Lynn Montross, writing on that topic in War Through the Ages ( 1960 ), said ; " This outcome ... may be explained by the fact that Jomini produced a system of war, Clausewitz a philosophy.

Clausewitz and his proponents have been severely criticized, perhaps quite unfairly, by competing theorists -- Antoine-Henri Jomini in the 19th century, B. H. Liddell Hart in the mid-20th century, and Martin van Creveld and John Keegan more recently.

The two most significant students of his work were Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian with a background in philosophy, and Antoine-Henri Jomini, who had been one of Napoleon's staff officers.

In contrast to Clausewitz, Antoine-Henri Jomini dealt mainly with operational strategy, planning and intelligence, the conduct of the campaign, and " generalship " rather than " statesmanship ".

A disciple of Carl von Clausewitz, whose theory of war was more an effort to grasp its essential nature, rather than of Jomini, who expounded a system of rules, Moltke regarded strategy as a practical art of adapting means to ends, and had developed the methods of Napoleon in accordance with altered conditions of his age.

Carl von Clausewitz, in his book Vom Kriege ( On War ) published in 1832, and Antoine Henri Jomini in his book, Precis de l ' Art de Guerre, published in 1838, developed theories of warfare based on the concepts and methods used during the Napoleonic Wars.

Drawing from the influences of Baron de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz, Corbett was instrumental in attempting to apply the existing theories of land warfare for war at sea.

For example, Corbett did not hesitate to take issue with Clausewitz, Jomini or other continental strategists on the importance of the search for the decisive battle and the principle of concentration.

Under Henderson he absorbed the principles, derived from Jomini, Clausewitz, and Edward Hamley ’ s Operations of War ( 1866 ), of concentration of physical and moral force and the destruction of the main enemy army.

To further understand concepts used by the German military in World War II, upon which maneuver warfare is largely based, Boyd studied Clausewitz, Jomini and the Napoleonic era.

Clausewitz, who disliked Jomini personally, as well as his concepts, instead emphasized the primacy of the political in warfare, and remained indifferent to theories arguing for any absolute solutions via the application of military force.

While Clausewitz was intensely aware of the value of intelligence at all levels, he was also very skeptical of the accuracy of much military intelligence: " Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory ; even more are false, and most are uncertain ....

All other forms of intrastate conflict, such as rebellion, are not accounted for because, in theoretical terms, Clausewitz could not account for warfare before the state ( However, near the end of his life, Clausewitz grew increasingly aware of the importance of non-state military actors.

Modern perception of war are based on the concepts Clausewitz put forth in On War, though these have been very diversely interpreted by various leaders ( e. g., Moltke, Vladimir Lenin, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mao Zedong, etc.

The official Bundeswehr traditions are based on three major lines: the military reformers at the beginning of the 19th century such as Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Clausewitz, the members of the military resistance against Hitler such as Claus von Stauffenberg and Henning von Tresckow and its own tradition since 1955.

In Tom Cruise: An Unauthorized Biography ( 2008 ), Andrew Morton described it as a " fraternal paramilitary organization ," and wrote that members are instructed to read The Art of War by warfare expert Sun Tzu, and On War by General Karl von Clausewitz.

Clausewitz's trilogies ( albeit used out of context ) are contested by Liddell Hart, who claims in Strategy that a poor choice of words by Clausewitz led his interpreters to overestimate the value of annihilation battles.

For example, the two books that are usually considered the most famous classics on warfare Sun Tzu's The Art of War and Clausewitz ' On War seem to have diametrically opposed views on the matter.

The book's significance is attested to by the fact that until the middle of 2008, it was included on the list of required reading for United States Army officers, and ( with Sun Tzu and Clausewitz ) the third non-American entry on the list.

Keegan was described as " profoundly mistaken " and Bassford stated that " Nothing anywhere in Keegan's work – despite his many diatribes about Clausewitz and ' the Clausewitzians ' – reflects any reading whatsoever of Clausewitz's own writings.

In the service of the Russian Empire, Clausewitz helped negotiate the Convention of Tauroggen ( 1812 ), which prepared the way for the coalition of Prussia, Russia, and the United Kingdom that ultimately defeated Napoleon and his allies.

Clausewitz introduced systematic philosophical contemplation into Western military thinking, with powerful implications not only for historical and analytical writing but also for practical policy, military instruction, and operational planning.

Clausewitz acknowledges that friction creates enormous difficulties for the realization of any plan, and the fog of war hinders commanders from knowing what is happening.

While previous wars were fought for social, religious, even cultural reasons, Clausewitz taught that war is merely " a continuation of politics by other means.

