Following the primary show, Dr. Friedman would engage in discussion with a number of selected debaters drawn from trade unions, academy and the business community, such as Donald Rumsfeld ( then of G. D. Searle & Company ) and Frances Fox Piven of City University of New York.

BSA then bought Aircraft Transport and Travel's aircraft from the liquidator and, in early 1921, established Daimler Airway and Daimler Air Hire under Daimler Hire Limited's Frank Searle.

After Diet Rite cola advertised its 100 percent use of aspartame, and the manufacturer of NutraSweet ( then, G. D. Searle & Company ) warned that the NutraSweet trademark would not be made available to a blend of sweeteners, Coca-Cola switched the formula to 100 percent NutraSweet.

Searle suggests that in the Twin Earth example, the second seems more plausible, since if Twin Earth doesn't have water, then all its water-based products will also be different.

A family friend, Ronald Searle, who created the St Trinian cartoons that inspired the later films, likened her to a mischievous St Trinian girl, and the name Trinny stuck from then onwards.

The second, which Searle now prefers but is less well known, is his ' syntax is not physics ' argument — nothing in the world is intrinsically a computer program except as applied, described or interpreted by an observer, so either everything can be described as a computer and trivially a brain can but then this does not explain any specific mental processes, or there is nothing intrinsic in a brain that makes it a computer ( program ).

The Kestrels were coached by Jane Searle and co-captained by Rebecca Bulley and Chelsey Tregear ( then Nash ).

He initially accepted, but later withdrew ; Britten then asked Arthur Oldham and Humphrey Searle to take his place.

Donald Rumsfeld served as CEO, and then as President, of Searle between 1977 and 1985.

In 1923, after the success of Blood and Sand, Naldi was named as a party in the divorce of then 54-year-old millionaire J. Searle Barclay from his wife of 16 years.

He was involved in the design of London General's B-Type bus, under Frank Searle and then George Green ; during World War I, he and Green worked on the Tank along with other gifted engineers such as Walter Wilson, after the war he had moved to the United States and under Green had been chief designer for John Hertz ' Yellow Coach Company, one of the leading bus-builders in the States, Rackham, under Green's direction had evolved a range of fast, relatively light chassis with powerful engines and a trademark of frames gracefully swept with elegantly varying side-member depth, the Y and Z models also had off-set under-slung worm rear-axles and six-cylinder overhead-camshaft ( OHC ) petrol engines, OHC was not generally known in UK buses at the time and six-cylinder engines likewise.

John Searle, on the other hand, suggests that a thinking machine is, at best, a simulation, and writes " No one supposes that computer simulations of a five-alarm fire will burn the neighborhood down or that a computer simulation of a rainstorm will leave us all drenched.

The Chinese room is a thought experiment presented by John Searle.

Suppose, says Searle, that this computer performs its task so convincingly that it comfortably passes the Turing test: it convinces a human Chinese speaker that the program is itself a live Chinese speaker.

The question Searle wants to answer is this: does the machine literally " understand " Chinese?

As the computer had passed the Turing test this way, it is fair, says Searle, to deduce that he would be able to do so as well, simply by running the program manually.

Searle asserts that there is no essential difference between the role the computer plays in the first case and the role he plays in the latter.

Searle argues that without " understanding " ( what philosophers call " intentionality "), we cannot describe what the machine is doing as " thinking ".

Searle believes that human beings directly experience their consciousness, intentionality and the nature of the mind every day, and that this experience of consciousness is not open to question.

" These replies question whether Searle is justified in using his own experience of consciousness to determine that it is more than mechanical symbol processing.

Critics of Searle argue that he is holding the Chinese room to a higher standard than we would hold an ordinary person.

Searle disagrees with this analysis and argues that " the study of the mind starts with such facts as that humans have beliefs, while thermostats, telephones, and adding machines don't ... what we wanted to know is what distinguishes the mind from thermostats and livers.

Therefore, Russell and Norvig argue, Searle is mistaken about the " knowability of the mental ".

So therefore, if Searle is right, it's most likely that human beings ( as we see them today ) are actually " zombies ," who nevertheless insist they are conscious.

A sequence of encounters with analytical philosophy is collected in Limited Inc ( 1988 ), having Austin and Searle as the main interlocutors.

Whilst agreeing with ( 2 ) Searle argues that ( 1 ) is false and points out that ( 3 ) does not follow from ( 1 ) and ( 2 ).

" An exception is analytic philosopher John Searle, who called it an incorrect assumption which produces false dichotomies.

Searle insists that " it is a condition of the adequacy of a precise theory of an indeterminate phenomenon that it should precisely characterize that phenomenon as indeterminate ; and a distinction is no less a distinction for allowing for a family of related, marginal, diverging cases.

American philosopher John Searle argued in 1990 that " The spread of ' poststructuralist ' literary theory is perhaps the best known example of a silly but noncatastrophic phenomenon.

As summarized by philosopher John Searle, de Saussure established that ' I understand the sentence " the cat is on the mat " the way I do because I know how it would relate to an indefinite — indeed infinite — set of other sentences, " the dog is on the mat ," " the cat is on the couch ," etc.

Rather, Searle simply claims that to posit the existence of something that is like a " thought " in every way except for the fact that no one can ever be aware of it ( can never, indeed, " think " it ) is an incoherent concept.

Within philosophy familiar names include Daniel Dennett who writes from a computational systems perspective, John Searle known for his controversial Chinese room, Jerry Fodor who advocates functionalism, and Douglas Hofstadter, famous for writing Gödel, Escher, Bach, which questions the nature of words and thought.

In a lively exchange over what has come to be referred to as " The Chinese room Argument ", John Searle sought to refute the claim of proponents of what he calls ' Strong Artificial Intelligence ( AI )' that a computer program can be conscious, though he does agree with advocates of " Weak AI " that computer programs can be formatted to " simulate " conscious states.

To make a Turing machine that speaks Chinese, Searle gets in a room stocked with algorithms programmed to respond to Chinese questions, i. e., Turing machines, programmed to correctly answer in Chinese questions asked in Chinese, and he finds he's able to process the inputs to outputs perfectly without having any understanding of Chinese, nor having any idea what the questions and answers could possibly mean.

John Searle imagines a man in a locked room who receives written sentences in Chinese, and returns written sentences in Chinese, according to a sophisticated instruction manual.

John Searle argued for this position with the Chinese room thought experiment, according to which no syntactic operations that occurred in a computer would provide it with semantic content.

John R. Searle does not elucidate the terms strong and weak in his book The Construction of Social Reality, but he clearly uses them in his Chinese room argument, where he debates the feasibility of creating a computing machine with a sharable understanding of reality, and he adds " We are precisely such machines.

Because both the Chinese room argument and the construction of social reality deal with Searle and his debates, and because they both use weak and strong to denote a philosophical position, and because both debate the programmability of " the other ", it is worth noting the correspondence that " strong AI " is strong social constructionism, and " weak AI " is weak social constructivism.

* Searle has developed two arguments, the first ( well known through his Chinese room thought experiment ) is the ' syntax is not semantics ' argument — that a program is just syntax, while understanding requires semantics ; therefore programs ( hence cognitivism ) cannot explain understanding.

" ( This argument, that a computer can't have conscious experiences or understanding would be made in 1980 by philosopher John Searle in his Chinese room argument.

The term " strong AI " was adopted from the name of a position in the philosophy of artificial intelligence first identified by John Searle as part of his Chinese room argument in 1980.

The role of information processing in consciousness has been criticised by John Searle who, in his Chinese room argument, states that he cannot find anything that could be recognised as conscious experience in a system that relies solely on motions of things from place to place.