" As mentioned above in section on Derrida's deconstruction of Husserl Derrida actually argues for the contamination of pure origins by the structures of language and temporality and Manfred Frank has even referred to Derrida's work as " Neostructuralism " and this seems to capture Derrida's novel concern for how texts are structured.

Husserl criticized the logicians of his day for not focusing on the relation between subjective processes that give us objective knowledge of pure logic.

Husserl stated that logic has three strata, each further away from consciousness and psychology than those that precede it.

* The second stratum would be called by Husserl " logic of consequence " or the " logic of non-contradiction " which explores all possible forms of true judgments.

Husserl also talked about what he called " logic of truth " which consists of the formal laws of possible truth and its modalities, and precedes the third logical third stratum.

According to Husserl, this view of logic and mathematics accounted for the objectivity of a series of mathematical developments of his time, such as n-dimensional manifolds ( both Euclidean and non-Euclidean ), Hermann Grassmann's theory of extensions, William Rowan Hamilton's Hamiltonians, Sophus Lie's theory of transformation groups, and Cantor's set theory.

Later, in the first volume of his Logical Investigations, the Prolegomena of Pure Logic, Husserl, while attacking the psychologistic point of view in logic and mathematics, also appears to reject much of his early work, although the forms of psychologism analysed and refuted in the Prolegomena did not apply directly to his Philosophy of Arithmetic.

For Husserl this is not the case: mathematics ( with the exception of geometry ) is the ontological correlate of logic, and while both fields are related, neither one is strictly reducible to the other.

Reacting against authors such as J. S. Mill, Sigwart and his own former teacher Brentano, Husserl criticised their psychologism in mathematics and logic, i. e. their conception of these abstract and a-priori sciences as having an essentially empirical foundation and a prescriptive or descriptive nature.

Husserl pointed out that the failure of anti-psychologists to defeat psychologism was a result of being unable to distinguish between the foundational, theoretical side of logic, and the applied, practical side.

Hermann Weyl's interest in intuitionistic logic and impredicativity appears to have resulted from his reading of Husserl.

Rudolf Carnap was also influenced by Husserl, not only concerning Husserl's notion of essential insight that Carnap used in his Der Raum, but also his notion of " formation rules " and " transformation rules " is founded on Husserl's philosophy of logic.

It was greatly influenced by the writings of Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche in the 19th century and other early-to-mid 20th-century philosophers, including phenomenologists Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, structuralist Roland Barthes, and the language / logic philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Husserl establishes a separate field for research in logic, philosophy, and phenomenology, independently from the empirical sciences.

Hence he and many of his pupils ( in particular Carl Stumpf and Edmund Husserl ) thought that the natural sciences could only yield hypotheses and never universal, absolute truths as in pure logic or mathematics.

" Scheler never agreed with Husserl that phenomenology is a method in the strict sense, but rather " an attitude of spiritual seeing ... something which otherwise remains hidden ...." Calling phenomenology a method fails to take seriously the phenomenological domain of original experience: the givenness of phenomenological facts ( essences or values as a priori ) " before they have been fixed by logic ," and prior to assuming a set of criteria or symbols, as is the case in the empirical and human sciences as well as other ( modern ) philosophies which tailor their methods to those of the sciences.

His publications in philosophy are concerned primarily with epistemology, the philosophy of mind and of logic, and with the philosophy of Edmund Husserl.

In philosophical logic, Martin-Löf has wrestled with the philosophy of logical consequence and judgment, partly inspired by the work of Brentano, Frege, and Husserl.

This modern Platonism ( sometimes rendered " platonism ," with a lower-case p, to distinguish it from the ancient schools ) has been endorsed in one way or another at one time or another by numerous philosophers ( most of whom taking a particular interest in the philosophy and foundations of logic and mathematics ), including Bernard Bolzano, Gottlob Frege, Edmund Husserl, Bertrand Russell, Alonzo Church, Kurt Gödel, W. V.

Husserl was so impressed by Brentano that he decided to dedicate his life to philosophy ; indeed, Franz Brentano is often credited as being his most important influence, e. g., with regard to intentionality.

Later Husserl lectured at Prague in 1935 and Vienna in 1936, which resulted in a very differently styled work that while innovative is no less problematic: Die Krisis ( Belgrade 1936 ).

In post-war editions of Sein und Zeit the dedication to Husserl is restored.

Another important element that Husserl took over from Brentano is intentionality, the notion that the main characteristic of consciousness is that it is always intentional.

Some years after the 1900-1901 publication of his main work, the Logische Untersuchungen ( Logical Investigations ), Husserl made some key conceptual elaborations which led him to assert that in order to study the structure of consciousness, one would have to distinguish between the act of consciousness and the phenomena at which it is directed ( the objects as intended ).

Husserl proposed that the world of objects and ways in which we direct ourselves toward and perceive those objects is normally conceived of in what he called the " natural standpoint ", which is characterized by a belief that objects materially exist and exhibit properties that we see as emanating from them.

