Raeder came to fear that this debate was starting to sully the image of the Navy to such an extent that he would never convince anyone in power to fund the Navy again, and so took extraordinary steps in the late 1920s to end the debate by trying to silence all critics of Tirpitz.

Raeder was keenly aware that the Army was the senior service and that many in Germany took the view that because the great High Seas Fleet that Tirpitz had built had done almost nothing in World War I that it would be a waste of money and time to attempt to rebuilt Tirpitz's fleet.

Raeder took the view that the Navy should be " one family " with himself as the stern, but loving father figure, and the sailors as his " children ", from whom he expected unconditional obedience.

This incident received much sensationalized and exaggerated press coverage in Germany where it was claimed that an attempted mutiny had occurred on the Emden, and which Raeder apparently took more seriously than he did the reports from his own officers.

At the same time, Raeder worked to promote National Socialist ideology as opposed to the NSDAP in the Navy, ordering in September 1936 that all officers read a tract by Kriegsmarine Commander Siegfried Sorge called Der Marineoffizier about what it took to be a good officer., Sorge had claimed that one could not be a good naval officer without believing in National Socialist values.

Because of the long period in which it took to build a battle fleet, Raeder was, despite his Anglophobia, hostile towards an anti-British foreign policy ( at least until the High Seas Fleet was resurrected ) and until 1937, Raeder saw his principal enemies as France, Poland and the Soviet Union.

Raeder later claimed when on trial for his life at Nuremberg that the Hossbach conference was a flight of fancy on Hitler's part that nobody took seriously, and he did not object because there was nothing to object to.

Despite his belief that the attack on Poland would cause only a local war, on 15 August 1939 Raeder took the precaution of ordering two Panzerschife the Admiral Graf von Spee and the Deutschland, a number of U-boats and the Dithmarschen ships Altmark and Westerwald to the Atlantic in case Britain should go to war.

In July 1941, when the U. S Marines took over the occupation of Iceland, Raeder advised Hitler that Germany should declare war on the United States as a reply.

Raeder took the view that because of the increasing number of naval " incidents " in the second half of 1941 between U-boats and US ships guarding convoys to Britain, that the best thing to do was to declare war on America in order to end all of the restrictions on fighting the U. S. Navy.

In late 1942, in an attempt to limit Dönitz's power and cut down his " vanity ", Raeder took away responsibility for training U-boat crews from Dönitz, only to see Dönitz ignore his orders.

Recognizing Hitler's fondness for Dönitz, Raeder always took Dönitz with him ( despite their mutual dislike ) when he went to lobby Hitler for more naval funding, guessing correctly that Hitler was more likely to say yes to a request for more money for U-boat construction from Dönitz than he was from himself.

Finally, Raeder was presented as a victim of Hitler with the committee having Raeder say " It was the tragedy of my life that our future took a completely different path ".

Raeder's strong authoritarian tendencies came to the fore as soon he assumed command of the Reichsmarine in 1928 when he sent out a circular making clear that dissent would not be allowed while at the same time carrying out the " great seal hunt " of 1928-29 when Raeder forced most of the senior admirals into early retirement in order to promote men who were loyal to him.

As a devout Lutheran who as captain of the Cöln in World War I personally conducted services on the deck of his cruiser, Raeder sought to make Christianity a great part of the lives of his men as possible.

At a speech on 1 April 1933, Raeder expressed his support for " the government of the National Revolution " which he hoped would " lead a unified people, thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the great chancellor to new heights ".

Owing to the fact that the great fleet envisioned in Plan Z existed only in blue-prints or had just began to be built, Raeder like Tirpitz before him in 1914 was forced to abandon his pre-war plans for a great naval battle in the North Sea, and instead embrace the guerre de course strategy that he had previously been opposed to.

The disparity in size between the Royal Navy and the Kriegsmarine meant the great Entscheidungsschlacht in the Mahan-Tirpitz mold that Raeder planned before the war could only end in the destruction of the German force.

Raeder had great hopes for the auxiliary cruisers which he sent to the Pacific, Indian and South Atlantic oceans to tie down British warships all over the globe.

In a message sent to all officers in early 1940, Raeder exclaimed: " The great aim of the Führer has set forth for the German nation requires the utmost exertion in all places ... A navy which undertakes daring actions against the enemy and suffers losses through this will be reborn on an even larger scale.

As a counterpart to his policy of terror, Raeder placed great emphasis on " spiritual leadership " as a war-winning factor in the Kriegsmarine, which in practice meant an intense program of National Socialist propaganda.

