Husserl describes here the cultural crisis gripping Europe, then approaches a philosophy of history, discussing Galileo, Descartes, several British philosophers, and Kant.

Merleau-Ponty and others question whether Husserl here does not undercut his own position, in that Husserl had attacked in principle historicism, while specifically designing his phenomenology to be rigorous enough to transcend the limits of history.

Au contraire, Husserl may be indicating here that historical traditions are merely features given to the pure ego's intuition, like any other.

Edmund Husserl, the philosopher and known as the father of phenomenology, taught here.

The metaphysical problem of establishing the material reality of what we perceive was of little interest to Husserl in spite of his being a transcendental idealist.

Ingarden, however, did not accept the later transcendental idealism of Husserl which he thought would lead to relativism.

Schutz sought to provide a critical philosophical foundation for Max Weber's interpretive sociology through the use of phenomenological methods derived from the transcendental phenomenological investigations of Edmund Husserl.

: For Husserl, the phenomenological reduction is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things and persons back to the transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic experiences, in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness.

* Edmund Husserl ( 1859 – 1938 ) established phenomenology at first as a kind of " descriptive psychology " and later as a transcendental and eidetic science of consciousness.

Phenomenology began at the start of the 20th century with the descriptive psychology of Franz Brentano ( 1838 – 1917 ), and then the transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl ( 1859 – 1938 ).

* Phenomenologists tend to debate whether or not what Husserl calls the transcendental phenomenological epochê and reduction is useful or even possible.

Natorp had a decisive influence on the history of phenomenology and is often credited with leading Edmund Husserl to adopt the vocabulary of transcendental idealism.

In the summer of 1929 Husserl had studied carefully selected writings of Heidegger, coming to the conclusion that on several of their key positions they differed, e. g., Heidegger substituted Dasein for the pure ego, thus transforming phenomenology into an anthropology, a specie of psychologism strongly disfavored by Husserl.

While for Husserl we would have to abstract from all concrete determinations of our empirical ego, to be able to turn to the field of pure consciousness, Heidegger claims that " the possibilities and destinies of philosophy are bound up with man's existence, and thus with temporality and with historicality.

And so Sartre parted company with Husserl over the latter's belief in a transcendent ego, which Sartre believed instead was neither formally nor materially in consciousness, but outside it: in the world.

Husserl proposed that the world of objects and ways in which we direct ourselves toward and perceive those objects is normally conceived of in what he called the " natural standpoint ", which is characterized by a belief that objects materially exist and exhibit properties that we see as emanating from them.

Although Scheler later criticised Husserl's idealistic logical approach and proposed instead a " phenomenology of love ", he states that he remained " deeply indebted " to Husserl throughout his work.

* Mohanty, J. N., 1974, " Husserl and Frege: A New Look at Their Relationship ", Research in Phenomenology 4: 51-62.

The slogan of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl is " all consciousness is consciousness of something ", which implies a distinction between " acts of thought " ( the noesis ) and " intentional objects of thought " ( the noema ).

Edmund Husserl, in the first volume of his Logical Investigations, called " The Prolegomena of Pure Logic ", criticized psychologism thoroughly and sought to distance himself from it.

The " object " of such an analysis is the meaningful lived world of everyday life: the " Lebenswelt ", or Life-world ( Husserl: 1889 ).

( E. Husserl, " Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy ", paragraphs 3 and 4 ).

Descombes has also written an introduction to modern French philosophy ( Le même et l ' autre ) focused on the transition, after 1960, from a focus on the three H's, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger to the " three masters of suspicion ", Marx, Nietzsche and Freud.

* Andersen, Holly, and Rick Grush, " A brief history of time-consciousness: historical precursors to James and Husserl ", To appear in the Journal of the History of Philosophy.

* REVUE DE L ' ENSEIGNEMENT PHILOSOPHIQUE ," La dernière œuvre de Husserl: la Krisis ", N ° 6 de la 32è année, Août-septembre 1982.

Edmund Husserl, in the first volume of his Logical Investigations, called " The Prolegomena of Pure Logic ", criticized psychologism thoroughly and sought to distance himself from it.

In it, Husserl for the first time attempts a historical overview of the development of Western philosophy and science, emphasizing the challenges presented by their increasingly ( one-sidedly ) empirical and naturalistic orientation.

Husserl, of course, had died several years earlier.

Heidegger's work built on, and responded to, the earlier explorations of phenomenology by another Weimar era philosopher, Edmund Husserl.

One of these was the new and increasingly fashionable movement of Structuralism, which was being widely favoured as the successor to the Phenomenology approach, started by Husserl sixty years earlier.

After about 1928 Weyl had apparently decided that mathematical intuitionism was not compatible with his enthusiasm for the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl, as he had apparently earlier thought.

In the introduction, Sartre sketches his own theory of consciousness, being, and phenomena through criticism of both earlier phenomenologists ( most notably Husserl and Heidegger ) as well as idealists, rationalists, and empiricists.

This usage arose and was dealt with by philosophers such as Edmund Husserl or, even earlier, by Hegel, and it seems to suggest that this body itself is precisely that which is doing the cognition of itself qua body, through self-consciousness.

However, the concept of holism also played a pivotal role in Spinoza's philosophy and more recently in that of Hegel and Husserl.

Also in Ideen Husserl explicitly elaborates the eidetic and phenomenological reductions.

