* Robert Nozick suggests knowledge must consist of justified true belief that is " truth-tracking "— belief held in such a way that if it turned out to be false it would not have been held, and vice versa ;

Nozick suggests that there is no grounds for complaint.

According to Stephen Metcalf, Nozick expresses serious misgivings about capitalist libertarianism, going so far as to reject much of the foundations of the theory on the grounds that personal freedom can sometimes only be fully actualized via a collectivist politics and that wealth is at times justly redistributed via taxation to protect the freedom of the many from the potential tyranny of an overly selfish and powerful few.

: The simple subtraction rule does not perfectly disentangle what the next generation has managed itself to contribute-inheriting wealth may make it easier to amass more-but it is a serviceable rule of thumb " ( Nozick 1989: 30-31 ).

" Nozick suggested, as a critique of Rawls and utilitarianism, that the sacrosanctity of life made property rights non-negotiable, such that an individual's personal liberty made state policies of redistribution illegitimate.

Nozick thus challenged the partial conclusion of John Rawls's Second Principle of Justice of his A Theory of Justice, that " social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to be of greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society.

However, the rights that Nozick takes to be fundamental and the basis for regarding them to be such are different from the equal basic liberties included in justice as fairness and Rawls conjectures that they are thus not inalienable.

Moreover, they assert that what really matters for assigning ownership is whether or not property was acquired or exchanged legally ( see Robert Nozick ), which is known as the historical entitlement theory, whereas Marxists assert that there are no property rights in the means of production.

Thus, entitlement theory would imply " a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess under the distribution " ( Nozick 1974: 151 ).

Unfortunately, not everyone follows these rules: " some people steal from others, or defraud them, or enslave them, seizing their product and preventing them from living as they choose, or forcibly exclude others from competing in exchanges " ( Nozick 1974: 152 ).

Right-libertarians like Robert Nozick, holding that self-ownership and property acquisition need not meet egalitarian standards and that they must merely avoid worsening the situation of others, have rejected left-libertarianism of the Steiner-Vallentyne school.

" Nozick cites Patterns of Discovery from pp. 119 – 120, quoting " Though the X ( color, heat, and so on ) of an object can be explained in terms of its being composed of parts of certain X-quality ( colors in certain array, average heat of parts, and so on ), the whole realm of X cannot be explained or understood in this manner.

Nozick appealed to the Kantian idea that people should be treated as ends ( what he termed ' separateness of persons '), not merely as a means to some other end.

Nozick, in Philosophical Explanations, advocated that, when considering the Gettier problem, the least counter-intuitive assumption we give up should be epistemic closure.

Nor does Nozick provide any means or theory whereby abuses of appropriation — acquisition of property when there is not enough and as good in common for others — should be corrected.

# Therefore Nozick, on his own grounds, should become an anarchist and then wait for the Nozickian invisible hand to operate afterward ; and

Due to certain counterexamples that could otherwise be raised against these counterfactual conditions, Nozick specified that:

Nozick says no, then asks whether we have reasons not to plug into the machine and concludes that since it does not seem to be rational to plug in, ethical hedonism must be false.

Robert Nozick suggested a clarification of " justification " which he believed eliminates the problem: the justification has to be such that were the justification false, the knowledge would be false.

In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick argues that, while the original position may be the just starting point, any inequalities derived from that distribution by means of free exchange are equally just, and that any re-distributive tax is an infringement on people's liberty.

Robert Nozick made the point that what happens in society can not always be reduced to competitions for a coveted position ; in 1974, Nozick wrote that " life is not a race in which we all compete for a prize which someone has established " and that there is " no unified race " and there is not some one person " judging swiftness.

" When a state takes on more responsibilities than these, Nozick argues, rights will be violated.

Thus Nozick argues that what the Wilt Chamberlain example shows is that no patterned principle of just distribution will be compatible with liberty.

What, Nozick asks, is the difference between seizing the second man's leisure ( which would be forced labor ) and seizing the first man's goods?

" Perhaps there is no difference in principle ," Nozick concludes, and notes that the argument could be extended to taxation on other sources besides labor.

Nozick attacks John Rawls's Difference Principle on the ground that the well-off could threaten a lack of social cooperation to the worse-off, just as Rawls implies that the worse-off will be assisted by the well-off for the sake of social cooperation.

Nozick asks why the well-off would be obliged, due to their inequality and for the sake of social cooperation, to assist the worse-off and not have the worse-off accept the inequality and benefit the well-off.

