Soon after taking command, on 9 November, LeMay relocated SAC to Offutt AFB south of Omaha.

It was under the leadership of LeMay that SAC developed the technical capability, strategic planning, and operational readiness to carry out its strategic mission anywhere in the world.

When LeMay assumed command of SAC, his vision was to create a force of nuclear-armed long-range bombers with the capability to devastate the Soviet Union within a few days of the advent of war.

But the reality when LeMay assumed command was that SAC had only sixty nuclear capable aircraft, none of which had the long-range capabilities he desired.

Despite having a limited range, by the end of LeMay ’ s command in 1957, the B-47 had become the backbone of SAC, comprising over half of its total aircraft and eighty percent of its bomber capacity.

A key factor enabling the B-47 to become the mainstay of SAC ( and to fulfill LeMay ’ s desire for a long range bomber ) was the development of in-flight refueling.

During LeMay ’ s command, SAC was able to effect great changes in American nuclear strategy.

It was this uncertainty that LeMay entered into upon assuming command of SAC which emboldened him and SAC planners to attempt to unilaterally form American nuclear strategy.

LeMay started shortly after his arrival at SAC, by having SAC planners draw up Emergency War Plan 1-49, which involved striking seventy Soviet cities with 133 atomic bombs over a thirty day period in an effort to destroy Soviet industrial capacity.

This was done by LeMay in a 1951 meeting with high level Air Force staff, when he convinced them that unreasonable operational demands were being placed on SAC and, in order to alleviate the issue, SAC should be allowed to approve target selections before they were finalized.

While the Eisenhower administration approved of the strategy in general, LeMay continued to increase SAC ’ s independence by refusing to submit SAC war plans for review, believing that operational plans should be closely guarded, a view the Joint Chiefs of Staff eventually came to accept.

But SAC did more than just provide a nuclear option during the Korean War, It also deployed four B-29 bomber wings that were used in tactical operations against enemy forces and logistics All of this led LeMay to express concern that “ too many splinters were being whittled off the stick ”, preventing him from being able to carry out his primary mission of strategic deterrence.

As a result, LeMay was relieved when the Korean War ended in 1953 and he was able to go back to building SAC ’ s arsenal and gaining control over nuclear strategy.

When LeMay took over command of SAC, it consisted of little more than a few understaffed B-29 bombardment groups left over from World War II.

Upon inspecting a SAC hangar full of US nuclear strategic bombers, LeMay found a single Air Force sentry on duty, armed only with a ham sandwich.

LeMay headed SAC until 1957, overseeing its transformation into a modern, efficient, all-jet force.

Several documents show LeMay advocating preemptive attack of the Soviet Union, had it become clear the Soviets were preparing to attack SAC or the US.

In these documents, which were often the transcripts of speeches before groups such as the National War College or events such as the 1955 Joint Secretaries Conference at the Quantico Marine Corps Base, LeMay clearly advocated using SAC as a preemptive weapon, if and when such was necessary.

LeMay insisted on rigorous training and very high standards of performance for all SAC personnel, be they officers, enlisted men, aircrews, mechanics, or administrative staff, and reportedly commented, " I have neither the time nor the inclination to differentiate between the incompetent and the merely unfortunate.

*" In Defense of Food Writing: A Reader ’ s Manifesto " A defense of the genre by Eric LeMay based on Michael Pollan's In Defense of Food.

Evidence of LeMay's thinking is that, in his 1965 autobiography ( co-written with MacKinlay Kantor ) LeMay is quoted as saying his response to North Vietnam would be to demand that " they ’ ve got to draw in their horns and stop their aggression, or we ’ re going to bomb them back into the Stone Age.

Curtis LeMay ’ s first contact with military service occurred in September 1924 when he enrolled as a student in the ROTC program at Ohio State University.

Thus, for this short period in LeMay ’ s career, he was technically an officer and enlisted soldier at the same time, a practice no longer permitted in the U. S. military.

The matter was resolved on October 2, 1929, when LeMay ’ s Guard and Reserve commission were terminated.

