* Mohanty, J. N., 1974, " Husserl and Frege: A New Look at Their Relationship ", Research in Phenomenology 4: 51-62.

Frege studied at a gymnasium in Wismar and graduated in 1869.

2 of which was published at his own expense ), Frege attempted to derive, by use of his symbolism, all of the laws of arithmetic from axioms he asserted as logical.

The group considered themselves logical positivists because they believed all knowledge is either derived through experience or arrived at through analytic statements, and they adopted the predicate logic of Frege, as well as the early work of Ludwig Wittgenstein ( 1889 – 1951 ) as foundations to their work.

The credit Frege tries to give to Hume is therefore probably not deserved, and Hume certainly would have rejected at least some of the consequences Frege draws from HP, in particular, the consequence that there are infinite sets.

Yes, says Frege, and on that account the concept is a horse is not a concept at all.

Schröder's influence on the early development of the predicate calculus, mainly by popularising C. S. Peirce's work on quantification, is at least as great as that of Frege or Peano.

He subsequently studied mathematical logic at the University of Jena under Gottlob Frege.

Notably he occurs in an influential 1977 paper by John Perry (' Frege on Demonstratives '), in which Perry asks us to imagine Lingens as an amnesiac in Main Library at Stanford who comes to read a complete biography of himself.

This modern Platonism ( sometimes rendered " platonism ," with a lower-case p, to distinguish it from the ancient schools ) has been endorsed in one way or another at one time or another by numerous philosophers ( most of whom taking a particular interest in the philosophy and foundations of logic and mathematics ), including Bernard Bolzano, Gottlob Frege, Edmund Husserl, Bertrand Russell, Alonzo Church, Kurt Gödel, W. V.

* Jean van Heijenoort editor 1967 From Frege to Gödel: A Source book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931, 3rd printing, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, ISBN 0-674-32449-8 ( pbk.

* Jean van Heijenoort ( 1967, 3rd printing 1976 ), From Frege to Godel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, ISBN 0-674-32449-8 ( pbk )

* Jean van Heijenoort, 1967, From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, ISBN 0-674-32449-8 ( pbk.

* Jean van Heijenoort 1967 From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic 1879-1931, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, ISBN 0-674-32449-8 ( pbk.

* Jean van Heijenoort, 1967, From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931, 3rd printing 1976, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, ISBN 0-674-32449-8.

* Jean van Heijenoort 1967, third printing 1976, From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, ISBN 0-674-32449-8 ( pbk.

In Jena Rudolf Hirzel lived in the same house as Gottlob Frege and it has been conjectured that his studies in ancient logic may have influenced him.

Russell and Alfred North Whitehead wrote their three-volume Principia Mathematica ( PM ) hoping to achieve what Frege had been unable to do.

The analysis of logical concepts and the machinery of formalization that is essential to Principia Mathematica ( 3 vols., 1910 – 1913 ) ( by Bertrand Russell, 1872 – 1970, and Alfred North Whitehead, 1861 – 1947 ), to Russell's theory of descriptions, to Kurt Gödel's ( 1906 – 1978 ) incompleteness theorems, and to Alfred Tarski's ( 1901 – 1983 ) theory of truth, is ultimately due to Frege.

Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead championed this theory fathered by Gottlob Frege.

However, today most students of logic are more familiar with the works of Frege, who actually published his work several years prior to Peirce but whose works remained in obscurity until Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead made them famous.

* 1848 – Gottlob Frege, German mathematician and logician ( d. 1925 )

The idea of second order predication was introduced by the German mathematician and philosopher Frege.

* November 8 – Gottlob Frege, German logician ( d. 1925 )

** Gottlob Frege, German mathematician and philosopher ( b. 1848 )

Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege (; 8 November 1848 – 26 July 1925 ) was a German mathematician, logician and philosopher.

Frege was born in 1848 in Wismar, in the state of Mecklenburg-Schwerin ( the modern German federal state Mecklenburg-Vorpommern ).

The German mathematician Gottlob Frege ( 1848 – 1925 ) presented an independent development of logic with quantifiers in his Begriffsschrift ( formula language ) published in 1879, a work generally considered as marking a turning point in the history of logic.