Husserl proposed a radical new phenomenological way of looking at objects by examining how we, in our many ways of being intentionally directed toward them, actually " constitute " them ( to be distinguished from materially creating objects or objects merely being figments of the imagination ); in the Phenomenological standpoint, the object ceases to be something simply " external " and ceases to be seen as providing indicators about what it is, and becomes a grouping of perceptual and functional aspects that imply one another under the idea of a particular object or " type ".

* The first stratum is what Husserl called a " morphology of meanings " concerning a priori ways to relate judgments to make them meaningful.

For example, the review falsely accuses Husserl of subjectivizing everything, so that no objectivity is possible, and falsely attributes to him a notion of abstraction whereby objects disappear until we are left with numbers as mere ghosts.

According to Frege the reference of a sentence is a truth value ; for Husserl it is a " state of affairs.

Husserl states that this effort made by psychologists is a " metábasis eis állo génos " ( Gr. " a transgression to another field ").

David Carr of Yale University commented in 1970 on Husserl's following: " It is well known that Husserl was always disappointed at the tendency of his students to go their own way, to embark upon fundamental revisions of phenomenology rather than engage in the communal task " as originally intended by the radical new science.

Martin Heidegger is the best known of Husserl's students, the one whom Husserl chose as his successor at Freiburg.

Academic discussion of Husserl and Heidegger is extensive.

is: Edmund Husserl

The concept is also present in the work of Max Weber, Gilles Deleuze, and Edmund Husserl.

Instead, as in the case of, Studies in Ethnomethodology ( 1967 ), we are given oblique theoretical references to: Wittgenstein Language Philosophy ; Husserl Phenomenology ; Gurwitsch Theory ; the works of the social phenomeonologist Alfred Schutz of the Natural Attitude ; and an assortment of traditional social theorists generally appearing as antipodes and / or sounding boards for ethnomethodological ideas.

Husserl countered that consciousness is not “ in ” the mind but rather conscious of something other than itself ( the intentional object ), whether the object is a substance or a figment of imagination ( i. e., the real processes associated with and underlying the figment ).

Whereas Husserl conceived humans as having been constituted by states of consciousness, Heidegger countered that consciousness is peripheral to the primacy of one ’ s existence ( i. e., the mode of being of Dasein ), which cannot be reduced to one ’ s consciousness of it.

When subjectivity or life are in question, they are never grasped in their purity ; they are systematically reduced to biological life, to their external relation with the world, or as in Husserl to an intentionality, i. e. an orientation of consciousness towards an object outside it.

* Nader El-Bizri, " Avicenna's De Anima between Aristotle and Husserl ," in The Passions of the Soul in the Metamorphosis of Becoming, ed.

Edmund Husserl ( 1962, 2000 ) wrote extensively about categorial systems as part of his phenomenology.

* Edmund Husserl, 1962.

This approach was first proposed by the philosopher Edmund Husserl, and later elaborated by other philosophers and scientists.

Influenced by the views of Brentano's pupil Alexius Meinong, and by Edmund Husserl, Germanophone and Francophone philosophy took a different direction regarding the question of existence.

Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (; April 8, 1859, Proßnitz, Moravia, Austrian Empire – April 26, 1938, Freiburg, Germany ) was a philosopher and mathematician and the founder of the 20th century philosophical school of phenomenology.

Although born into a Jewish family, Husserl was baptized as a Lutheran in 1886.

Husserl himself taught philosophy as a Privatdozent at Halle from 1887, then as professor, first at Göttingen from 1901, then at Freiburg from 1916 until he retired in 1928.

Husserl was born in 1859 in Prostějov (), a town in the Bohemian province of Moravia, that was then in the Austrian Empire, after 1918 in Czechoslovakia, and since 1993 in the Czech Republic.

At the University of Leipzig from 1876 to 1878, Husserl studied mathematics, physics, and astronomy.

There Husserl also attended Friedrich Paulsen's philosophy lectures.

Although a steadfast proponent of a radical and rational autonomy in all things, Husserl could also speak " about his vocation and even about his mission under God's will to find new ways for philosophy and science ," observes Spiegelberg.

Yet already Husserl had felt the desire to pursue philosophy.

Then professor Weierstrass became very ill. Husserl became free to return to Vienna where, after serving a short military duty, he devoted his attention to philosophy.

Following academic advice, two years later in 1886 Husserl followed Carl Stumpf, a former student of Brentano, to the University of Halle, seeking to obtain his Habilitation which would qualify him to teach at the university level.

Following his marriage Husserl began his long teaching career in philosophy.

In 1901 Husserl with his family moved to the Georg-August University of Göttingen where he taught as extraordinarius professor.

This work was well received and became the subject of a seminar given by Wilhelm Dilthey ; Husserl in 1905 traveled to Berlin to visit Dilthey.

During this period Husserl had delivered lectures on internal time consciousness, which several decades later his former student Heidegger edited for publication.

In 1912 at Freiburg the journal Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung was founded by Husserl and his school, which published articles of their phenomenological movement from 1913 to 1930.

Also in Ideen Husserl explicitly elaborates the eidetic and phenomenological reductions.