Robert Nozick suggested a clarification of " justification " which he believed eliminates the problem: the justification has to be such that were the justification false, the knowledge would be false.

Nozick suggested a " truth tracking " theory of knowledge, in which the x was said to know P if x's belief in P tracked the truth of P through the relevant modal scenarios.

A well-known critique of free-market anarchism is by Robert Nozick, who argued that a competitive legal system would evolve toward a monopoly government – even without violating individuals rights in the process.

* Robert Nozick: Criticized Rawls, and argued for libertarianism, by appeal to a hypothetical history of the state and of property.

Robert Nozick and John Rawls expressed competing visions in Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia and Rawls ' A Theory of Justice.

* 1997, " Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers ' Brief " ( with R. Dworkin, R. Nozick, J. Rawls, T. Scanlon, and J. J. Thomson ), New York Review of Books, March 27, 1997.

In 1974, Rawls ' colleague at Harvard, Robert Nozick, published a defense of libertarian justice, Anarchy, State, and Utopia.

This for a long time has been the most prevalent defense of toleration by liberals ... It is found, for example, in the writings of American philosophers John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, Brian Barry, and a Canadian, Will Kymlicka, among others.

Overall, the Democratic Party advocates economic policies pretty close to " liberalism " in the sense of John Rawls ( rather than, say, of Robert Nozick or Friedrich Hayek, as commonly accepted outside North America ), in sharp contrast with the traditional radical free-market orientation of Hong Kong.

In opposition to A Theory of Justice by John Rawls, and in debate with Michael Walzer, Nozick argues in favor of a minimal state, " limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on.

Nozick attacks John Rawls's Difference Principle on the ground that the well-off could threaten a lack of social cooperation to the worse-off, just as Rawls implies that the worse-off will be assisted by the well-off for the sake of social cooperation.

In Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, Rawls notes that Nozick assumes that just transactions are " justice preserving " in much the same way that logical operations are " truth preserving ".

In the article " Social Unity and Primary Goods ", republished in his Collected Papers, Rawls notes that Nozick handles Sen's Liberal Paradox in a manner that is similar to his own.

However, the rights that Nozick takes to be fundamental and the basis for regarding them to be such are different from the equal basic liberties included in justice as fairness and Rawls conjectures that they are thus not inalienable.

Pogge insists that Rawls has been importantly misunderstood by his most influential critics, including the libertarian Robert Nozick and the communitarian Michael Sandel.

Unusually for a law professor without a graduate degree in philosophy, he has published significant work in moral and political theory only indirectly related to the law ; Right and Wrong, for instance is an impressive general statement of a Kantian position in ethics with affinities with the work of Thomas Nagel, John Rawls, and Robert Nozick.

Ellis also states that the discussion of Rawls and Nozick in After Virtue " is slight and assertive ".

Nozick created the thought experiment of the " utility monster " to show that average utilitarianism could lead to a situation where the needs of the vast majority were sacrificed for one individual.

Nozick supports the side-constraint view against classical utilitarianism and the idea that only felt experience matters by introducing the famous Experience Machine thought experiment.

In Philosophical Explanations ( 1981 ), which received the Phi Beta Kappa Society's Ralph Waldo Emerson Award, Nozick provided novel accounts of knowledge, free will, personal identity, the nature of value, and the meaning of life.

Robert Nozick made the point that what happens in society can not always be reduced to competitions for a coveted position ; in 1974, Nozick wrote that " life is not a race in which we all compete for a prize which someone has established " and that there is " no unified race " and there is not some one person " judging swiftness.

Nozick presses " the major objection " to theories that bestow and enforce positive rights to various things such as equality of opportunity, life, and so on.

However, the original discussion by Nozick says only that the Predictor's predictions are " almost certainly " correct, and also specifies that " what you actually decide to do is not part of the explanation of why he made the prediction he made ".

As a resolution of this apparent paradox and in defiance of Hohfeld, Robert Nozick asserted that there are no positive civil rights, only rights to property and the right of autonomy.

Nozick argued that a minimalist state of property rights and basic law enforcement would develop out of a state of nature without violating anyone's rights or using force.

Nozick argued against equality of opportunity on the grounds that it violates the rights of property, since the equal opportunity maxim interferes with an owner's right to do what he or she pleases with a property.

Nor does Nozick provide any means or theory whereby abuses of appropriation — acquisition of property when there is not enough and as good in common for others — should be corrected.

Moreover, they assert that what really matters for assigning ownership is whether or not property was acquired or exchanged legally ( see Robert Nozick ), which is known as the historical entitlement theory, whereas Marxists assert that there are no property rights in the means of production.

Entitlement theory is a theory of distributive justice and private property created by Robert Nozick in his book Anarchy, State, and Utopia.

The theory is Nozick's attempt to describe " justice in holdings " ( Nozick 1974: 150 )-or what can be said about and done with the property people own when viewed from a principle of justice.

The Steiner-Vallentyne school of left-libertarianism takes a distinctive position regarding the issue that Robert Nozick calls the “ original acquisition of holdings .” That is the question of how property rights came about in the first place, and how property was originally acquired.

Right-libertarians like Robert Nozick, holding that self-ownership and property acquisition need not meet egalitarian standards and that they must merely avoid worsening the situation of others, have rejected left-libertarianism of the Steiner-Vallentyne school.

Nozick used this idea to form his Lockean Proviso which governs the initial acquisition of property in a society.

** Natural rights theories, such that of John Locke or Robert Nozick, which hold that human beings have absolute, natural rights.

" When a state takes on more responsibilities than these, Nozick argues, rights will be violated.

Furthermore, Rawls's idea regarding morally arbitrary natural endowments comes under fire ; Nozick argues that natural advantages that the well-off enjoy do not violate anyone's rights and therefore have a right to them, on top of which is the fact that Rawls's own proposal that inequalities be geared toward assisting the worse-off is in itself morally arbitrary.

Leff stated that Nozick built his entire book on the bald assertion that " individuals have rights which may not be violated by other individuals ", for which no justification is offered.

Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia argued that a night watchman state provides a framework that allows for any political system that respects fundamental individual rights.

Nozick instead argues that people who have or produce certain things have rights over them: " on an entitlement view, and distribution are not .. separate questions .. things come into the world already attached to people having entitlements over them " ( Nozick 1974: 160 ).

Nozick believes that unjustly taking someone's holdings violates their rights.

No one has a right to something whose realization requires certain uses of things and activities that other people have rights and entitlements over " ( Nozick 1974: 238 ).