Sinn and bedeutung were introduced by German philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege in his 1892 paper " Über Sinn und Bedeutung " (" On sense and reference ").

What this article has called sense and reference are what Frege calls Sinn and Bedeutung, respectively, in the original German.

The German philosopher Gottlob Frege seems to have held a theory of this sort.

In the philosophy of language, the distinction between concept and object is attributable to the German philosopher Gottlob Frege.

Boolos was an authority on the 19th-century German mathematician and philosopher Gottlob Frege.

* November 8-Gottlob Frege ( died 1925 ), German mathematician.

19th-century British philosophy came increasingly to be dominated by strands of neo-Hegelian thought, and as a reaction against this, figures such as Bertrand Russell and George Edward Moore began moving the direction of analytic philosophy, which was essentially an updating of traditional empiricism to accommodate the new developments in logic of the German mathematician Gottlob Frege.

Begriffsschrift ( German for, roughly, " concept-script ") is a book on logic by Gottlob Frege, published in 1879, and the formal system set out in that book.

He teaches and writes on, among other things, Gottlob Frege, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, and German philosophy in the Nazi period.

* Sense and reference, an innovation of the German philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege

Gottlob Frege did explicitly axiomatize a theory in which the formalized version of naive set theory can be interpreted, and it is this formal theory which Bertrand Russell actually addressed when he presented his paradox.

However, the term naive set theory is also used in some literature to refer to the set theories studied by Frege and Cantor, rather than to the informal counterparts of modern axiomatic set theory ; care is required to tell which sense is intended.

Gottlob Frege, founder of the analytic tradition in philosophy, famously argued for the analysis of language in terms of sense and reference.

Since many commentators view the notion of sense as identical to the notion of concept, and Frege regards senses as the linguistic representations of states of affairs in the world, it seems to follow that we may understand concepts as the manner in which we grasp the world.

From Frege to Godel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879 – 1931.

Franz Brentano challenged this ; so also ( as is better known ) did Frege.

According to the direct-reference view, an early version of which was originally proposed by Bertrand Russell, and perhaps earlier by Gottlob Frege, a proper name strictly has no meaning when there is no object to which it refers.

It drew the adverse notice of Gottlob Frege, who criticized its psychologism.

In his professorial doctoral dissertation, On the Concept of Number ( 1886 ) and in his Philosophy of Arithmetic ( 1891 ), Husserl sought, by employing Brentano's descriptive psychology, to define the natural numbers in a way that advanced the methods and techniques of Karl Weierstrass, Richard Dedekind, Georg Cantor, Gottlob Frege, and other contemporary mathematicians.

Likewise, in his criticism of Frege in the Philosophy of Arithmetic, Husserl remarks on the distinction between the content and the extension of a concept.

Contrary to what Frege states, in Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic we already find two different kinds of representations: subjective and objective.

Husserl makes no mention of Frege as a decisive factor in this change.

In a letter dated May 24, 1891, Frege thanked Husserl for sending him a copy of the Philosophy of Arithmetic and Husserl's review of Ernst Schröder's Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik.

In the same letter, Frege used the review of Schröder's book to analyze Husserl's notion of the sense of reference of concept words.

Hence Frege recognized, as early as 1891, that Husserl distinguished between sense and reference.

Consequently, Frege and Husserl independently elaborated a theory of sense and reference before 1891.

Frege, however, did not conceive of objects as forming parts of senses: If a proper name denotes a non-existent object, it does not have a reference, hence concepts with no objects have no truth value in arguments.

According to Frege the reference of a sentence is a truth value ; for Husserl it is a " state of affairs.

" Frege's notion of " sense " is unrelated to Husserl's noema, while the latter's notions of " meaning " and " object " differ from those of Frege.

In fine, Husserl's conception of logic and mathematics differs from that of Frege, who held that arithmetic could be derived from logic.

Word and Object in Husserl, Frege, and Russell: The Roots of Twentieth-Century Philosophy.

Husserl and Frege.

Logical empiricism ( aka logical positivism or neopositivism ) was an early 20th century attempt to synthesize the essential ideas of British empiricism ( e. g. a strong emphasis on sensory experience as the basis for knowledge ) with certain insights from mathematical logic that had been developed by Gottlob Frege and Ludwig Wittgenstein.