The first is that Wehler credits leaders such as Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and Prince Bernhard von Bülow with a greater degree of vision then what they in fact possessed The second is that many of the pressure groups on the right who advocated an imperialist policy for Germany were not the creations of the government, and in fact often demanded far more aggressive policies then what the government was willing to undertake The third was that many of these imperialist lobbying groups demanded a policy of political and social reform at home, in addition to imperialism abroad Eley argued that what is required in thinking about social imperialism is a broader picture with an interaction from above and below, and a wider view of the relationship between imperialism abroad and domestic politics.

Wehler wrote :" Does our understanding of National Socialist policies really depend on whether Hitler had only one testicle ?... Perhaps the Führer had three, which made things difficult for him, who knows ?... Even if Hitler could be regarded irrefutably as a sado-masochist, which scientific interest does that further ?... Does the " Final Solution of the Jewish Question " thus become more easily understandable or the " twisted road to Auschwitz " become the one-way street of a psychopath in power?

Wehler is a leader of the so-called Bielefeld School, a group of historians who use the methods of the social sciences to analyze history.

In a 1980 article, Wehler mocked those who sought to explain Nazi Germany as due to some defect in Adolf Hitler's personality by commenting :" Does our understanding of National Socialist policies really depend on whether Hitler had only one testicle ?... Perhaps the Führer had three, which made things difficult for him-who knows ?... Even if Hitler could be regarded irrefutably as a sado-masochist, which scientific interest does that further ?... Does the " Final Solution of the Jewish Question " thus become more easily understandable or the " twisted road to Auschwitz " become the one-way street of a psychopath in power ?".

Besides Nolte, Wehler also attacked the work of Michael Stürmer as " a strident declaration of war against a key element of the consensus upon which the socio-political life of this second republic has rested heretofore " During the Historikerstreit, Wehler was one of the few historians who endorsed Jürgen Habermas's method of attacking Andreas Hillgruber by creating a sentence about " tested senior officials in Nazi Party in the East " out of a long sentence in which Hillgruber had said no such thing on the grounds that it was a secondary issue of no real importance.

In Entsorgung der deutschen Vergangenheit ?, Wehler writing not only of the work of Nolte, but also of the work and intentionist theories about the Holocaust of Klaus Hildebrand, Andreas Hillgruber, Joachim Fest and Michael Stürmer, declared :" This survey is directed-among other matters-against the apologetic effect of the tendency of interpretations that once more blame Hitler alone for the ' Holocaust '- thereby exonerating the older power elites and the Army, the executive bureaucracy, and the judiciary ... and the silent majority who knew ".

In a 1989 essay, the American historian Jerry Muller criticized Wehler as a " leading Left-Liberal historian " who used the Historikerstreit to unjustly smear neo-conservatives with the Nazi tag Muller went on to write of the " interesting peculiarity of the political culture of German Left-liberal intellectuals " such as Wehler, in that Wehler referred to repression in the Stalin-era Soviet Union as " the excesses of the Russian Civil War ", and argued that there was no comparison between Soviet and German history.

From the Left, Wehler has been criticized by two British Marxist historians, David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley who in their 1980 book Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung ( translated into English in 1984 as The Peculiarities of German History ) rejected the entire concept of the Sonderweg as a flawed construct supported by a " a curious mixture of idealistic analysis and vulgar materialism " that led to an " exaggerated linear continuity between the nineteenth century and the 1930s ".

The first is that Wehler credits leaders such as Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and Prince Bernhard von Bülow with a greater degree of vision than they in fact possessed The second is that many of the right-wing pressure groups who advocated an imperialist policy for Germany were not government creations, and in fact often demanded far more aggressive policies then the government was willing to undertake The third was that many of the groups advocating imperialism demanded a policy of political and social reform at home to complement imperialism abroad Eley argued that what is required in thinking about social imperialism is a broader picture with an interaction between above and below, and a wider view of the relationship between imperialism abroad and domestic politics

In the 1970s, the conservative German historian Andreas Hillgruber, together with his close associate Klaus Hildebrand, was involved in a very acrimonious debate with the leftish German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler over the merits of the Primat der Aussenpolitik (" primacy of foreign politics ") and Primat der Innenpolitik (" primacy of domestic politics ") schools.

