler wrote that the foremost goal of German economic policy should be: " the satisfactory provisioning of the population with fats, even in relation to armaments, as having political priority ".

Goerdeler warned that to continue the present course of increasing statism in the economy and the current levels of high military spending would result in the total collapse of the economy with an extremely drastic drop in living standards.

In the spring of 1936, Goerdeler came into increasing conflict with Haake over the question of demolition of a monument to the German-Jewish composer Felix Mendelssohn.

Despite his earlier differences with Dr. Schacht, Goerdeler together with Schacht headed the " free-market " faction in the German government who during the economic crisis of 1936 urged Hitler to reduce military spending, turn away from autarkic and protectionist policies, and reduce statism in the economy.

Despite his disagreements with Göring over the best economic course to follow, on August 6, 1936, Göring commissioned a report from Goerdeler as a leading economic expert about whether Germany should devalue the Reichmark or not.

In his memorandum for Göring, Goerdeler wrote of the " grandiose possibility " that a German reengagement with the world economy, and the end of protectionism and autarchism would lead to a new age of economic co-operation among the world's largest economies.

Goerdeler wrote that " I can well imagine that we will have to bring certain issues ... into a greater degree of alignment with the imponderable attitudes of other peoples, not in substance, but in the manner of dealing with them ".

Before leaving, Goerdeler met with Adolf Hitler and the Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, and received their promise that nothing would happen to the statue during his trip.

The case of Goerdeler has been used by the historian Hans Mommsen to support his view of " resistance as a process ", with Goerdeler going from an ally of the regime to increasing disillusionment by Nazi economic policies in the mid-1930s, and finally becoming committed to the regime's overthrow by 1937.

Goerdeler wrote that Stauffenberg " revealed himself as a cranky, obstinate fellow who wanted to play politics.

Von Falkenhausen was a close friend of two anti-Hitler conspirators, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler and Field Marshal Erwin von Witzleben, and soon came to detest Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime, offering his support to von Witzleben for a planned coup d ' état.

I also ask you to think over the method I have suggested and to give an opportunity on my return to discuss the situation and the posssibilites calmely. With my best wishes. Yours sincerely. GOERDELER Goerdeler had great faith in his idea that if only he could meet with Hitler and explain to him that his leadership was grossly inadequate on military and economic grounds, then Hitler could be persuaded to resign in his favor, thereby ending Nazi Germany through non-violent means.

In January – February 1940, Goerdeler together with Popitz, Beck and Hassell spent of their time working on the sort of constitutional, economic, social and educational system that a post-Nazi government would carry out.

In October 1937, during a visit to the United States, Goerdeler stayed with the British historian Sir John Wheeler-Bennett at the latter's estate in Virginia, and informed him of his desire to restore the monarchy in Germany.

Stauffenberg saw Goerdeler as an out-of-touch reactionary, a man living in the past, whose plans to restore the monarchy were simply not relevant to the modern world.

" However, Goerdeler was heavily criticised by other members of the German resistance ( for example by some members the Kreisau Circle ) for objecting to killing Hitler ( whom Goerdeler wanted to see tried ; Goerdeler had no objection to Hitler being executed after his conviction ), for his sympathy for reintroducing monarchy, and for his extremely anti-communist ideology.

The idea of restoring the former Emperor Wilhelm II to his throne was rejected by Goerdeler under the grounds that the personality of the former Kaiser and the way he had behaved during his thirty-year reign made him a completely unsuitable candidate.

Popitz by contrast, while agreeing with Goerdeler that the unstable former Kaiser was unsuitable, insisted on dynastic grounds that the Crown Prince Wilhelm be the next Emperor, and was to spent much time arguing with Goerdeler over which of the sons of the former Emperor was to sit on the throne.