In addition, the fact that Ribbentrop chose to spend as little time as possible in London in order to stay close to Hitler irritated the British Foreign Office immensely, as Ribbentrop's frequent absences prevented the handling of many routine diplomatic matters.

When Ribbentrop finally got around to announcing his decision, the Hungarian delegation who had expected Ribbentrop to rule in favour of Romania broke out in cheers while the Romanian foreign minister Mihail Manoilescu fainted.

In the spring of 1941, Ribbentrop appointed an assemblage of SA men to German embassies in Eastern Europe, with Manfred von Killinger going to Romania, Siegfried Kasche to Croatia, Adolf Beckerle to Bulgaria, Dietrich von Jagow to Hungary, and Hans Ludin to Slovakia.

Poglavnik Ante Pavelić of the Independent State of Croatia and Joachim von Ribbentrop in Salzburg, 6 June 1941

When Ribbentrop recovered, he sought a chance for increasing the agency's influence by giving Croatia independence.

In order to deport foreign Jews living in the Reich, Ribbentrop then had Luther negotiate agreements with the governments of Romania, Slovakia, and Croatia to allow Jews holding citizenship of those states to be deported.

Ribbentrop halted deportations from Romania and Croatia ; in the case of the former, he was insulted because the SS were negotiating with the Romanians directly, and in the case of the latter because the SS and Luther were jointly pressuring the Italians in their zone of occupation in Croatia to deport their Jews without first informing Ribbentrop, who was supposed to be personally kept abreast of all developments in Italo-German relations.

In September 1941, Stalin told British diplomats that he wanted two agreements: ( 1 ) a mutual assistance / aid pact and ( 2 ) a recognition that, after the war, the Soviet Union would gain the territories in countries that it had taken pursuant to its division of Eastern Europe with Hitler in the Molotov – Ribbentrop Pact.

Count Wolf-Heinrich von Helldorf, with whom Ribbentrop had served in the 12th Torgau Hussars in the First World War, arranged the introduction.

A visitor to a party Ribbentrop threw in 1928 recorded that Ribbentrop had no political views beyond a vague admiration for Gustav Stresemann, fear of Communism, and a wish to restore the monarchy.

Several Berlin Jewish businessmen who did business with Ribbentrop in the 1920s and knew him well later expressed astonishment at the vicious anti-Semitism Ribbentrop later displayed in the Third Reich, saying that they did not see any indications that he had held such views when they knew him.

And Ribbentrop was blowing up the whole day and I had to do nothing.

The Dienststelle Ribbentrop, which had its offices directly across from the Foreign Office's building on the Wilhelmstrasse in Berlin, had in its membership a collection of Hitlerjugend alumni, dissatisfied businessmen, former reporters, and ambitious Nazi Party members, all of whom tried to conduct a foreign policy independent of, and often contrary to, the Foreign Office.

As for the contradiction between German rearmament and his message of peace, Ribbentrop argued to whoever would listen that the German people had been “ humiliated ” by the Versailles treaty, that Germany wanted peace above all, and German violations of Versailles were part of an effort to restore Germany's " self-respect " By the 1930s, much of British opinion had been convinced that the treaty was monstrously unfair and unjust to Germany, so as a result, many in Britain like Thomas Jones were very open to Ribbentrop ’ s message that if only Versailles could be done away with, then European peace would be secured.

A German diplomat, Truetzschler von Falkenstein, complained after the war that " Ribbentrop, having had contact with only a small group in England – representatives of the so-called two hundred families – did not know the great mass of the English people.

Another German diplomat commented that Ribbentrop had the strange idea to " conduct international relations through aristocrats ".

A former aide recalled that Ribbentrop threw the German Embassy into chaos due to his erratic personality: He rose, muttering bad-temperedly ... Dressed in his pyjamas, he received the junior secretaries and press attachés in his bathroom ... He scolded, threatened, gesticulated with his razor and shouted at his valet ... As he took his bath, he ordered people to be summoned from Berlin, accepted and cancelled, appointed and dismissed, and dictated through the door to a nervous stenographer ... He cursed people in their absence, calling them saboteurs and communists ... It was my task to put his calls through ; his valet stood within splashing distance holding a white telephone ... Ribbentrop believed only ministers ranked above him: everyone else, including his ambassadorial colleagues, had to kept waiting on the line.

I had to console them with feeble excuses such as that His Excellency was not very well, or engaged in an urgent state call to Berlin ... For the rest of the morning he listened to reports from members of the Embassy staff, unless I had to accompany him to the Foreign Office ... When Ribbentrop strutted through the Office corridors like a peacock, his head thrown back, it was a miracle that he did not fall over.

To help with his move to London, and with the design of the new German Embassy Ribbentrop had built ( the existing Embassy was insufficiently grand for Ribbentrop ), Ribbentrop, at his wife's suggestion, hired a Berlin interior decorator named Martin Luther.

During the abdication crisis of December 1936, Ribbentrop reported to Berlin that the reason the crisis had occurred was an anti-German Jewish-Masonic-reactionary conspiracy to depose Edward ( whom Ribbentrop represented as a staunch friend of Germany ), and that civil war would soon break out in Britain between the King's supporters and those of Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin's.