In the course of the 1960s, however, some German historians ( notably Hans-Ulrich Wehler and his cohort ) began to rebel against this idea, instead suggesting a " Primacy of Domestic Politics " ( Primat der Innenpolitik ), in which the insecurities of ( in this case German ) domestic policy drove the creation of foreign policy.

Hillgruber and Hildebrand argued for the traditional Primat der Aussenpolitik approach with empirical research on the foreign-policy making elite, while Wehler argued for the Primat der Innenpolitik approach, treating diplomatic history as a sub-branch of social history with the focus on theoretical research.

Wehler by contrast argued for the Primat der Innenpolitik ( Primacy of Domestic Politics ) approach which called for seeing foreign policy largely as a reflection of domestic politics and employing theoretically-based research into social history to examine domestic politics.

* Wehler, Hans-Ulrich Bismarck und der Imperialismus, Colonge: Kipenheur und Witsch, 1969.

" Review of Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte -- Vierter Band: Vom Beginn des Ersten Weltkriegs bis zur Gruendung der beiden deutschen Staaten 1914-1949 ," H-German, H-Net Reviews, June, 2005. online

Wehler has advocated an approach he calls Historische Sozialwissenschaft ( Historical Social Science ), which favors integrating elements of history, sociology, economics and anthropology to study in a holistic fashion long-term social changes in a society In Wehler's view, Germany between 1871 – 1945 was dominated by a social structure which retarded modernization in some areas while allowing it in others.

*" Pity for this Man is Out of Place " by Hans-Ulrich Wehler

The left-wing German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler has defined social imperialism as " the diversions outwards of internal tensions and forces of change in order to preserve the social and political status quo ", and as a " defensive ideology " to counter the " disruptive effects of industrialization on the social and economic structure of Germany " In Wehler's opinion, social imperialism was a device that allowed the German government to distract public attention from domestic problems and preserve the existing social and political order Wehler argued the dominant elites used social imperialism as the glue to hold together a fractured society and to maintain popular support for the social status quo Wehler argued German colonial policy in the 1880s was the first example of social imperialism in action, and was followed up by the " Tirpitz plan " for expanding the German Navy starting in 1897 In this point of view, groups such as the Colonial Society and the Navy League are seen as instruments for the government to mobilize public support.

The demands for annexing most of Europe and Africa in World War I are seen by Wehler as the pinnacle of social imperialism.

The German Empire was, for Hans-Ulrich Wehler, a strange mixture of highly successful capitalist, industrialization and socio-economic modernization on the one hand, and of surviving pre-industrial institutions, power relations and traditional cultures on the other.

The left-wing German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler has defined social imperialism " the diversions outwards of internal tensions and forces of change in order to preserve the social and political status quo ", and as a " defensive ideology " to counter the " disruptive effects of industrialization on the social and economic structure of Germany " In Wehler's opinion, social imperialism was a device that allowed the German government to distract public attention from domestic problems and preserve the existing social and political order Wehler argued the dominant elites used social imperialism as the glue to hold together a fractured society and to maintain popular support for the social status quo Wehler argued German colonial policy in the 1880s was the first example of social imperialism in action, and was followed up by the " Tirpitz plan " for expanding the German Navy starting in 1897 In this point of view, groups such as the Colonial Society and the Navy League are seen as instruments for the government to mobilize public support.

The demands for annexing most of Europe and Africa in World War I are seen by Wehler as the pinnacle of social imperialism.

Wehler has argued that the aggressive foreign policies of the German Empire, especially under Kaiser Wilhelm II, were largely part of an effort on the part of the government to distract the German people from the lack of internal democracy.

Wehler is a leading critic of what he sees as efforts on the part of conservative historians to whitewash the German past.