From the Ideen onward, Husserl concentrated on the ideal, essential structures of consciousness.

His overall approach in physics was based on the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl, specifically Husserl's 1913 Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie.

In 1912 at Freiburg the journal Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung was founded by Husserl and his school, which published articles of their phenomenological movement from 1913 to 1930.

In 1913 Karl Jaspers visited Husserl at Göttingen.

Scheler, who was at Göttingen when Husserl taught there, was one of the original few editors of the journal Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung ( 1913 ).

In the war-time 1941 edition of Heidegger's primary work, Being and Time ( first published in 1927 ), the original dedication to Husserl was removed.

Some years after the 1900-1901 publication of his main work, the Logische Untersuchungen ( Logical Investigations ), Husserl made some key conceptual elaborations which led him to assert that in order to study the structure of consciousness, one would have to distinguish between the act of consciousness and the phenomena at which it is directed ( the objects as intended ).

From Logical Investigations ( 1900 / 1901 ) to Experience and Judgment ( published in 1939 ), Husserl expressed clearly the difference between meaning and object.

According to Husserl, this view of logic and mathematics accounted for the objectivity of a series of mathematical developments of his time, such as n-dimensional manifolds ( both Euclidean and non-Euclidean ), Hermann Grassmann's theory of extensions, William Rowan Hamilton's Hamiltonians, Sophus Lie's theory of transformation groups, and Cantor's set theory.

In his professorial doctoral dissertation, On the Concept of Number ( 1886 ) and in his Philosophy of Arithmetic ( 1891 ), Husserl sought, by employing Brentano's descriptive psychology, to define the natural numbers in a way that advanced the methods and techniques of Karl Weierstrass, Richard Dedekind, Georg Cantor, Gottlob Frege, and other contemporary mathematicians.

This is particularly the case when one attends to the phenomena of the body ( which is at once body-subject and body-object ), subjective time ( the consciousness of time is neither an act of consciousness nor an object of thought ) and the other ( the first considerations of the other in Husserl led to solipsism ).

Although studying an array of subjects at the school, Foucault's particular interest was soon drawn to philosophy, reading not only the works of Hegel and Marx that he had been exposed to by Hyppolite but also studying the writings of the philosophers Immanuel Kant ( 1724 – 1804 ), Edmund Husserl ( 1859 – 1938 ) and most significantly, Martin Heidegger ( 1889 – 1976 ).

Husserl ), he also brackets out issues of meaning.

The phenomenological tie-in with the sociology of knowledge stems from two key historical sources for Mannheim's analysis: Mannheim was dependent on insights derived from Husserl's phenomenological investigations, especially the theory of meaning as found in Husserl's Logical Investigations of 1900 / 1901 ( Husserl: 2000 ), in the formulation of his central methodological work: " On The Interpretation of Weltanschauung " ( Mannheim: 1993: see fn41 & fn43 )-this essay forms the centerpiece for Mannheim's method of historical understanding and is central to his conception of the sociology of knowledge as a research program ; and The concept of " Weltanschauung " employed by Mannheim has its origins in the hermeneutic philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey, who relied on Husserl's theory of meaning ( above ) for his methodological specification of the interpretive act ( Mannheim: 1993: see fn38 ).

* Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology ( 1954 ), Northwestern UP.

Husserl countered that consciousness is not “ in ” the mind but rather conscious of something other than itself ( the intentional object ), whether the object is a substance or a figment of imagination ( i. e., the real processes associated with and underlying the figment ).

Whereas Husserl conceived humans as having been constituted by states of consciousness, Heidegger countered that consciousness is peripheral to the primacy of one ’ s existence ( i. e., the mode of being of Dasein ), which cannot be reduced to one ’ s consciousness of it.

* Carl Stumpf ( 1848 – 1936 ), student of Brentano and mentor to Husserl, used " phenomenology " to refer to an ontology of sensory contents.

* Herman Van Breda ( 1911 – 1974 ), founder of the Husserl Archives.

However, two of his most famous students ( Alexius Meinong and Edmund Husserl ), ultimately moved radically beyond his theories.

* Edmund Husserl ( Vienna, 1884 – 1886 ), founded the phenomenological movement, influencing:

Instead, as in the case of, Studies in Ethnomethodology ( 1967 ), we are given oblique theoretical references to: Wittgenstein Language Philosophy ; Husserl Phenomenology ; Gurwitsch Theory ; the works of the social phenomeonologist Alfred Schutz of the Natural Attitude ; and an assortment of traditional social theorists generally appearing as antipodes and / or sounding boards for ethnomethodological ideas.

Brown ( 2006: p. 19 ) charts the lineage of philosophers, namely Nietzsche ( 1844 – 1900 ), Husserl ( 1859 – 1938 ), Heidegger ( 1889 – 1976 ), Sartre ( 1905 – 1980 ), Merleau-Ponty ( 1908 – 1961 ), and Levinas ( 1906 — 1995 ) who challenged the entrenched Cartesian dualism of a hard split between " body " and " mind " and hence, embraced different views of nondual ' bodymind ' or body-mind continuum thus:

From 1910 to 1911, Scheler briefly lectured at the Philosophical Society of Göttingen, where he made and renewed acquaintances with Theodore Conrad, Hedwig Conrad-Martius ( an ontologist and Conrad's wife ), Moritz Geiger, Jean Hering, Roman Ingarden, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Husserl, Alexandre Koyré, and Adolf Reinach.