In September 1937, the British Consul in Munich, writing about the group Ribbentrop had brought to the Nuremberg Party Rally, reported that there were some " serious persons of standing among them " and that an equal number of Ribbentrop's British contingent were " eccentrics and few, if any, could be called representatives of serious English thought, either political or social, while they most certainly lacked any political or social influence in England ".

After Operation Margarethe's success, Ribbentrop instructed the new Reich Plenipotentiary for Hungary, Edmund Veesenmayer, to begin deporting Hungarian Jews to Nazi death camps.

A trade agreement was concluded on 18 August, and on 22 August, Ribbentrop flew to Moscow to conclude a formal non-aggression treaty.

After a failed attempt to sign an anti-German military alliance with France and Britain and talks with Germany regarding a potential political deal, on 23 August 1939, the Soviet Union entered into a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany, negotiated by Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov and German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop.

Once the talks began, Ribbentrop, who possessed a certain elan and sense of audacity, issued Sir John Simon an ultimatum.

In November 1937, Ribbentrop was placed in a highly embarrassing situation when his forceful advocacy of the return of the former German colonies led to the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and the French Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos offering to open talks on returning the former German colonies, in return for which the Germans would make binding commitments to respect their borders in Central and Eastern Europe.

Before the Anglo-German summit at Berchtesgaden on 15 September 1938, Henderson and Weizsäcker worked out a private arrangement that Hitler and Chamberlain were to meet with no advisers present as a way of excluding the ultra-hawkish Ribbentrop from attending the talks.

In April 1939, when Ribbentrop announced at a secret meeting of the Foreign Office's senior staff that Germany was ending talks with the Poles and was instead going to destroy Poland in an operation late that year, the news was greeted joyfully by those present.

As the Germans had broken the Turkish diplomatic codes, Ribbentrop was well aware as he warned in a circular to German embassies that Anglo-Turkish talks had gone much further " than what the Turks would care to tell us ".

In public, Ribbentrop expressed great fury at the Polish refusal to allow for Danzig's return to the Reich, or to grant Polish permission for the " extra-territorial " highways, but since these matters were only intended after March 1939 to be a pretext for German aggression, Ribbentrop always refused in private to allow for any talks between German and Polish diplomats about these matters.

To further block German-Polish diplomatic talks, Ribbentrop had the German Ambassador to Poland, Count Hans-Adolf von Moltke, recalled, and refused to see the Polish Ambassador, Józef Lipski.

Ribbentrop had only expected to see the Soviet Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov, and was most surprised to be holding talks with Joseph Stalin.

During his trip to Moscow, Ribbentrop's talks with Stalin and Molotov proceed very cordially and efficiently with the exception of the question of Latvia, which Hitler had instructed Ribbentrop to try to claim for Germany.

After finishing his talks with Stalin and Molotov, Ribbentrop, at a dinner with the Soviet leaders, launched into a lengthy diatribe against the British Empire, with frequent interjections of approval from Stalin, and then exchanged toasts with Stalin in honour of German-Soviet friendship.

During his talks with the Spanish foreign minister, Ramón Serrano Súñer, Ribbentrop affronted Súñer with his tactless behaviour, especially his suggestion that Spain cede the Canary Islands to Germany.

An area where Ribbentrop enjoyed more success arose in September 1940, when he had the Far Eastern agent of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, Dr. Heinrich Georg Stahmer, start negotiations with the Japanese foreign minister, Yōsuke Matsuoka, for an anti-American alliance ( the German Ambassador to Japan, General Eugen Ott, was excluded from the talks on Ribbentrop's orders ).

The end result of these talks was the signing in Berlin on 27 September 1940 of the Tripartite Pact by Ribbentrop, Count Ciano, and Japanese Ambassador Saburo Kurusu.

In addition, Ribbentrop hoped that recognizing Wang would be seen as a coup which might add to the prestige of the pro-German Japanese Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka, who was opposed to opening American-Japanese talks.

In the fall of 1941, Ribbentrop worked for both the failure of the Japanese-American talks in Washington and Japan attacking the United States.

On 22 August, one day after the talks broke down with France and Britain, Moscow revealed that Ribbentrop would visit Stalin the next day.

In November 1940 Stalin sent Molotov to Berlin to meet von Ribbentrop and Adolf Hitler ( see German – Soviet Axis talks # Molotov travels to Berlin ).

The talks began on Tuesday, June 4, 1935 at the Admiralty office with Ribbentrop heading the German delegation and Simon the British delegation.

Ribbentrop, who was determined to succeed at his mission, no matter what, began his talks by stating the British could either accept the 35: 100 ratio as " fixed and unalterable " by the weekend, or else the German delegation would go home, and the Germans would build their navy up to any size they wished.

Simon was visibly angry with Ribbentrop ’ s behavior, stated that “ It is not usual to make such conditions at the beginning of negotiations ”, and walked out of the talks.

Also on June 5, during talks between Sir Robert Craigie, the British Foreign Office ’ s naval expert and chief of the Foreign Office's American Department and Ribbentrop ’ s deputy, Admiral Karl-Georg Schuster, the Germans conceded that the 35: 100 ratio would take the form of tonnage ratios, during the Germans would more or less build their tonnage up to whatever the British tonnage was in various warship categories.