Raeder was later to claim after the war the armistice as a great " lost opportunity " for the Kriegsmarine.

Raeder believed that once Britain was defeated, Germany would have to take on and destroy Japan to properly achieve its " world power status " because as a great sea power, Japan was bound to become an enemy of the Reich sooner or later.

Raeder believed that capturing Gibraltar, and the Suez Canal would be a great blow to Britain.

Dönitz had little respect for " old navy " admirals like Raeder, whom he accused of being more interested in a building a great fleet after the war than in actually winning the war.

Raeder, who had always taken great pride in the history of the Navy, was very hurt by Hitler's account of German naval history, which was almost certainly Hitler's intention.

Another debate that brought Raeder's name into the news had started in January 1956 when Captain Karl-Adolf Zenker of the Bundesmarine gave a speech before a group of cadets, which he had mentioned he shown to Raeder in advance for his approval, during which Zenker argued not only for the innocence of Raeder and Dönitz whom Zenker called officers just doing their duty in "... a war thrust upon them ", but also called Raeder and Dönitz great heroes who should be role models when the cadets became officers.

* German leadership rejected Hartenstein's cease fire proposal, partly because Admiral Raeder did not think it wise to enter into a " deal " with the Allies, nothing was to interfere with Eisbär's surprise attack on Cape Town to strike at the supplies destined for the British and Soviets, and Hitler had directed that no word of Laconias sinking or the proposed Axis rescue be transmitted to the Allies, though subordinates ignored Hitler's orders and communicated messages to the Allies about the proposed rescue attempt.

Raeder used his old college Magnus von Levetzow, who worked as Adolf Hitler's naval adviser in the late 1920s and early 1930s to leak Reichsmarine material to the Nazis out of hope that this might win the Nazis over to navalism.

In 1932, when the Navy's chief chaplain, Pastor Friedrich Ronneberger urged in his sermons that everyone pray for Hitler's victory in the presidential election that spring, Raeder sent him a letter remaining him that the Navy was supposed to be neutral on political issues, and asking him to keep his political opinions out of his sermons.

Through Raeder approved of Hitler as a man who believed that it was necessary for Germany to achieve " world power status ", he disapproved of Hitler's proposed means of attaining it.

Raeder was greatly dismayed by Hitler's criticism of Tirpitz and of the pre-1914 Anglo-German naval race, and of his statements that if he came to power, he would a reach an understanding with Britain, whereby Germany would " renounce " naval and colonial ambitions into exchange for British support of German ambitions in Eastern Europe.

In a letter to Levetzow, Raeder declared: " Hitler's contentions concerning rearmament and capital ships are among the silliest that he has come up with yet.

Through Raeder had doubts about Hitler's commitment to navalism, the banning of the SPD and KPD together with the militarist and ultra-nationalist tone of the new regime were appealing to him.

Together with Göring, Raeder were the only ones present who did not object to Hitler's plans for aggression in Eastern Europe.

Raeder reported that in the future the Kriegsmarine would have to take precedence over the other branches of the Wehrmacht to meet the construction targets within Hitler's deadlines.

As such, Raeder very much approved of Hitler's denunciation of the A. G. N. A.

The only problem Raeder faced was Hitler's determination to attack Poland.

The American historian Keith Bird summed up the strategic differences between Hitler and Raeder: " Raeder's continual pressure for an intensified war with Britain and his willingness to risk war with the United States, however, conflicted with Hitler's short-term continental goals.

Raeder persistently tried to influence Hitler's every decision in favour of preparing the foundations for the next step of the Navy's ambitions.

In general, officers who were in some way critical of Hitler's military, if not necessarily political leadership, such as Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt and Admiral Raeder, received ( and accepted ) larger bribes than officers who were well known to be convinced National Socialists, such as General Walter Model, Admiral Karl Dönitz and Field Marshal Ferdinand Schörner.

The success of Hitler's bribery system backfired in that some officers, who had proven themselves especially greedy, such as Guderian and Raeder, came to be regarded by Hitler as a serious annoyance because of their endless demands for more money and more free land for their estates.

Raeder left the meeting of 6 January very depressed, especially over the prospect of seeing his beloved capital ships scrapped and of Hitler's criticism of his leadership.

Raeder claimed that he was not involved in a conspiracy to commit aggression because Hitler's statements in the Hossbach Memorandum of 1937 and again to senior officers including Raeder for plans for a war with Poland in May and August 1939 together with Raeder's own statements to Hitler about seizing Norway in October – November 1939 were all just mere talk that was not to be taken seriously.