[permalink] [id link]
As Clausewitz stated, a successful military strategy may be a means to an end, but it is not an end in itself.
from
Wikipedia
Some Related Sentences
Clausewitz and stated
German strategist Carl von Clausewitz stated that " the employment of battles ... to achieve the object of war " was the essence of strategy.
Carl von Clausewitz stated that " Everything in war is very simple but the simplest thing is difficult ".
Keegan was described as " profoundly mistaken " and Bassford stated that " Nothing anywhere in Keegan's work – despite his many diatribes about Clausewitz and ' the Clausewitzians ' – reflects any reading whatsoever of Clausewitz's own writings.
Carl von Clausewitz stated that " Everything in war is very simple but the simplest thing is difficult ".
Clausewitz stated that the purpose of war is to make the opponent comply with the will of the nation or state.
Clausewitz and military
German military history had previously been influenced by Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred von Schlieffen and von Moltke the Elder, who were proponents of maneuver, mass, and envelopment.
Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz (; July 1, 1780 – November 16, 1831 ) was a Prussian soldier and military theorist who stressed the moral ( in modern terms, " psychological ") and political aspects of war.
Clausewitz entered the Prussian military service at the age of twelve as a Lance-Corporal, eventually attaining the rank of Major-General.
Clausewitz was a professional soldier who was involved in numerous military campaigns, but he is famous primarily as a military theorist interested in the examination of war.
Soldiers before this time had written treatises on various military subjects, but none had undertaken a great philosophical examination of war on the scale of those written by Clausewitz and Leo Tolstoy, both of which were inspired by the events of the Napoleonic Era.
Clausewitz introduced systematic philosophical contemplation into Western military thinking, with powerful implications not only for historical and analytical writing but also for practical policy, military instruction, and operational planning.
Nonetheless, Clausewitz conceived of war as a political, social, and military phenomenon which might — depending on circumstances — involve the entire population of a nation at war.
In any case, Clausewitz saw military force as an instrument that states and other political actors use to pursue the ends of policy, in a dialectic between opposing wills, each with the aim of imposing his policies and will upon his enemy.
While Clausewitz was intensely aware of the value of intelligence at all levels, he was also very skeptical of the accuracy of much military intelligence: " Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory ; even more are false, and most are uncertain ....
All other forms of intrastate conflict, such as rebellion, are not accounted for because, in theoretical terms, Clausewitz could not account for warfare before the state ( However, near the end of his life, Clausewitz grew increasingly aware of the importance of non-state military actors.
Vom Kriege () is a book on war and military strategy by Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz ( 1780 – 1831 ), written mostly after the Napoleonic wars, between 1816 and 1830, and published posthumously by his wife in 1832.
Conversely, Clausewitz has also been seen as " The preeminent military and political strategist of limited war in modern times.
This military revolution was described and codified by Clausewitz.
In the 1832 treatise On War, Prussian military general and theoretician Carl von Clausewitz defined war as follows: " War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.
* November 16 – Carl von Clausewitz, German military strategist ( b. 1780 )
* June 1 – Carl von Clausewitz, Prussian military strategist ( d. 1831 )
The father of modern strategic study, Carl von Clausewitz, defined military strategy as " the employment of battles to gain the end of war.
Clausewitz and Jomini are required reading for today's military professional officer.
In his seminal book On War the Prussian Major-General and leading expert on modern military strategy Carl von Clausewitz defined military strategy as " the employment of battles to gain the end of war.
Hence, Clausewitz placed political aims above military goals, ensuring civilian control of the military.
Clausewitz and strategy
Yet, as a theoretician, his devotion to ground and caution led his contemporary, Carl von Clausewitz, to criticize his rigidity and adherence to geographic strategy.
Clausewitz dismissed " geometry " as an insignificant factor in strategy, believing instead in the Napoleonic concept of victory through battle and destruction of the opposing force, at any cost.
In contrast to Clausewitz, Antoine-Henri Jomini dealt mainly with operational strategy, planning and intelligence, the conduct of the campaign, and " generalship " rather than " statesmanship ".
In 1960, as Cold War tensions were near their peak following the Sputnik crisis and amidst talk of a widening " missile gap " between the U. S. and the Soviets, Kahn published On Thermonuclear War, the title of which clearly alluded to the classic 19th-century treatise on military strategy, On War, by German military strategist Carl von Clausewitz.
Military strategy books like The Art of War by Sun Tzu, On War by von Clausewitz, and The Little Red Book by Mao Zedong became business classics.
" From Von Clausewitz they learned the dynamic and unpredictable nature of military strategy.
Clausewitz felt that in a situation of chaos and confusion, strategy should be based on flexible principles.
Keegan was also criticized by peers, including Sir Michael Howard and Christopher Bassford for his critical position on Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian officer and author of Vom Kriege ( On War ), one of the basic texts on warfare and military strategy.
A disciple of Carl von Clausewitz, whose theory of war was more an effort to grasp its essential nature, rather than of Jomini, who expounded a system of rules, Moltke regarded strategy as a practical art of adapting means to ends, and had developed the methods of Napoleon in accordance with altered conditions of his age.
d. In the process of adapting Clausewitz ’ s theory to the unique circumstances of naval warfare, Corbett developed his own innovative theory of limited war in maritime strategy.
e. Like Clausewitz, Corbett shared a belief in the primacy of politics in war and in devising an appropriate strategy to protect the national interests.
Clausewitz also included in the essay general principles of strategy by saying that Warfare has three main objects:
Known as " the American Clausewitz ," he was an initial architect of nuclear deterrence strategy and tried to ascertain the role and value of nuclear weapons after their creation.
Clausewitz and may
Lynn Montross, writing on that topic in War Through the Ages ( 1960 ), said ; " This outcome ... may be explained by the fact that Jomini produced a system of war, Clausewitz a philosophy.
Clausewitz and be
This is badly dated ( based on the 1873 Graham translation ), severely abridged ( leaving out, for instance, Book Six on defense — which Clausewitz considered to be the stronger form of warfare ), and badly biased ( because of its Vietnam War era and the editor's hostility to " neo-Clausewitzian " Henry Kissinger ).
The breakthrough of sorts made by Clausewitz in suggesting eight principles on which such methods can be based, in Europe, for the first time presented an opportunity to largely remove the element of chance and error from command decision making process.
During the height of the battle, Kutuzov's subordinates were making all of the decisions for him ; according to Colonel Karl von Clausewitz, famous for his work On War, the Russian commander " seemed to be in a trance.
In this they were following their training in the Prussian military tradition of Carl von Clausewitz, who had argued that the focus of the offensive must be the enemy's " centre of gravity " ( Schwerpunkt ).
Clausewitz defined the ‘ order of battle ’ as “ that division and formation of the different arms into separate parts, or sections, of the whole Army, and that form of general position or disposition of those parts which is to be the norm throughout the whole campaign or war .”
Much of Vernichtungsgedanke can be seen in Clausewitz ’ classic treatise Vom Kriege ( On War ).
He had to judge whether the moment was favorable for starting a war of liberation ; and, whatever might be the enthusiasm of his junior staff-officers, Yorck had no illusions as to the safety of his own head, and negotiated with Clausewitz.
This is an important support measure for maneuver warfare to be most effective and was copied by von Clausewitz.
As wars cannot run themselves, and require politics and society to exist, Clausewitz held absolute war to be impossible, as it could not avoid these influences.
Clausewitz on the other hand argues that a commander has a foggy idea of what is going on anyway and that creating some sort of false appearance, particularly on a large scale, is costly and can only be acceptable from a cost-benefit-analysis point of view under special circumstances.
1.281 seconds.