Furthermore, Rawls's idea regarding morally arbitrary natural endowments comes under fire ; Nozick argues that natural advantages that the well-off enjoy do not violate anyone's rights and therefore have a right to them, on top of which is the fact that Rawls's own proposal that inequalities be geared toward assisting the worse-off is in itself morally arbitrary.

Nozick believed the counterfactual conditionals bring out an important aspect of our intuitive grasp of knowledge: For any given fact, the believer's method must reliably track the truth despite varying relevant conditions.

Nozick asked us to imagine that " superduper neuropsychologists " have figured out a way to stimulate a person's brain to induce pleasurable experiences.

Nozick argued that a minimalist state of property rights and basic law enforcement would develop out of a state of nature without violating anyone's rights or using force.

Anarchy, State, and Utopia came out of a semester-long course that Nozick taught with Michael Walzer at Harvard in 1971, called Capitalism and Socialism.

Nozick believed that the third subjunctive condition served to address cases of the sort described by Gettier.

Nozick further claims this condition addresses a case of the sort described by D. M. Armstrong: A father believes his son innocent of committing a particular crime, both because of faith in his son and ( now ) because he has seen presented in the courtroom a conclusive demonstration of his son's innocence.

Classical liberalism was revived in the 20th century by Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, and further developed by Milton Friedman, Robert Nozick, Loren Lomasky, and Jan Narveson.

* Robert Nozick: Criticized Rawls, and argued for libertarianism, by appeal to a hypothetical history of the state and of property.

However, it was first analyzed and was published in a philosophy paper spread to the philosophical community by Robert Nozick in 1969, and appeared in Martin Gardner's Scientific American column in 1974.

However, the original discussion by Nozick says only that the Predictor's predictions are " almost certainly " correct, and also specifies that " what you actually decide to do is not part of the explanation of why he made the prediction he made ".

An anarcho-capitalist and contractarian, Narveson's form of libertarian anarchism is deeply influenced by the thought of Robert Nozick and David Gauthier.

* An interview with Jan Narveson about the philosophy of Robert Nozick by Peter Jaworski

He states that one of the best attempts to clarify this position is given by Robert Nozick:

Fred Dretske ( 1971 ) developed an account of knowledge which he called " conclusive reasons ", revived by Robert Nozick as what he called the subjunctive or truth-tracking account ( 1981 ).

This for a long time has been the most prevalent defense of toleration by liberals ... It is found, for example, in the writings of American philosophers John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, Brian Barry, and a Canadian, Will Kymlicka, among others.

An argument similar to D ' Souza's was raised by Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, who wrote that the only way to achieve equality of opportunity was " directly worsening the situations of those more favored with opportunity, or by improving the situation of those less well-favored.

That some people's " natural assets " were unearned is irrelevant to the equation, according to Nozick, and he argued that people are nevertheless entitled to enjoy these assets and other things freely given by others.

"</ ref > Although compatibilism, the view that determinism and free will are not logically incompatible, is the most popular position on free will amongst professional philosophers, metaphysical libertarianism is discussed, though not necessarily endorsed, by several philosophers, such as Peter van Inwagen, Robert Kane, Robert Nozick, Carl Ginet, Hugh McCann, Harry Frankfurt, Alfred Mele, Roderick Chisholm, Daniel Dennett, Timothy O ' Connor, Derk Pereboom and Galen Strawson.

The lifelong process of self-definition in this broader sense is construed indeterministically by Nozick.

A well-known critique of free-market anarchism is by Robert Nozick, who argued that a competitive legal system would evolve toward a monopoly government – even without violating individuals rights in the process.

Despite these comments, Marx has been criticised strongly for adding the " socially necessary " qualification to labour time by the libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia, for whom it is an unjustified ' bolt-on ' aspect of Marx's theory.

Anarchy, State, and Utopia is a 1974 book by the American political philosopher Robert Nozick.

In opposition to A Theory of Justice by John Rawls, and in debate with Michael Walzer, Nozick argues in favor of a minimal state, " limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on.

Nozick arrives at the night-watchman state of classical liberalism theory by showing that there are non-redistributive reasons for the apparently redistributive procedure of making its clients pay for the protection of others.

Nozick supports the side-constraint view against classical utilitarianism and the idea that only felt experience matters by introducing the famous Experience Machine thought experiment.