The " dualism " of Clausewitz's view of war ( i. e., that wars can vary a great deal between the two " poles " he proposed, based on the political objectives of the opposing sides and the context ) seems simple enough, but few commentators have proven willing to accept this crucial variability — they insist that Clausewitz " really " argued for one end of the scale or the other.

It has been blamed for the level of destruction involved in the First and Second World Wars, but it seems rather that Clausewitz ( who did not actually use the term " total war ") had merely foreseen the inevitable development that started with the huge, patriotically motivated armies of the Napoleonic wars.

On War is a work rooted solely in the world of the nation state, says historian Martin Van Creveld, who alleges that Clausewitz takes the state " almost for granted " as he rarely looks at anything previous to Westphalia.

He alleges that Clausewitz does not address any form of intra / supra-state conflict, such as rebellion and revolution, because he could not theoretically account for warfare before the existence of the state.

This is badly dated ( based on the 1873 Graham translation ), severely abridged ( leaving out, for instance, Book Six on defense — which Clausewitz considered to be the stronger form of warfare ), and badly biased ( because of its Vietnam War era and the editor's hostility to " neo-Clausewitzian " Henry Kissinger ).

Professor de la Paz names Carl von Clausewitz, Niccolò Machiavelli, Oskar Morgenstern, and Che Guevara as part of a long list of authors for revolutionaries to read.

The breakthrough of sorts made by Clausewitz in suggesting eight principles on which such methods can be based, in Europe, for the first time presented an opportunity to largely remove the element of chance and error from command decision making process.

During the height of the battle, Kutuzov's subordinates were making all of the decisions for him ; according to Colonel Karl von Clausewitz, famous for his work On War, the Russian commander " seemed to be in a trance.

Prussian general and military strategist Carl Phillip Gottlieb von Clausewitz also resided in Neuruppin for a few years.

Keegan was also criticized by peers, including Sir Michael Howard and Christopher Bassford for his critical position on Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian officer and author of Vom Kriege ( On War ), one of the basic texts on warfare and military strategy.

He had to judge whether the moment was favorable for starting a war of liberation ; and, whatever might be the enthusiasm of his junior staff-officers, Yorck had no illusions as to the safety of his own head, and negotiated with Clausewitz.

His works, however, were not translated into English for some time, hence the reputation of him held by professional military theorists in English-speaking countries has not reached the significance of Clausewitz, for example.

German military history had previously been influenced by Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred von Schlieffen and von Moltke the Elder, who were proponents of maneuver, mass, and envelopment.

Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz (; July 1, 1780 – November 16, 1831 ) was a Prussian soldier and military theorist who stressed the moral ( in modern terms, " psychological ") and political aspects of war.

Clausewitz entered the Prussian military service at the age of twelve as a Lance-Corporal, eventually attaining the rank of Major-General.

Clausewitz was a professional soldier who was involved in numerous military campaigns, but he is famous primarily as a military theorist interested in the examination of war.

Soldiers before this time had written treatises on various military subjects, but none had undertaken a great philosophical examination of war on the scale of those written by Clausewitz and Leo Tolstoy, both of which were inspired by the events of the Napoleonic Era.

Nonetheless, Clausewitz conceived of war as a political, social, and military phenomenon which might — depending on circumstances — involve the entire population of a nation at war.

In any case, Clausewitz saw military force as an instrument that states and other political actors use to pursue the ends of policy, in a dialectic between opposing wills, each with the aim of imposing his policies and will upon his enemy.

Vom Kriege () is a book on war and military strategy by Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz ( 1780 – 1831 ), written mostly after the Napoleonic wars, between 1816 and 1830, and published posthumously by his wife in 1832.

Conversely, Clausewitz has also been seen as " The preeminent military and political strategist of limited war in modern times.

This military revolution was described and codified by Clausewitz.

In the 1832 treatise On War, Prussian military general and theoretician Carl von Clausewitz defined war as follows: " War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.

* November 16 – Carl von Clausewitz, German military strategist ( b. 1780 )

* June 1 – Carl von Clausewitz, Prussian military strategist ( d. 1831 )

The father of modern strategic study, Carl von Clausewitz, defined military strategy as " the employment of battles to gain the end of war.

As Clausewitz stated, a successful military strategy may be a means to an end, but it is not an end in itself.

In his seminal book On War the Prussian Major-General and leading expert on modern military strategy Carl von Clausewitz defined military strategy as " the employment of battles to gain the end of war.

Hence, Clausewitz placed political aims above military goals, ensuring civilian control of the military.