Socrates concludes that if Euthyphro's definition of piety is acceptable, then there must exist at least one thing that is both pious and impious ( as it is both loved and hated by the gods )— which Euthyphro admits is absurd.

Euthyphro then proposes yet again another definition: Piety, he says, is an art of sacrifice and prayer.

Euthyphro then revises his definition, so that piety is only what is loved by all the gods unanimously ( 9e ).

Eleanor Stump and Norman Kretzmann have responded to the Euthyphro dilemma by appealing to the doctrine of divine simplicity, a concept associated with Aquinas and Aristotle which suggests that the substance and attributes of God are identical.

* Plato's dialogue Euthyphro, in which Socrates seeks a definition of piety.

For example, in the Euthyphro, Socrates asks Euthyphro to provide a definition of piety.

Thus, Euthyphro is brought to a realization by this dialectical method that his definition of piety is not sufficiently meaningful.

In the scene, Socrates and Euthyphro are discussing the nature of piety when Socrates presents the dilemma, which can be presented as the question ' Is X good because God commands it, or does God command X because it is good?

Morality in this absolute sense solidifies in the dialogues of Plato, together with the emergence of monotheistic thought ( notably in Euthyphro, which ponders the concept of piety ( τὸ ὅσιον ) as a moral absolute ).

Taking place during the weeks leading up to Socrates ' trial, the dialogue features Socrates and Euthyphro, a religious expert also mentioned at Cratylus 396a and 396d, attempting to define piety or holiness.

At the end of the dialogue, Euthyphro is forced to admit that each definition has been a failure, but rather than correct it, he makes the excuse that it is time for him to go, and Socrates ends the dialogue with a classic example of Socratic irony: since Euthyphro has been unable to come up with a definition that will stand on its own two feet, Euthyphro has failed to teach Socrates anything at all about piety, and so he has received no aid for his own defense at his own trial ( 15c ff.

Socrates goads Euthyphro to offer one definition after another for the word ' piety '.

The hope is to use a clear definition as the basis for Euthyphro to teach Socrates the answer to the question, " What is piety?

Euthyphro offers as his first definition of piety what he is doing now, that is, prosecuting his father for manslaughter ( 5d ).

When questioned by Socrates as to exactly what is the end product of piety, Euthyphro can only fall back on his earlier claim: piety is what is loved by all the gods ( 14b ).

Socrates and Euthyphro discuss the nature of piety in Euthyphro.

A famous paradox called the Euthyphro dilemma essentially asks: is something right because God commands it, or does God command it because it's right?

" This raises the question, similar to the Euthyphro Dilemma, of where this law of logic, which God is bound to obey, comes from.

Plato famously formalized < nowiki > the </ nowiki > Socratic elenctic style in prose — presenting Socrates as the curious questioner of some prominent Athenian interlocutor — in some of his early dialogues, such as Euthyphro and Ion, and the method is most commonly found within the so-called " Socratic dialogues ", which generally portray Socrates engaging in the method and questioning his fellow citizens about moral and epistemological issues.

Euthyphro replies that the pious is that which is loved by the gods.

This conclusion implicitly takes the first horn of the Euthyphro dilemma, asserting the independence of good and evil morality from God ( as God is defined in monotheistic belief ).

The Euthyphro dilemma can elicit the response that an action is good because God commands the action, or that God commands an action because it is good.

Proponents of the Euthyphro dilemma might claim that divine command theory is obviously wrong because either answer challenges the ability of God to give moral laws.

This line of reasoning is introduced most famously in Plato's dialogue Euthyphro, which asks whether something is right because the gods love it, or whether the gods love it because it is right.

Euthyphro (;, " Euthuphron ": right-minded or sincere ) is one of Plato's early dialogues, dated to after 399 BC.

In an example of " Socratic irony ," Socrates states that Euthyphro obviously has a clear understanding of what is pious ( τὸ ὅσιον to hosion ) and impious ( τὸ ἀνόσιον to anosion ).

Since Socrates himself is facing a charge of impiety, he expresses the hope to learn from Euthyphro, all the better to defend himself in his own trial.

Euthyphro claims that what lies behind the charge brought against Socrates by Meletus and the other accusers is Socrates ' claim that he is subjected to a daimon or divine sign which warns him of various courses of action ( 3b ).

Yet with every definition Euthyphro proposes, Socrates very quickly finds a fatal flaw ( 6d ff.

Euthyphro proposes ( 6e ) that the pious ( τὸ ὅσιον ) is the same thing as what is loved by the gods ( τὸ θεοφιλές ), but Socrates finds a problem with this proposal: the gods may disagree among themselves ( 7e ).

The Euthyphro dilemma has been addressed by many philosophers and theologians since the time of Plato, though not always with reference to the Platonic dialogue.

This supplies James with an adequate answer to the underlying question of the Euthyphro ".

** Bundled with Euthyphro, Socrates ' Defense ( aka Apology ) and the death scene from Phaedo

** Bundled with Euthyphro, Crito and the death scene from Phaedo

Yet after claiming to be able to tell even more amazing such stories, Euthyphro spends little time or effort defending the conventional view of the gods.

But, Socrates also has Euthyphro agreeing that the gods are quarrelsome and their quarrels, like human quarrels, concern objects of love or hatred.

Euthyphro tries to argue against Socrates ' criticism by pointing out that not even the gods would disagree amongst themselves that someone who kills without justification should be punished but Socrates argues that disputes would still arise — over just how much justification there actually was, and hence the same action could still be both pious and impious.

At this point Socrates introduces the " Euthyphro dilemma " by asking the crucial question: " Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious?

Without yet realizing that it makes his definition circular, Euthyphro at this point agrees that the gods like an action because it is pious.

Socrates presses Euthyphro to state what benefit the gods get from the gifts humans give to them, warning that this " knowledge of exchange " is a species of commerce ( 14e ).

The Euthyphro dilemma is found in Plato's dialogue Euthyphro, in which Socrates asks Euthyphro, " Is the pious ( τὸ ὅσιον ) loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?