In the 1970s, Wehler was involved in a somewhat discordant and acrimonious debate with Hildebrand and Hillgruber over the merits of the two approaches to diplomatic history.

In the 1970s Hildebrand was deeply involved in a rancorous debate with Hans-Ulrich Wehler over the merits of traditional diplomatic history versus social history as way of explaining foreign policy.

Modernization theory was presented by Hans-Ulrich Wehler ( 1931-) and his Bielefeld School as the way to transform " traditional " German history, that is, national political history, centered on a few " great men ," into an integrated and comparative history of German society encompassing societal structures outside politics.

Hans-Ulrich Wehler, a leader of the Bielefeld School of social history, places the origins of Germany's path to disaster in the 1860s-1870s, when economic modernization took place, but political modernization did not happen and the old Prussian rural elite remained in firm control of the army, diplomacy and the civil service.

The faculty of history launched the " Bielefeld School " of Social History under Hans-Ulrich Wehler, while the Laborschule and Center for Interdisciplinary Research ( ZiF ) are projects of the faculty of educational science.

A history book on Imperial Germany by Hans-Ulrich Wehler published in 1973 holds that as a result of Fischer's theories, " two opposing schools of thought " have formed.

Hans-Ulrich Wehler ( born September 11, 1931 in Freudenberg, Westphalia ) is a German historian known for his role in promoting social history through the " Bielefeld School ", and for his critical studies of 19th century Germany.

Modernization theory was presented by Wehler and the Bielefeld School as the way to transform " traditional " German history, that is, national political history, centered on a few " great men ," into an integrated and comparative history of German society encompassing societal structures outside politics.

Wehler has often criticized traditional German historiography with its emphasis on political events, the role of the individual in history and history as an art as unacceptably conservative and incapable of properly explaining the past.

Wehler sees history as a social science and contends that social developments are frequently more important than politics.

Instead Wehler suggested that the only valid comparisons were between German history and those of other Western nations.

Muller criticized Wehler for his lack of interest in Soviet history, and unwillingness to engage in a comparative history between Eastern and Western nations, instead of just Western nations.

The Canadian historian Fred Kautz called Wehler an anti-Semite for his attacks on Goldhagen Kautz wrote that " He doesn't dare say it openly that he thinks Goldhagen is incapable of writing about the Holocaust because he is a Jew ... It's flabbergasting what perverse ideas are dreamt up in the studies of German professors, where according to an ancient legend, one seeks the truth unperturbed, " sine ira et studio " (" with diligence and without anger "): the victims of history should not be allowed to write their own history!

Wehler has argued that Germany was the only nation to be created in Western Europe through a military " revolution from above ", which happened to occur at the same time that the agricultural revolution was fading and the Industrial Revolution was beginning in Central Europe.

In 2000, Wehler became the eighth German historian to be inducted as an honorary member of the American Historical Association.

In a 2006 interview, Wehler supported the imprisonment of David Irving for Holocaust Denial in Austria on the grounds that " The denial of such an unimaginable murder of millions, one third of whom were children under the age of 14, cannot simply be accepted as something protected by the freedom of speech ".

Stürmer argued for geographical factors as the reason for the Sonderweg while Wehler insisted on cultural and social factors.

Wehler is an advocate of the concept of social imperialism, which he has defined as " the diversions outwards of internal tensions and forces of change in order to preserve the social and political status quo ", and as a " defensive ideology " to counter the " disruptive effects of industrialization on the social and economic structure of Germany " In Wehler's opinion, social imperialism was a device that allowed the German government to distract public attention from domestic problems to the benefit of preserving the existing social and political order Wehler argued that the dominant elites used social imperialism as the glue to hold together a fractured society and maintain popular support for the social status quo He further argued that German colonial policy in the 1880s was the first example of social imperialism in action, followed by the " Tirpitz plan " to expand the German Navy from 1897 onwards According to this point of view, groups such as the Colonial Society and the Navy League are seen as government instruments for mobilizing public support The demands for annexing most of Europe and Africa in World War I are seen by Wehler as the pinnacle of social imperialism