The Games have acted as a stepping stone for many of Canada ’ s celebrated athletes, including: Toller Cranston ( 1967 ), Bob Gainey ( 1971 ), Ian Bridge ( 1977 ), Sylvie Daigle ( 1979 ), Catriona LeMay Doan ( 1983 and 1987 ), Bruny Surin ( 1985 ), Marianne Limpert, Annie Pelletier and Anne Montminy ( 1989 ), Hayley Wickenheiser and Marc Gagnon ( 1991 ), Andrea Neil ( 1993 ), Steve Nash ( 1993 ), Maryse Turcotte ( 1995 ), Alexandre Despatie ( 1997 ), Dwayne De Rosario ( 1997 ), Patrice Bernier ( 1997 ), Adam Van Koeverden ( 1997 ), Heather Moyse ( 1997 ), Jeff Francis ( 2001 ), Kara Lang ( 2001 ), Erin McLeod ( 2001 ) Jared Connaughton ( 2005 ), Krista Betts ( 2005 ), Sidney Crosby ( 2003 ), and Steven Stamkos ( 2007 ).

By then, Arnold, impatient with Wolfe ’ s progress, had replaced him temporarily with Brigadier General LaVern G. Saunders, until Major General Curtis E. LeMay could arrive from Europe to assume permanent command.

Despite SAC's establishment of " hardened " underground command and control facilities at its headquarters at Offutt AFB, LeMay and his planners knew that a direct nuclear strike by Soviet forces employing hydrogen weapons would likely destroy the facility.

General LeMay was instrumental in SAC's acquisition of a large fleet of new strategic bombers, establishment of a vast aerial refueling system, the formation of many new units and bases, development of a strategic ballistic missile force, and establishment of a strict command and control system with an unprecedented readiness capability.

The memorandum from LeMay, Chief of Staff, USAF, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 4, 1964, illustrates LeMay's reasons for keeping bomber forces alongside ballistic missiles: " It is important to recognize, however, that ballistic missile forces represent both the U. S. and Soviet potential for strategic nuclear warfare at the highest, most indiscriminate level, and at a level least susceptible to control.

General Curtis LeMay, USAF ( former head of the Strategic Air Command and serving at the time as Chief of Staff of the Air Force ), used his considerable influence to allow Producer Sy Bartlett and Director Delbert Mann unprecedented access to various SAC facilities, in the belief that this film would play a vital role in reminding Americans that the Air Force did indeed have its weapons of mass destruction under tight control in sharp contrast to the impressions that the movies Dr. Strangelove and Fail-Safe ( both based on novels written prior to 1963 whose premise was that accidental nuclear war caused by SAC was not only possible but likely ) would give.

For this first attack, LeMay ordered the defensive guns removed from 325 B-29s, loaded each plane with Model E-46 incendiary clusters, magnesium bombs, white phosphorus bombs, and napalm, and ordered the bombers to fly in streams at 5, 000 to 9, 000 feet over Tokyo.

LeMay initially started flying supplies into Berlin, but then decided that it was a job for a logistics expert and he found that person in Lt. General William H. Tunner, who took over the operational end of the Berlin Airlift.

LeMay became aware that the new single sideband ( SSB ) technology offered a big advantage over amplitude modulation ( AM ) for SAC aircraft operating long distances from their bases.

During the 1968 campaign, LeMay became widely associated with the " Stone Age " comment, especially because he had suggested use of nuclear weapons as a strategy to quickly resolve a deeply protracted conventional war which eventually claimed over 50, 000 American and millions of Vietnamese lives.

Since fighter opposition was minimal over Japan in late 1944, many of the Army Air Force leadership — most notably Curtis LeMay, commander of the XXI Bomber Command — felt that a ( lighter ) faster bomber would better evade Japanese flak.

Curtis LeMay argued that the large stocks of missiles were in the areas not photographed by the U-2's, and arguments broke out over the Soviet factory capability in an effort to estimate their production rate.

USAF General Curtis LeMay updated the concept for the nuclear age.

In 1949, LeMay was first to propose that a nuclear war be conducted by delivering the nuclear arsenal in a single overwhelming blow, going as far as " killing a nation ".

Despite popular claims that LeMay advanced the notion of preventive nuclear war, the historical record indicates LeMay actually advocated justified preemptive nuclear war.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, LeMay clashed again with U. S. President John F. Kennedy and Defense Secretary McNamara, arguing that he should be allowed to bomb nuclear missile sites in Cuba.

LeMay gradually became convinced that Nixon planned to pursue a conciliatory policy with the Soviets and accept nuclear parity rather than retain America's first-strike supremacy.

When Wallace announced his selection in October 1968, LeMay opined that he, unlike many Americans, clearly did not fear using nuclear weapons.

At this time, LeMay was best known to the American public as an enthusiastic proponent of the use of nuclear weapons in war.

An additional inspiration was provided by the 1961 interview by Knebel, who was also a political journalist and columnist, conducted with the newly-appointed Air Force Chief of Staff, Curtis LeMay, an advocate of preventive first-strike nuclear option.